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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND COMMUNITY IN KIERKEGAARD’S
THOUGHT
Kierkegaard is generally regarded as a quintessential individualist who leaves no room
for social or political engagement. This interpretation is the dominant lens through which
many scholars view Kierkegaard, and it also shapes the way Kierkegaard’s thought has
been received by his followers and critics. Many recent works have significantly
challenged the traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, but they have not examined the
topic systematically. In order to remedy this deficit, this study provides a holistic account
of Kierkegaard’s social thought. First, it challenges the dominant view that society as
represented by the crowd is simply a foil for Kierkegaard’s individual by: (a) articulating
a general approach for understanding how Kierkegaard’s negative comments about
society and community do not constitute a rejection of sociality as such, and (b)
demonstrating that Kierkegaard’s well-developed ideas on faith and religiosity are
compatible with an account that emphasizes a broader social dimension in his thought.
Second, I present a framework that outlines a positive theory of community, a ‘Dialectic
of Community,’ which explains the importance of the Kierkegaardian single individual in
the formation and development of community. This framework provides an interpretation
of the social period of Kierkegaard’s authorship and its importance for the entirely of the
authorship. Even though the interpretation is helpful for understanding Kierkegaard and
his relationship to 19th and 20th century European moral, social, and political thought,
Kierkegaard never explicitly describes how his conception of the self is consistent with
his social thought. I address this problem by developing a narrative model of selfhood
that illustrates the importance of subjectivity and the single individual for an adequate
account of intersubjective selfhood. More specifically, I argue that narratives are
important intersubjectively for becoming a person and a moral agent, but the concept of
self is not exhausted in narrative. That is, having a self-narrative presupposes that the
person is a subject who has a set of principles that organize one’s experiences and
activities. This framework not only shows how Kierkegaard’s concept of subjectivity can
be understood in a social context, but it also addresses a significant problem in narrative
identity theory.

KEY WORDS: Søren Kierkegaard, G.W.F. Hegel, Community, Narrative Identity
Theory, 19th Century Denmark.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Kierkegaard is generally regarded as a quintessential individualist who leaves no
room for social or political engagement. This interpretation is the dominant lens through
which most scholars view Kierkegaard, and it also shapes the way Kierkegaard’s thought
has been received by his followers and critics. This general characterization of
Kierkegaard has come under fire in recent years from a variety of angles. First, there have
been a number of works that have considered the social aspect of Kierkegaard’s project;
this work is primarily focused on Kierkegaard’s texts and it shows that, at least in
particular works, Kierkegaard is not an apologist for the asocial, apolitical, atomistic
individual.1 Second, some recent scholars, notably Martin J. Matuštík and Jürgen
Habermas, have moved beyond merely interpreting Kierkegaard’s work, and they have
developed some of the concepts in Kierkegaard’s writings which can contribute, directly
and indirectly, to contemporary discourses within social philosophy.2 Third, in Bruce
Kirmmse’s Golden Age of Denmark and Jon Stewart’s Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel
Reconsidered, Kierkegaard is presented in his immediate historical context, and

1

All of the following books focus on the importance of human relationships and community in
Kierkegaard. M. Jamie Ferreira, Love's Grateful Striving (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001);
George Connell and C. Stephen Evans (ed.), Foundations of Kierkegaard's Vision of Community: Religion,
Ethics, and Politics in Kierkegaard (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1992); George Pattison and
Steven Shakespeare (ed.), Kierkegaard: The Self in Society (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). Ferreira’s
work reveals the ethical dimension of Kierkegaard’s thought in Works of Love, while the latter two works
are a compilation of essays that address a variety of topics related to Kierkegaard and social and political
issues.
2

Martin J. Matuštík, Postnational Identity: Critical Theory and Existential Philosophy in Habermas,
Kierkegaard, and Havel. (New York & London: the Guilford Press, 1993); Jürgen Habermas, The Future
of Human Nature (Oxford & Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003); and Jürgen Habermas, “Individuation
through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s Theory of Subjectivity,” Postmetaphysical Thinking
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992) pp. 164-170.

1

Kierkegaard’s awareness of and response to the social issues of his day is evident even
though these works do not explicitly deal with the social dimension of his thought.3
Each of these approaches has significantly challenged the traditional
interpretation of Kierkegaard, but they have not examined the topic systematically and
they have failed to develop a Kierkegaardian understanding of community. In order to
remedy this deficit, this study will provide a holistic account of Kierkegaard’s social
thought. First, it will challenge the dominant view that society as represented by the
crowd is simply a foil for Kierkegaard’s individual by: (a) articulating a general approach
for understanding how Kierkegaard’s negative comments about society and community
can be understood as a ‘corrective’ that does not constitute a rejection of sociality as
such, and (b) demonstrating, in particular, that Kierkegaard’s well-developed ideas on
faith and religiosity are compatible with an account that emphasizes a broader social
dimension in his thought.
Second, I will present a framework that outlines a positive theory of community, a
‘Dialectic of Community,’ which will explain the importance of the Kierkegaardian
single individual in the formation and development of community. This framework will
provide an interpretation of the social period of Kierkegaard’s authorship and its
importance for the entirely of the authorship. Even though the interpretation is plausible
and helpful for understanding Kierkegaard and his relationship to 19th and 20th century
European moral, social, and political thought, Kierkegaard never explicitly or clearly
describes how his conception of the self is consistent with his social thought. I address
this problem by developing a Kierkegaardian narrative model of selfhood that will
3

Bruce Kirmmse, Golden Age of Denmark (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). Jon Stewart,
Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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illustrate the importance of subjectivity and the single individual for an adequate account
of intersubjective selfhood.
In order to understand why this study is needed, I will describe and examine how
Kierkegaard’s contemporaries and those figures he influenced throughout much of the
20th century treated Kierkegaard’s social thought. I will suggest that there are important
cultural and historical reasons for their negative portrayal and these reasons explain the
reactions of his immediate contemporaries and the reception of his thought throughout
Europe in the early 20th century. Then, I will provide a short summary of the structure of
this project and a brief description of the contents of each chapter, which will ultimately
provide an indication of the implications and contributions of this project for Kierkegaard
studies, 19th and 20th century European social philosophy, and narrative identity theory.
The Traditional View of Kierkegaard’s Social Thought
The traditional view of Kierkegaard’s thought is that he rejects any possibility of
a genuine social philosophy. Kierkegaard is thought of as simply a champion of the
single individual. This view is not altogether inaccurate as it relies on a number of ideas
and positions that Kierkegaard explicitly develops, which I will discuss and address in
chapter two, but it is also conditioned by historical events including the contingencies of
Kierkegaard’s reception in Europe and the United States as well as the standard way
Kierkegaard is taught in the English-speaking world. In order to justify my claim that
many scholars have overlooked an important social dimension to Kierkegaard’s works, I
will indicate explicitly what the traditional view is and indicate historical events that have
contributed to the predominance of this particular interpretation of Kierkegaard’s
thought.

3

The traditional view is that Kierkegaard’s philosophical and religious views
commit him to a view of the individual which either is incompatible with any conception
of community, or, as some of the more moderate scholars may suggest, only allows for a
seriously defective view of community. This basic position has been a mainstay of both
the reaction to Kierkegaard and Kierkegaard scholarship itself since Kierkegaard’s death.
This interpretation has impacted not only the immediate reaction of his contemporaries,
but also his reception among critical theorists, existentialists, and theologians. The
predominance of this view continues today among contemporary philosophers and
Kierkegaard scholars4, as well as in many of the primary texts used in introductory
classes on Kierkegaard.
Grundtvig and Martensen, two of the most prominent targets of Kierkegaard’s
critiques, thought Kierkegaard rejected the possibility of community. Grundtvig wrote,
“Kierkegaard was careful not to write that he, either by his own insight or out of the New
Testament, had gained a light and a power to live a real Christian, spiritual, and eternal
life which he could transmit to others.”5 Grundtvig’s claim is that Kierkegaard’s view of
the individual or religion gleaned from the “New Testament” is so radically unique that it
cannot be taught or communicated to others. A commentator on Grundtvig concurs and
claims that for Grundtvig, “Christianity is not a matter of individual concern alone; it is a
community life which finds its earthly home in the human forms of common values that
have grown in various parts of our created world. This corporate aspect…was absent in

4

A large number of contemporary Kierkegaard scholars are sympathetic to views that emphasize the social
dimension of Kierkegaard’s thought.
5

N.F.S. Grundtvig, Selected Writings. Ed., trans. and introduction by Johannes Knudsen (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1976), p.64-65.

4

Kierkegaard’s agonizing search for Christian living.”6 Although both the commentator
and Grundtvig focus on Kierkegaard according to his religious implications, the point is
clear: for Kierkegaard the most important aspects of life are a matter of “individual
concern alone.” According to H.L. Martensen, another Danish contemporary,
Kierkegaard denied all forms of association. He wrote, “He [Kierkegaard] did not want
to found a congregation or establish any new society. He totally denied every notion of
society or associations, and he looked only to individuals….”7
This interpretation is also prominent within critical theory. Georg Lukács was an
early student of Kierkegaard and his thought profoundly influenced the direction and
tenor of not only Lukács’s early work but his subsequent work as well. In his first book,
Soul and Form, Lukács deals with Kierkegaard explicitly, and much of his early work
can be read an attempt to bring much of Kierkegaard’s thought to bear on social problems
in pre-World War I Europe.8 One could argue that it is Lukács’s appropriation of
Kierkegaard which allows him to anticipate and predate the humanist interpretation of
Marx before the publication of the 1844 Political and Economic Manuscripts in 1932.
Despite Lukács’s appreciation of Kierkegaard, he ultimately finds him morally
responsible for the “fetishized inwardness” and complacency of the “bourgeois
intellectuals” of French existentialism. Both Adorno and Marcuse view Kierkegaard
along the same lines. Adorno wrote explicitly about Kierkegaard on three different
occasions including his first published philosophical work The Construction of the
6

Johannes Knudsen in the Introduction to Grundtvig, Selected Writings, p. 5-6.

7

Hans Lassen Martensen in Bruce Kirmmse, Encounters with Kierkegaard.
University Press, 1996), p. 203.
8

(Princeton: Princeton

Georg Lukács, Soul and Form, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974). For an
insightful discussion of Kierkegaard influence on Lukács see Alastair Hannay Kierkegaard: A Biography
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp. 428-436 .
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Aesthetic (1933), a lecture titled “Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Love” given in New York at
a seminar organized by Paul Tillich (1940), and finally a study of Kierkegaard’s final
view of Christianity as exhibited in the attack titled, “Kierkegaard One More Time”
(1966).9 Despite Adorno’s familiarity with Kierkegaard’s overall thought, his
understanding of Kierkegaard was formed by the way in which Kierkegaard’s thought
was received in Germany in the early 20th century. The first thing to note about
Kierkegaard’s reception is that his thought was first appropriated by theologians ranging
from Paul Tillich to Karl Barth to Emmanuel Hirsh. Second, he was philosophically
identified as a forerunner to the existentialist philosophers (e.g., Karl Jaspers and
Heidegger) even though he had just as profound an influence on a number of critical
theorists including Lukács and Adorno. Kierkegaard’s thought was understood as being
individualistic and asocial largely as a result of this early reception of his thought by
existentialist theologians and philosophers – some of whom were associated with
National Socialism. He was identified, on the one hand, with the rise of existentialism in
theology and philosophy and on the other, with being either unresponsive to social crises
in the Third Reich or even worse expressing views that justify and undergird its moral,
social, and political failings. Rather than addressing the particular issues that Adorno
raises for Kierkegaard’s thought which has been done elsewhere,10 I merely want to
suggest that there is some reason for thinking that the reaction against Kierkegaard
9

Theodore Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1989); Theodore Adorno, “Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Love,” Kierkegaard:
Critical Assessments by Leading Philosophers ed. Daniel Conway (London: Routledge, 2003). The third
work is, as far as I know, unpublished in English, and all three are published together in Theodore Adorno,
Kierkegaard Konstrucktion des Ästhetischen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966).
10

See Marcia Morgan, “Adorno’s Reception of Kierkegaard: 1929-1933” The Søren Kierkegaard
Newsletter 46 (September 2003). For an evaluation of Adorno’s interpretation of Kierkegaard and see
Ferreira, Love's Grateful Striving for a compelling and clear refutation of Adorno’s critique of
Kierkegaard’s ethics of love.

6

among social and critical theorists derives from the historical and cultural association of
him with figures that they were more directly critical of, i.e., Martin Heidegger and
Emmanuel Hirsch among others.
This view is perhaps most evident in Herbert Marcuse’s comparison of Hegel and
Kierkegaard in his Reason and Revolution where Marcuse explicitly identifies
Kierkegaard as the champion of the “isolated individual” in contrast to Hegel’s sociallyconstituted individual.11 According to Marcuse, Hegel “demonstrated that the fullest
existence of the individual is consummated in his social life,” and that the “critical
employment of the dialectical method tended to disclose that individual freedom
presupposes a free society, and that the true liberation of the individual therefore requires
the liberation of society.”12 But Kierkegaard’s “fixation on the individual alone…
amounts to adopting an abstract approach…” which is antithetical to any social or
cultural criticism.13 Although this interpretation is clear in each of the critical theorists
mentioned, Marcuse’s account is the most explicit. He specifically contrasts Hegel’s view
of the social, which is important for Marx and the critical theorists, to Kierkegaard’s antisocial individualism.
This interpretation among the critical theorists is likely the result of a variety of
factors, but at least one factor was that many of the critical theorists understood
themselves as opponents of existentialism, and they identified Kierkegaard as an
important precursor to the movement, which is often characterized as lacking a social or
political dimension. This view of Kierkegaard was not limited to the critical theorists.
11

Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (London: Oxford University
Press, 1941) pp. 262-263.
12

Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, pp. 262-263.

13

Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, p. 263.

7

Karl Jaspers, for instance, directly and explicitly appropriates Kierkegaard for his own
purposes. He writes, “It is therefore possible to understand Kierkegaard’s basic thoughts
and to appropriate them as “the primal text of individual, human conditions of Existenz,”
completely divorced from Christianity.”14 Although an emphasis on individuality does
not explicitly deny community, Jaspers continues, claiming that to interpret
Kierkegaard’s purpose as “the revival of the community spirit” is to appropriate his
“concepts dishonestly” in a manner which is “alien to him”.15 Jaspers finds
Kierkegaard’s individual to be antithetical to the formation of a community.
Furthermore, there are a number of existentialists who were critical of
Kierkegaard precisely because he lacked a social and political dimension to his thought.
Even though Sartre was deeply appreciative of Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the
fundamental importance of the singular individual who is instantiated in history and made
the universal, he was equally critical of Kierkegaard for ignoring political thought and
activism.16 As one scholar has noted, “[T]he later Sartre’s orientation turned increasingly
in a direction that many commentators claim not to find in Kierkegaard himself, the
socio-political… [F]reedom in the later Sartre is above all the freedom of praxis, human
activity within a social milieu, hence no longer as individualistic as Kierkegaardian
freedom is typically thought to be.”17
This basic idea is also expressed in Martin Buber’s Between Man and Man.
Although he is quite appreciative of Kierkegaard’s insights in general, Buber offers a
14

Karl Jaspers, The Great Philosophers, v. IV (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1995), p. 290.

15

Jaspers, p. 289.

16

Jean-Paul Sartre, “Kierkegaard: The Singular Plural,” Between Existentialism and Marxism (New York:
New Left, 1974).
17

William McBride, “Sartre’s Debts to Kierkegaard: A Partial Reckoning” Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity
(ed) Martin J. Matuštík and Merold Westphal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995) p. 29.
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similar criticism of Kierkegaard’s concept of the individual. Buber claims that
Kierkegaard’s view focuses too much on the uniqueness of the individual and her
exclusive relation with God, thereby undermining any possibility for genuine community.
Buber cites two passages from Point of View, “Everyone should be chary about having to
do with ‘the others’, and should essentially speak only with God and with himself” and
“[O]ne should be, ‘regarding the highest concerns, related solely to God.”18 This
explicitly states that everyone ought to be wary of entering into relationships with other
people because those relationships can undermine one’s relationship with God.
According to Buber, Kierkegaard thinks that the individual relates solely and essentially
to God. Buber claims, “This relation is an exclusive one, the exclusive one, and this
means, according to Kierkegaard, that it is the excluding relation, excluding all
others…”19 For Kierkegaard, there is a conflict between one’s relation to creation and
one’s relation to God. God’s relation to the individual trumps an individual’s relation to
the world to such a degree that the individual must resign everything of the world
including relationships and possessions among other things.
The traditional interpretation, however, is not merely limited to philosophers and
social theorists. Many theologians who are deeply sympathetic with Kierkegaard’s
overall project question his view of the community and/or church. Jaroslav Pelikan, a
Lutheran theologian, who is very sympathetic to Kierkegaard’s philosophical theology
says, “There are several blind spots in [Kierkegaard’s] thought, notably the individualism
18

Buber, The Question to the Single One” Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York:
MacMillan, 1948), pp. 50-51. ‘Essentially’ in this context means that the relationship to God is an
exclusive relation. Buber’s quotations are from PV 106 / SV 13, 593. That Buber quotes from the Point of
View indicates that he was quite familiar with Kierkegaard’s corpus since Point of View was not as
accessible as some of Kierkegaard’s other works.
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and subjectivism which have prevented most of his followers from articulating an
adequate doctrine of the Church.”20 This sentiment is echoed by another theologian,
Howard Johnson:
One of the ways in which the Kierkegaardian stress on ‘the individual’ has
been misunderstood…. is in the contention, constantly recurring, that
Kierkegaard had no essential place in his thought for the Church. I too
maintain that, measured by the New Testament conception of the Church,
Kierkegaard’s ecclesiology is defective. But to assert that his doctrine of
the Church is defective is different from asserting that he had no doctrine
at all.21
Although Johnson views himself as defending Kierkegaard against those who deny any
“essential place in his thought for the Church,” he still finds Kierkegaard’s view to be
defective. To label Kierkegaard’s view of the church or community as a “blind spot” in
his thought, or as being “defective” is an example of the traditional view of
Kierkegaard’s view of community.
Although all of the examples given above are historical examples with the latest
quote from 1968, this interpretation is still alive and well in the present. Bruce Kirmmse,
a very well renowned Danish historian and Kierkegaard scholar, wrote, “In the last part
of his life it looked as if Kierkegaard opposed not only the Danish State or People’s
Church, but also the very concepts of Church and congregation as such.”22 This
quotation comes from an article where Kirmmse provides a very detailed defense of the
claim that Kierkegaard’s emphasis on a private, individual religiosity is antithetical to
any form of community.
20
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Likewise, in Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Mark C. Taylor says
that for Kierkegaard, “the journey to selfhood cannot culminate in spiritual community
but must be a solitary sojourn that separates self from other.”23 According to Taylor,
Hegel’s approach to becoming a self is much more coherent and philosophically
defensible because Hegel’s notion of self is inherently relational and social whereas
Kierkegaard’s notion is fundamental disconnected from any other(s). Taylor’s view
echoes Marcuse’s view that Kierkegaard and Hegel represent antipodes regarding the
relationship between the relative importance of the individual and the community.
Additionally, the standard textbooks used to introduce and teach Kierkegaard to
students have also reinscribed this basic interpretation. In his introduction to Kierkegaard
in Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre, Walter Kaufmann interprets Kierkegaard as
an individualist and claims that Kierkegaard is “a befuddled thinker, yet a writer who
intrigues and fascinates by virtue of his individuality” and that Kierkegaard “not only was
an individual but tried to introduce the individual into our thinking as a category.”24 He
also claims that although some thought Hegel was not liberal enough and too
authoritarian, “For Kierkegaard, Hegel was too rational and liberal.”25
But perhaps the most important textbook for introducing Kierkegaard to Englishspeaking students is Robert Bretall’s A Kierkegaard Anthology. In this work, Bretall
explicitly pits Kierkegaard as a key figure in the “revolt against Hegel”. According to
Bretall, Kierkegaard “had been one of the very first to react against Hegel’s
intellectualism and to launch the counter-movement in the direction of temporality,
23

Mark Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard (Berkeley: University of California Press:
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concreteness, and the “individual.”26 Bretall further reinforces the traditional view in his
introduction to his selections from The Present Age (A Literary Review). He claims (in
stark contrast to the actual content of A Literary Review) that Kierkegaard was apolitical,
and that “the value of individuality was for him supreme and could neither be enhanced,
nor on the other hand impaired, by any change of social organization.”27 Although both
Kaufmann and Bretall hold views which are far from universally accepted among
contemporary Kierkegaard scholars, their influence on the traditional way Kierkegaard is
taught and understood in the English-speaking world is unquestioned. Their views serve
as an indicator of the generally accepted view of Kierkegaard. I do not, however, mean to
suggest that this traditional view is without any textual support in Kierkegaard’s
authorship. On the contrary, this interpretation is based on a number of quite explicit texts
where the single individual is pitted against not only the community but against any
relation whatsoever (except for the relation to God). I will address these texts in chapter
two and three where I will show that these texts alone are insufficient to justify the
traditional view of Kierkegaard, and this claim will further support my argument that
historical and cultural influences play a significant role in 20th century and contemporary
interpretations of Kierkegaard as a defender of asocial individualism.
Chapter Summaries
My project challenges the view of Kierkegaard that arises from this historical
milieu. In the four chapters of this project, I will show (1) that Kierkegaard’s thought
does not preclude sociality as such (chapters two and three), (2) that there is, in fact, a
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positive theory or account of the social and that this account has important implications
for our understanding of Kierkegaard and 19th century social philosophy (chapter four),
and (3) that Kierkegaard’s view of the self can be articulated as a narrative theory of
selfhood that illustrates how his emphasis on subjectivity and the individual is related to
the intersubjective and social features of his thought (chapter five).
In chapter two, I will show that Kierkegaard’s understanding of his own work as a
‘corrective’ provides a hermeneutical framework for finding features of Kierkegaard’s
social thought that are, at the very least, implicit in his authorship. The corrective is not
simply reacting against the status quo, but it is a strategy that Kierkegaard selfconsciously employed in order to account for and address particular problems in his own
society and culture. Since this strategy itself is aimed at ameliorated social ills, then it is
reasonable to think that Kierkegaard does not universally eschew the social sphere. More
importantly, however, if Kierkegaard’s (or various pseudonym’s28) negative comments
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The “pseudonym problem” is a significant problem in Kierkegaard scholarship, and it is one that every
scholar must address and consider. There are a variety of different positions that scholars have taken
regarding Kierkegaard’s use of various pseudonyms. The most extreme position, perhaps, is Roger Poole’s
expressed in Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
1993). In the work, Poole makes a sharp distinction between the views expressed by the various
pseudonyms (particularly those that are used prior to 1848 in Repetition, The Concept of Anxiety, Stages on
Life’s Way, and Concluding Unscientific Postscript among others) and Kierkegaard himself. This strategy
rightly acknowledges that Kierkegaard often developed specific personalities and styles for a significant
number of his pseudonyms and in many cases, he employed them in a particular way for a particular
purpose; but one need not accept the extreme view in order to acknowledge this fact. First, a variety of
themes are repeated and expressed similarly in various pseudonyms. In such cases particularly if those
views are collaborated in non-pseudonymous writings, it is permissible to consider Kierkegaard’s view in
relation to a particular pseudonym’s views. Thus, I do not think that the pseudonym problem means that
one is unable to discuss similar themes from various pseudonyms. Second, contemporary exegetical studies
provide a compelling reason why the extreme response to the pseudonym problem is mistaken. For
example, there are a number of works that were written under the guise of a particular pseudonym, but the
pseudonym was only added after the manuscript was completed and Kierkegaard sometimes failed to
correct certain passages and references to himself as the author. Søren Bruun has convincingly shown that
this is the case with The Concept of Anxiety. See Søren Bruun, “the Genesis of The Concept of Anxiety,”
Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook. 2001, pp. 1-14. It is also well-known that The Sickness Unto Death was
originally planned as a work under Kierkegaard’s own name, but it was at the last minute changed to the
pseudonym Anti-Climacus. There are also cases where Kierkegaard will use the same materials in both
pseudonymous and non-pseudonymous works. Jon Stewart discusses one case in Prefaces in his
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about community, the congregation, and other people in general are best understood as
correctives, then there is good reason to look deeper into the issue and not take these
claims at face value. It will not suffice to simply examine a handful of texts that portray
the individual in opposition to other people, the community, and the Church while
thinking the issue is settled. My claim in this chapter is not that there is a social
dimension to Kierkegaard’s thought; rather, I am only claiming that a more thorough
investigation of the issue is needed in light of Kierkegaard’s self-understanding of his
own work as a corrective. As my analysis of Kierkegaard’s use of the term the
‘corrective’ will show, only when one has properly identified what Kierkegaard’s is
attempting to correct and accurately portrayed an image of what his alternative is – only
then, is one able to adequately understand the role of interpersonal relationships and
community within his thought.
Chapter three examines three prominent Kierkegaardian themes and topics – the
primacy of inwardness and subjectivity, the one-to-one God relation, and final attack on
the Danish church – that are generally thought to preclude a social dimension to
Kierkegaard’s thought. I address the first two themes as they arise in the figure of
Abraham in Fear and Trembling. The figure of Abraham is the father of faith, and his
Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, p. 41. These instances show that varying degrees of
weight should be placed on Kierkegaard’s use of a pseudonym, and in many cases it is perfectly reasonable
to infer a connection between Kierkegaard’s views and a particular pseudonym’s views on a subject. My
own view is sympathetic to those scholars who recognize the pseudonym problem as something worthy of
consideration, but I reject the extreme view. Nevertheless, how one addresses the pseudonym problem is
largely irrelevant to my broader project. First, I use the standard practice of referring to pseudonyms rather
than Kierkegaard himself when I discuss particular pseudonymous works. The only exception is when I
discuss the view of self presented in The Sickness Unto Death. I alter my usual presentation there for ease
of presentation, but since my task is not to elucidate or describe the arguments in The Sickness Unto Death,
it is not important for my purposes whether or not the views represented there are wholly identical to
Kierkegaard’s or the hyper-Christian thinker Anti-Climacus. Second, the three most prominent works that
figure in my study (A Literary Review, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, and Works of Love) are
non-pseudonymous work, and I am not aware of any scholar who views any of these three works as ironical
or as works that ought not be taken at face value. Thus, the pseudonym problem does not threaten the
integrity of this project, even if one adopts the extreme position.
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sacrifice of Isaac is thought to set him against ethics, community, and even his own
family; but I present an interpretation of the work that shows how Abraham, in order to
actually be the knight of faith, must fully embrace the finite world including his
relationships with Isaac, Sarah, the community as a whole, and the ethical. Furthermore,
my interpretation of “the absolute relation to the absolute” (ordinarily understood as a
reference to the one-to-one God-relation) referenced throughout Fear and Trembling
does not preclude social relationships, though it indicates the importance of the single
individual and inwardness in the development of oneself as a social individual.
I will also show how the attack on the Church is not an attack on the concept of
community as such, and I will indicate how there is an implicit concept of a community
even during Kierkegaard’s polemics against Denmark’s most important social institution.
In both Fear and Trembling and the attack on the Danish Church, there is an implicit
subtext that points toward Kierkegaard’s social thought that is only fully articulated in the
middle period of Kierkegaard’s authorship in 1846-1847. In this chapter, I am merely
showing how three of the most “anti-social” aspects of Kierkegaard’s work are not, in
fact, anti-social. This approach, on the one hand, lays the foundation for chapters four and
five where I will show that there is a positive social dimension to Kierkegaard’s thought,
and on the other hand, it illustrates how the social dimension of Kierkegaard’s thought
can be incorporated into his already well-developed views of the single individual, faith
and religiosity.
In chapters four and five, I will show that there is a social dimension in
Kierkegaard’s thought that can be conceptualized in philosophically interesting ways. In
the fourth chapter, I develop a Kierkegaardian theory of community by means of a close
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analysis of the three texts that comprise the social period of Kierkegaard’s authorship in
1846-1847 – A Literary Review, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, and Works of
Love. These views are situated within Kierkegaard’s immediate intellectual and cultural
context, and I examine them in light of Hegel’s and some of his student’s views on the
subject. I show that Kierkegaard has, in fact, appropriated a “dialectic of community” that
is in structure and content closely tied to Hegel, which he adopted from Hegel’s student
Karl Bayer. All three figures maintain that individuals and communities develop only in
relation to one another, and it follows from this that there is an implicit social dimension
to Kierkegaard’s defense of the individual and subjectivity. Kierkegaard’s dialectic of
community outlines a framework that sheds light on his social views, the relationship
between the three works of the social period, and the relationship of the social period of
the authorship to its earlier and later counterparts.
Although it is clear that Kierkegaard sees a direct connection between the
subjectivity of the early authorship and the social character of life in the middle period,
he never explicitly clarifies how the two are related. In order to illustrate how the two
might be related, in chapter five I present a narrative theory of selfhood as a framework
for understanding the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity in the self.
This issue has become a prominent issue in Kierkegaard scholarship in relation to
MacIntyre’s criticism of Either/Or in After Virtue. I argue that MacIntyre’s narrative
theory has significant problems in comparison with competing views and that
Kierkegaard’s understanding of self in the Sickness Unto Death is amenable to being
understood in narrative terms. Such an account shows how subjective notions of self are
related to the social dimension of human existence. I also indicate how Kierkegaard’s
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characterization of self can ameliorate some problems in otherwise promising narrative
identity theories.
As I demonstrate in chapters four and five, this project contributes to relevant
scholarly fields by (1) proposing and defending a new and more comprehensive
interpretation of Kierkegaard’s efforts as an ethical and social thinker, (2) establishing a
clear and unmistakable debt to Hegel concerning interpersonal relationships and the
relationship between the individual and community, and (3) developing a Kierkegaardian
narrative theory of selfhood that incorporates the subjective, intersubjective, and
objective dimensions of selfhood in such a way that both (a) shows how one can
reconcile the Kierkegaardian emphasis on subjectivity and inwardness with the social
dimension of his thought and (b) demonstrates the value and limits of narrative identity
theory.

Copyright © J. Michael Tilley, 2008

17

Chapter Two: The Corrective, Community, and Culture
As a Kierkegaard scholar, one commonly hears the old adage that one gets what
one wants out of Kierkegaard. The evangelical Christians finds a defender of the faith,
while the person who despises organized religion finds a fellow radical. The Lutheran
theologian finds a great thinker who recovers Luther’s original insight, while the Catholic
finds a troubled Protestant about to swim the Tiber. The Marxist finds a bourgeois
individualist, while the 19th century Danish commoner finds a friend. The character of
Kierkegaard’s overall authorship is such that textual support can be marshaled for a
variety of contradictory viewpoints, and there is good reason to think that Kierkegaard
meant for his readers to be confronted with these different viewpoints so that the reader
would be forced to make a choice among them. This component of Kierkegaard’s
authorship is sometimes characterized as Kierkegaardian irony, but it is also regularly
described as a “corrective.” The concept of the corrective is an important one for
Kierkegaard, and he employs it throughout much of his authorship. In this chapter, I will
analyze what Kierkegaard means when he claims that his work is a corrective, and I will
argue that reading Kierkegaard as a corrective, at least in some situations, does not lend
itself to the old adage about finding whatever one wants in Kierkegaard. Reading
Kierkegaard as a corrective is particularly important, since his activity as a corrective
illumines both his relationship to many of his contemporaries and his understanding of
sociality and community. If some of Kierkegaard’s more extreme statements about the
Danish Church or the solitary life of the Christian are best understood as a corrective,
then there is good reason to think that human relationships play a more important role in
Kierkegaard’s thought than is ordinarily assumed.
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The concept of corrective is prominent in Kierkegaard’s characterization of his
own project in both published and unpublished writings. The term itself – Correctiv – is
not a Danish word but is derived from the Latin correctio. Kierkegaard does occasionally
use more traditional Danish words for correction (e.g., Berigtigelse), but Kierkegaard
reserves the Latin word as a technical term. The first use of the term occurs in 1844
relatively early in Kierkegaard’s authorship1, and the final use of the term is in February
1855 well into the attack on Christendom.2 The concept is most fully developed in a
number of journal and notebook entries in 1849-1850, and it is perhaps one of the most
important concepts for understanding Kierkegaard’s self-representation of his prior and
subsequent work.
Although the term plays a prominent role in Kierkegaard’s thought, there have
been relatively few systematic studies of its use.3 Most often, the concept is just taken to
mean that Kierkegaard simply emphasizes the opposite of the prevailing tendencies of his
culture.4 This understanding of Kierkegaard’s project is pervasive in many domains of
Kierkegaard scholarship. Just as Kierkegaard’s culture emphasized the union of Church
and State, so Kierkegaard posited a sharp split between the two. Danish Protestantism
focused on Christ as sacrifice, so Kierkegaard focuses on Christ as example. Hegelianism
1

JP 3, 3299 / SKS 18, JJ:236. Although the term ‘corrective’ is first used in 1844 in the journals, the basic
idea is present in Kierkegaard’s thought from the very beginning. In 1836 he wrote, “When the dialectic
period [the age of individuality]… has been passed through in world history… social life must again play
its role to the utmost degree, and ideas such as the state (for example, as the Greeks knew it, the Church in
the older Catholic meaning of the word) must of necessity return richer and fuller--that is, with all the
content that the residual diversity of individuality can give the idea...” JP 4, 4070 / Pap I A 307.
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MLW 41-42/ SV 14, 47-48. This passage uses the more traditional Danish word interchangeably with its
Latin counterpart.
3

The best treatment of it up to this point was a short section in Elsebert Jegstrup’s dissertation:
Kierkegaard on Citizenship and Character (Chicago: Loyola University Chicago, 1991) pp. 185-204.
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Joel Rasmussen uses the concept in this way in his “The Pitiful Prototype,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook
(New York:De Gruyter, 2007), p. 274. He suggests that Kierkegaard’s emphasis on suffering and
martyrdom is a “corrective” to the “easy grace” of 19th century Denmark.
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values objectivity and reflection, so Kierkegaard values subjectivity and passion. There
are two different responses that a person can have to these dyads. On the one hand, a
person could adopt one perspective and deny the other. One could adopt either the
Kierkegaardian position that genuine faith is opposed to the ethical or the view that faith
must be incorporated and understood with a system that is ethical and rational.
On the other hand, a person could try to mediate between the two views and
maintain that neither view is complete in itself, but both views present aspects of a
complex situation. One could argue that Kierkegaard’s claim that true Christianity results
in suffering adequately counteracts the claim that sickness, suffering and poverty exhibit
a lack of faith but at the same time think that it goes too far and makes suffering a
requirement for being a Christian. Neither of these two responses understands
Kierkegaard’s notion of the corrective, and this misunderstanding obscures key elements
of Kierkegaard’s thought. In light of this deficiency, I will clarify the concept of the
corrective by analyzing Kierkegaard’s use of the concept. I will describe the three
essential characteristics of the corrective using Kierkegaard’s reactions to his
contemporaries as models for understanding the concept. I will then apply Kierkegaard’s
concept of the corrective to his polemics against some of his contemporaries in order to
elaborate the concept more fully. I will also defend the practice of reading Kierkegaard as
a corrective, and I will argue that this allows for the possibility that social and political
concerns play a more important role in his thought that is ordinarily admitted.
2.1. Kierkegaard’s Concept of the Corrective
Kierkegaard uses the concept of the corrective in three related ways – as a
philosophical corrective, an existential-corrective, and as a corrective to the established
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order. The last of these uses is the most important and it encompasses the other two. The
corrective in this sense refers to a counterbalance to the establishment. This use of the
concept expresses the essence of what it means to be a corrective, and both of the two
other characterizations presented below fall within the confines of this way of using the
term.
In the first, Kierkegaard refers to his own work as an intellectual or theoretical
corrective to speculation and idealism. He claims that his own contextual approach, in
which one “will not begin with nothing or without any presuppositions,” is a “necessary
corrective” to “German philosophy.”5 Despite the explicit reference to German
philosophy, Kierkegaard is most likely identifying H.L. Martensen, a Danish philosopher
and theologian who was influential in the popularizing of Hegelian philosophy in
Denmark, as the target of his criticism.6 In another passage, Kierkegaard presents
Socratic ignorance as “what the speculation of our time needs as a corrective.”7 The final
reference to a philosophical corrective is when he mentions that Martensen would prefer
to “ignore the corrective [Kierkegaard],” rather than engage with his arguments.8 In each
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Most of Kierkegaard’s knowledge of the German philosophical tradition is from Martensen’s lectures on
the topic. Furthermore, Martensen played a significant role in the Danish debate about beginning
philosophy with “no presuppositions.” For both of these reasons, there is strong evidence that Kierkegaard
was referencing Martensen directly when he claims that it “begins with nothing” and indirectly when he
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Doctrine were published, Martensen began to distance himself from Hegelian philosophy. Stewart,
Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, pp. 61-62.
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of these three references, Kierkegaard is identifying implicitly or explicitly Martensen’s
views as the object of his correction.9
In the second, Kierkegaard describes his “task” as an “existential-corrective.” He
provides the existential-corrective “by poetically presenting the ideals…” which in turn
incites “people about the established order…” while at the same time “criticizing all the
false reformers and the opposition.”10 I do not think that this use of the concept is distinct
from the general way of using the term, even though the terminology is different. Both of
these further uses of the concept – the philosophical corrective and the existentialcorrective – are subsets of the larger concept of the corrective in general. Kierkegaard’s
philosophical corrective shows the deficiencies of established scholars and professors,
and his existential-corrective is explicitly described as a response to the established order.
In my further elaboration of the concept, I will focus on this more general use of the term.
2.2. The Three Essential Features of the Corrective
There are three primary features to Kierkegaard’s concept of the corrective. It is
one-sided, aimed at reforming the whole, and it cannot become normative. All three of
these features are essential for understanding Kierkegaard’s use of the concept. In this
section, I will describe each of these three features, and I will illustrate them by
describing the way Kierkegaard reacted to some of his contemporaries. In particular,
Kierkegaard’s indirect criticism of Martensen will illustrate how a critique can reform the
whole by being expertly one-sided.
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2.2.A. Reforming the Whole
The most important feature of the corrective is that it subtly alters the functioning
and understanding of the whole, thus bringing about the possibility of genuine reform.
Kierkegaard says that the corrective will “cast a humorous-edifying warmth over the
whole”11 and that it will incite “people about the established order.”12 Kierkegaard uses a
series of metaphors that illumine the way in which the corrective alters the whole for the
better. The first metaphor compares the corrective with a skilled cook adding a little dash
of cinnamon. The cook realizes that the dish needs just a little bit of cinnamon even
though the ordinary person is unable to taste it. The cook knows how the slight addition
will make the whole more tasty. The second metaphor concerns the painter who adds a
little red to a painting that has many colors. The red is introduced in small quantities and
only in particular places such that people hardly notice any red in the overall painting. In
both cases, there must be a little bit of cinnamon or a little bit of red that vanishes in the
whole. The corrective is designed to contribute to the overall structure and design of the
whole without being the focal point.13 Kierkegaard does not mean, however, that the
corrective is designed to moderate the established toward some happy medium ground.
Rather, it is a dynamic structure meant to advance the whole.
To illustrate this idea, it is helpful to add an analogy to Kierkegaard’s two others:
the corrective is like a fugue. In a fugue, a voice or musical pattern is in tension with
another concurrent pattern, and this tension is used in order to bring out key aspects of
the whole. The concurrent pattern or the dissident voice alone is not able to produce the
11
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proper aesthetic experience, but when the two patterns are played together the impact and
style of both are accented. This metaphor is particularly appealing because it shows that
the tension between the corrective and the established is resolved neither by dismissing
one or the other, nor by mitigating the force of the corrective to make it more palatable to
the established. Rather, the whole is most improved when the corrective is presented
forcefully and articulately, and when the established is strong enough to withstand the
assault. The idea is not to resolve the tension but to insist on it all the more for the benefit
of all.14
2.2.B. One-sidedness
Furthermore, the corrective is to be one-sided, but its one-sidedness does not
entail that it ignores the opposing position. It must be expertly one-sided such that any
appropriation of it, failure to consider it, or attack on it will change the totality. The
corrective must be presented in such a way that any response to it results in the
appropriate change to the whole. It follows that the one who uses the corrective must
know the established order well, and it “must study the weak sides… scrupulously and
penetratingly.”15 The corrective is presented as a criticism of these deficiencies with an
eye toward altering the whole. Each response – appropriation, attacking, or ignoring the
corrective – are riddled with practical difficulties if the corrective is presented properly.
As a model for understanding how the corrective can be presented such that ignoring or
appropriating the corrective can serve its purposes, I will discuss Kierkegaard’s indirect
criticisms of Martensen in the pseudonymous work Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
14
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explicitly describes the work as a “fugue” in Sections 81 and 82. Contributions to Philosophy, trans.
Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000).
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Martensen’s Christian Dogmatics, and Rasmus Nielsen’s criticism of Martensen for
ignoring Kierkegaard’s criticism.16 Though the criticisms of Martensen in Concluding
Unscientific Postscript are described as a corrective in one journal entry, it is not
essential to my argument that they be understood as correctives. Rather, I am claiming
that these critical comments are presented in such a way that any response – attack,
silence, or appropriation – would accomplish Kierkegaard’s goal.
Concerning the following situation, it is important to note that Kierkegaard does
not explain how an attack on the corrective would bring the appropriate change in the
established position. It is plausible that, in certain circumstances, an immediate response
to a critic validates and strengthens the critic’s position. It may highlight a problem of
which people were generally unaware, or it may force people to investigate the matter for
themselves to determine the validity of the criticism. My claim here is not that criticism
always produces this type of change; though if presented appropriately in the right
context, the corrective will accomplish its purpose when attacked.
The response to Martensen’s Christian Dogmatics illustrates how the corrective
accomplishes its purpose when it is ignored and appropriated. Martensen’s work was
published in 1849.17 The work was a comprehensive theological treatise on the nature and
activity of the Trinity – in creation and in the incarnation – and it also dealt with the
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Kierkegaard’s relationship with Martensen is a much broader topic than I will be covering in this chapter.
Although there are substantial theoretical disagreements between the two men, much of the mutual
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see the way a one-sided critique functions.
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relationship between revelation, reason, and faith.18 Although the work never explicitly
mentions Kierkegaard (or any of his pseudonyms) by name, he rejects in short order the
views of those who use “maxims, aphorisms, ideas, and glimpses,”19 even though he
addressed issues central to Kierkegaard’s authorship. Martensen’s Dogmatics created
quite the stir in Copenhagen, and there were a number of critiques written in response to
it. The most important response in this context was Rasmus Nielsen’s “Magister
Kierkegaard’s ‘Johannes Climacus’ and Dr. Martensen’s ‘Christian Dogmatics.’ A
Thorough Review.”20 Nielsen had spent a good deal of time reading and studying the
works of Johannes Climacus, and he had extensive conservations with Kierkegaard
himself during this formative time. Nielsen’s review of Martensen’s Dogmatics quoted
liberally from the writings of Johannes Climacus – primarily Concluding Unscientific
Postscript – while criticizing Martensen for ignoring Kierkegaard’s insights about the
relation of objective thinking and the subjective faith of an individual.21 Nielsen follows
Climacus in his claim that faith and speculation have separate domains and that
Christianity is addressed to faith and to the individual.
This situation shows the practical difficulties of ignoring a one-sided critique. In a
journal entry commenting on this situation, Kierkegaard writes:
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On Prof. Nielsen's Relationship to My Pseudonym Johannes Climacus
A.
What I Cannot Approve
…Attempts have been made to explain Prof. Nielsen's intervention against Prof.
M. simply on the basis of personal antagonism. It seems to me that another
explanation comes just as close. To write a dogmatics in a limited setting like
ours, one that even claims to "heed the signs of the times," and then try to ignore
completely my work as an author or even try to sweep it away with a few casual
words in a preface to a dogmatics which, strangely enough, indirectly bears
unmistakable marks that there is considerable awareness of the existence of my
work as a writer--yes, this is strange. I do not know of anything better to do than
to smile, because I have nothing to say on this occasion. But another person can
look at this strange matter from another angle, and it seems to me that it is quite
understandable that Nielsen (who, parenthetically noted, is also a professor of the
University of Copenhagen and a better student of Hegel than Prof. Martensen)
feels called upon to protest against such strange conduct, he who has found these
writings so significant that he has used two years to become acquainted with
them. The point here is not that an objection can be made against Nielsen's attack
upon Martensen from the standpoint of the idea and on behalf of the pseudonym;
this was considered in its proper place anyway. Only this: it is a mistake, at times
an offense, to want to ignore the corrective. But to want to change the corrective
into doctrine is an alteration of the corrective and anything but imitating it, for the
corrective should not be used by one who wants to be a corrective also, but by one
whose greatness, yes, whose superiority to the corrective would be precisely that
elevation by which he would say short and sweet: I have wanted to be
corrected…22
Kierkegaard’s evaluation of Nielsen’s critique deals with the second and third essential
features of the corrective – its one-sidedness and the fact that it should not become
normative. Kierkegaard believes that Nielsen rightly criticizes Martensen for ignoring
Kierkegaard’s work as an author. Martensen’s Dogmatics treated Kierkegaard only with a
few cursory remarks in the preface, and Nielsen criticized his work publicly precisely
because it ignored the works attributed to Kierkegaard. If the corrective is deployed
appropriately in the proper setting, not only will an attack on it bring about the desired
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change but ignoring it will also contribute to the reform of the whole. The idea is that
ignoring legitimate criticism of one’s position subjects one’s view to further scrutiny.23
Finally, it is also the case that those who appropriate the corrective ultimately
serve its aims. If the corrective is adequately one-sided, then it will never be adopted
fully by the establishment even though it may gradually have a greater influence. It has a
larger influence because those in power will often “surreptititiously utilize the corrective
and pretend as if they themselves had said it… If they detect that that the corrective has
power, they advance and covertly utilize the corrective – and then appropriate to
themselves the honor of exemplifying moderation.”24 The one-sided character of the
corrective prevents the powers that be from coming to a place of rest. It continually
challenges and provokes, and it must be dealt with if only to dismiss it. It is a point
outside of the established order that produces external and, more importantly, internal
change.
The corrective must be deployed in such a way and in a particular setting such
that any of the responses presented above – appropriation, silence, or attack – accomplish
its purposes. Kierkegaard means precisely this when he claims that the corrective is
supposed to be expertly one-sided with a deep awareness of the flaws and problems in the
position it is correcting. The one-sidedness of the corrective, however, is problematic if it
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is severed from its historical context – that is, if it is severed from that which it is
correcting. Thus, the third essential characteristic of the corrective is that it cannot
become normative.
2.2.C. Not Becoming Normative
Kierkegaard developed his concept of the corrective in order to express his selfunderstanding of his own work, and his fear was that his corrective would become
normative. That is, he did not intend for it to be universally accepted on its own. The
entire purpose of the Kierkegaardian corrective is as a defense of the establishment. It is
like a medicine that weakens the body temporarily but ultimately makes it stronger.
“[T]he corrective should not be used by one who wants to be a corrective also, but by
one… [who] would say… I have wanted to be corrected…”25 Kierkegaard expresses this
feature of the corrective in a number of entries, and it occurs most prominently in his
criticism of Lutheranism and the People’s Church of Denmark. The problem with Luther,
says Kierkegaard, is that he allowed himself to be made “into a paradigm.”26 His work
was essentially a corrective that was “made into the normative… [which is] confusing in
another generation (where that for which it was a corrective does not exist).”27
Kierkegaard even claims that a confusing corrective degenerates ultimately into that
which it was supposed to correct by means of subsequent reactions against it. For
example, Luther intended to recover authentic Christianity but instead he produced “the
most refined kind of secularism and paganism,”28 that is, 19th century bourgeois
25
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Christianity. In another passage, Kierkegaard asserts that one who wants “to change the
corrective into a doctrine” misunderstands its nature.29 The goal is not to bring a new
doctrine into the world or to organize a party.30 Rather one presents “ideals” which not
only “incite people about the established order” but also criticize “all the false reformers
and the opposition… whom only ideals can halt.”31 To organize a party or promote a new
doctrine changes the corrective from a constraint into a standard that strives for universal
adoption, but a genuine corrective is an external critique designed to produce internal
change and reform (though it may also result in external changes). It is in this respect that
the corrective is understood as a defense of the establishment.
Kierkegaard’s own polemics against the Danish Lutheranism and the People’s
Church illustrates the proper use of the corrective. He is not only critical of the
establishment, but he also criticizes the critics of the establishment. Both his enemy and
his enemy’s enemies were his enemies. In cases where Kierkegaard understands his work
as a corrective, he uses this model of presentation. He presents a criticism of the standard
view while at the same time distancing himself from other critics. This approach is
important for understanding Kierkegaard’s relation to his contemporaries as well as his
views concerning sociality, community and interpersonal relationships.
2.2.D. Objections to Reading Kierkegaard as a Corrective
In order to understand whether a particular argument employed by Kierkegaard is
a corrective, it is essential to examine whether it bears the marks of these three essential
features. This approach precludes the primary problem associated with reading
29
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Kierkegaard as a corrective, i.e., that such a reading could serve as a justification for
dismissing those elements of Kierkegaard’s thought that one finds unpalatable. It must be
admitted, however, that dismissing problematic aspects of Kierkegaard’s authorship is a
challenge for most interpreters. Since he often makes assertions and arguments that
seems antithetical to one another, the fear is that people will pick whichever
interpretations suit their own biases rather than finding the best interpretation of the
available information from the text and historical situation. For example, an evangelical
Christian may interpret Kierkegaard as a proto-evangelical Christian dismissing
Kierkegaard’s critique of Christianity, or a person who believes in participatory
democracy may interpret Kierkegaard as a democrat whose criticisms of democracy are
merely ironic correctives of the political conservatives of his day.
In spite of this risk, it is important not to dismiss the significance of the concept
for Kierkegaard. First, this methodology is explicitly stated as a key for understanding
Kierkegaard’s work from as early as 1836 through 1855.32 Although the term ‘corrective’
is first used in 1844 in the journals, the basic idea is present in Kierkegaard’s thought
from the very beginning. The first use of the basic idea is in a journal entry in 1836,33 and
it remains a dominant theme at least up through significant portions of the attack on
Christendom where Kierkegaard continues to use the concept of a “corrective.”34 In an
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article written in February 1855, Kierkegaard discusses the importance of retrieving
intensiveness, and with it genuine Christianity, rather than merely generating a greater
number of “Christians.” Even though Kierkegaard’s approach is dissimilar to the
propagation of Christianity in the New Testament, this new method is needed because the
situations are different. The first reason for adopting a corrective reading of some of
Kierkegaard’s arguments is that he himself understands many of his substantive
arguments as correctives and he maintains this view throughout much (if not in the entire)
authorship.
Another reason for adopting this approach is that Kierkegaard’s authorial style
lends itself to reading him as a corrective despite whatever challenges it poses for
scholars. When a reader is attempting to discern Kierkegaard’s view on a given matter,
she must distinguish between that which is merely the corrective and Kierkegaard’s own
fully developed positions (assuming there is such a thing). This process forces a reader to
make certain hermeneutical choices such that one is never allowed simply to accept
Kierkegaard as an authority. When Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms or Kierkegaard himself
express multiple views from a variety of different perspectives, the reader is forced to
decide for herself what elements are significant and which are hyperbole, exaggeration or
corrective. Kierkegaard preferred that readers engage his work in this way.35

up to New Testament Christianity. Rather it is that official Christendom is unable to admit that it does not
resemble Christianity in the New Testament. Kierkegaard’s claim suggests that reform, and perhaps
correction, is not possible But he still has hope that the establishment will be changed for the better and
thus, reform is possible if the establishment would simply admit that it no longer lives up to the ideal of
New Testament Christianity. Thus, it appears that Kierkegaard does leave open the possibility of reform
even though he makes explicit comments to the contrary.
35

This idea is expressed in many places throughout Kierkegaard’s authorship, but the following passage is
a representative example: “It is one thing to introduce a new doctrine into the world; it is something else to
appropriate a given doctrine personally in inward deepening. In the first case disciples may be accepted, a
party organized, because otherwise it could easily happen that the doctrine, with the teacher gone, would
not get out into the world at all. It is entirely different with personal appropriation of a given doctrine in

32

Kierkegaard’s explicit use of this methodology and his authorial style are good
reasons for us to take the concept of the corrective seriously, but I have not directly
addressed the concern that reading Kierkegaard as a corrective could end up justifying
any position. The best response to this particular worry is that the corrective has a distinct
logic and structure that cut against the misuse of the concept within Kierkegaard’s work.
The structure must address the three features of the corrective that I have articulated
above: it must aim at reforming the established position, be expertly one-sided, and it
must not become normative. If one of Kierkegaard’s positions or arguments is to be
understood as a corrective, then it will have this structure. The first two conditions are
relatively easy to meet given Kierkegaard’s polemical style. Kierkegaard often presented
one-sided appraisals of situations or positions for the sake of some higher end, but the
third feature of the corrective is the most significant. As I have mentioned above,
Kierkegaard (or one of his pseudonyms) will often criticize those reformers who have set
themselves against the established authorities even when Kierkegaard’s actual argument
is similar in many respects to that of the reformers. If Kierkegaard uses this particular
tactic, then it is likely to be the case that the argument in question is being presented as a
corrective.
This standard is useful because it shows that not all of Kierkegaard’s arguments
are best understood as a corrective, and it gives us criteria for evaluating whether or not a
particular argument should be understood in light of the concept. In the next two sections,
I will describe two of Kierkegaard’s arguments that are relevant to my overall work
inward deepening. Here it is essential that disciples not be accepted or a party organized, because doing so
inevitably weakens personal appropriation; here what counts is to work as an individual, to stand as a single
individual, to be sacrificed as a single individual. The task of personal appropriation is the only one there
can be any question about in ‘Christendom,’ for everyone, to be sure, is acquainted with the doctrine.” JP
2, 2046 / Pap X-5 A 121.
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concerning the social and political dimension to Kierkegaard’s thought. I will argue, on
the one hand, that Kierkegaard’s criticism of democracy (the numerical) is not presented
as a corrective and, on the other hand when he criticizes his society or the concept of
community, he intends it to be a corrective. This distinction is also important because it
shows that even if Kierkegaard rejects democratic politics, there is still room for
articulating a social dimension in his thought. A critique of certain social and political
institutions and approaches need not be taken as a wholesale rejection of sociality as
such.
2.3. Kierkegaard’s Critique of Democratic Processes and the Numerical
Kierkegaard’s critique of democracy, the liberal movement in general, and the
“numerical” are prominent in his early polemical writings, but they are also evident in his
more mature views. In this section, I will analyze his criticisms of democratic procedure
and the numerical in terms of his methodology of correction. I will defend the view that
these criticisms are not cases where Kierkegaard is presenting his argument as a
corrective. Rather, he is expressing his own reservations about voting and democratic
procedure. Kierkegaard’s early criticisms of the liberal movement and democratic
procedures in his Early Polemical Writings are followed by more developed criticisms in
A Literary Review and in his journals.36 In this chapter, I will only consider his journal
entries on the topic, since I will treat the content of A Literary Review in a subsequent
chapter.
Kierkegaard’s criticism of voting and democracy and its requisite emphasis on the
numerical follow from his conception of the nature of the human being. He claims, “The
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single individual" is a spiritual definition of being a human being; the crowd, the many,
the statistical or numerical is an animal definition of being a human being… The single
individual ranks qua spirit according to the extent he can endure, wholly unchanged,
having statistics thrown at him...”37 Human beings have a composite nature consisting of
an animal component and a spiritual component. Achieving a majority, voting, or any
other activity that presupposes the importance of the merely numerical gives priority to
the animal nature. In these cases, the individual is considered merely as an instance of the
universal. The central insight of Christianity, according to Kierkegaard, is that it
promotes the category of the individual over the species or the genus. “Christianity is
inversely related to the numerical, and generally advances are made in a direction
opposite to the numerical.”38 “The numerical is actually the conspiracy, for the numerical
craftily suffocates the point in Christianity. Under the guise of zeal for Christianity the
numerical smothers Christianity…”39
Kierkegaard’s notion of the human being and his understanding of Christianity
give rise to a number of worries about democracy. First, Kierkegaard helps himself to the
familiar criticism that democracy is simply the tyranny of the majority. He writes, “Fear
of men is dominant; indeed, as antiquity has already declared (Aristotle somewhere in
Politics or Ethics): Tyranny and democracy hate each other just as the one potter hates
another--that is, it is the same form of government, only in tyranny one is the tyrant, in
democracy, the masses.”40 Second, he maintains that the democratic commitment to the

37

JP 2, 2050 / Pap XI-1 A 81

38

JP 2, 2072 / Pap XI-1 A 490

39

JP 3, 2914 / Pap XI-2 A 174

40

JP 3, 3219 / Pap XI-1 A 51

35

numerical undermines responsibility for one’s actions, since the individual is anonymous
in the crowd and impervious to criticism. “[N]o one wants to be the single individual;
there is… a fear of the envy and opposition of the environment... "Number" makes us all
alike. Ten names joined together have a basically anonymous effect, and the anonymous
does not excite envy.”41 Kierkegaard claims that people prefer to run “together in a herd”
because “in the herd one is free from the criterion of the individual and of the ideal.”42
The only available criterion in the numerical is comparison with others. Kierkegaard
writes:
The numerical (which as numbers increase more and more has become the law of
human existence [Tilværelsens]) also has the demoralizing effect that the sight of
these thousands and thousands prompts men to live merely comparatively, all
human existence dissolves in the nonsense of comparison, the mud of numbers,
which then is even prettied up to look like something under the name of history
and politics, where the whole point (the mark of spiritlessness) is always that what
counts is a large number of participants, that numbers confer significance, almost
as if the idea were like a teller in a bank, who ponders numbers.43
Although the democratic impulse may be purportly justified in terms of some broader
communal or political good, the desire is not really for the good or the true as such but
only numerical victory. Kierkegaard expresses the same point in another passage: “The
law of existence for the numerical or for mass men is that they live by comparisons. We
see from this that the numerical is the sophistical, a self-extending factor which,
inspected more closely, dissolves into nothing.”44 If there is no independent criterion for
establishing the importance and value of the individual then the accumulation of power
for oneself or one’s group will be the ultimate aim of all human activity.
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In this situation, truth and reality are ignored and replaced with merely pragmatic
concerns. “The Public… is the very opposite of the idea. For the public is numbers… the
battle of opinions in public life is neither more nor less than the business of a stock
exchange. Just as with the quotations on stocks and bonds, [one] is concerned only with
the opinion having the highest percentage. He believes that numbers are ideas.”45
Although Kierkegaard rejects any attempt to reduce Christianity, truth, or the good to a
platform for others to consider and vote on, he does suggest, sarcastically, a limited role
for democratic governance. In two passages, Kierkegaard discusses the difference
between voting on matters of religious truth and the proper subject matter of the political:
[Christianity].....cannot be formed according to the paradigm of balloting
(balloting, balloting with discussion, balloting without discussion--balloting,
from, in, with, upon, by balloting) or be done according to the popular song: Let's
a few of us get together, hurrah, hurrah, hurrah. Street-lighting and clothes and,
with all due respect, the sanitation department can be reformed in this manner; but
let us be men: Christianity does not lend itself to reformation in this way.46
The Old Orthodox who claimed that they were the only true Christians in
Denmark. I have nothing against their separating from us--but it is indefensible
that they should achieve this by balloting and without giving up the claim that
they are the true Church. But this is supposed to be the tactic--and then judgment
is supposed to fall upon Mynster and his party. In what frame of mind could the
honest Spandet make his proposal? Did he look upon it as similar to a motion
about gas street-lighting and the like--if so, then of course a vote may be taken,
but it was certainly improper to make his proposal in this vein. Or, if he insists
that he has regarded it as a matter of conscience, how in the world can he then be
satisfied with serving a matter of conscience (which as a "royal service" not only
must be promoted quickly and be put through but must also be put through or the
one commissioned falls)--by making a motion for balloting and then seeing how
many votes it will get.47
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Voting is an appropriate form of decision-making when the material being decided upon
is purely pragmatic, addressing questions about traffic, electricity, clothes, streetlights or
public sanitation; but such a procedure is antithetical to the determination of truth and
goodness. Democratic governance is acceptable so long as it is limited to its proper,
trivial domain.
Kierkegaard’s criticisms of democratic procedure, voting and the numerical in
general are informed by his conception of human nature. His views on the subject appear
to be straightforward critiques of the burgeoning democratic ethos coming to the fore in
19th century Denmark. His general views on the subject are always expressed against the
growing liberal movement that supported and wanted both State and Church
Constitutions. Kierkegaard’s criticism of D.G. Monrad, the author of the Danish
Constitution, and the concept of the “People’s Church of Denmark” (den danske folkekirke) provide concrete examples of the more general criticism of democratic voting
procedures.48 Kierkegaard’s arguments show that he unequivocally rejects both the
liberal movement and the union of the political and the religious, and therefore,
Kierkegaard’s opposition to the political liberals and democrats of his day should not be
understood as a “corrective.” He gives a normative position concerning the role of
democratic procedure in the domain of the religious.
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Despite writing frequently on political topics as a student, Kierkegaard says very
little about political issues, the liberal movement or its members in his mature authorship.
There are only three journal entries during this period where Monrad is mentioned
specifically with only a handful of others related to these themes. Nevertheless, there are
three points of contrast that are evident in these passages. First, Kierkegaard viewed the
ordination of Monrad as Bishop as a political concession, and he explicitly described it as
an instance of “worldly shrewdness” rather than Christian wisdom.49 Monrad’s high-level
religious appointment to the politically volatile region of Lolland-Falster appears from
Kierkegaard’s point of view as a sort of pragmatic political decision. Kierkegaard
interprets Monrad’s ordination in this manner because of Monrad’s association with the
liberal constitutional movement.50
Kierkegaard’s criticism in relation to this event is directed at both Mynster,
representing the establishment, and Monrad, representing the reformers. The apparent
political character of Mynster’s ordination of Monrad demonstrates that there is a radical
difference between New Testament Christianity and Mynster’s Christianity.51
Furthermore, it shows that “Bishop Mynster’s life, Christianly, is a lie” because Mynster
maintains that Copenhagen, his entire diocese in Zealand, and all of Denmark are “in
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truth Christian.”52 Neither New Testament Christianity nor true Christianity is explicitly
described in these journal entries, but it is evident that it involves some sort of
commitment to the truth of Christianity even at the expense of one’s wealth, cultural
status, and reputation. The ordination of Monrad is evidence that Mynster is more
concerned with maintaining the established Church and his position within it rather than
with acting out the demands of New Testament Christianity.
Second, Kierkegaard was also critical of Monrad’s political activity as a member
of the Danish constitutional committee. In one journal entry, Kierkegaard compares the
political situation to the relationship between parents and children.53 Although parents are
able to submit themselves to their children, even more effectively than children could
submit to their parents, it is still not the best state of affairs for the family, the parents, or
the children. Likewise, the old vanguard, the religious establishment, the landowners, and
the cultural elites are much more adept at submitting to the will of the new constitutional
liberals than vice versa but this, according to Kierkegaard, is not the best form of
government. This comparison is applied specifically to Mynster’s ordination of Monrad.
Although Mynster is well-disciplined and can obey Monrad, “the young Monrad” is not
able to do “his duty in obeying the old bishop.”54 This passage shows that Kierkegaard’s
political sympathies lie with the “old vanguard,” and it also reveals interesting facets of
Kierkegaard’s understanding of the relationship between Christianity and politics. It
shows that he rejects any cooption of the democratic impulse for religious purposes. He
interprets Mynster’s decision to appoint Monrad as Bishop as a political compromise that
52
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demonstrates how Mynster is all too willing to not only participate in the new political
developments of 1849, but to use them to his own advantage. He reinscribes his own
authority and position and that of the Danish Church by appointing Monrad to a political
region prone to revolt in the hope that Monrad’s position will quiet dissent. The
flexibility of the established Church in capitulating to the demands of the time conflicts
with what Kierkegaard sees as genuine Christianity.
Implicit within this characterization is Kierkegaard’s hope that the political events
of 1848-1849 would correct established Christianity in Denmark and allow one to
reintroduce Christianity into Christendom. In A Literary Review, written just prior to the
political developments of 1848-1849, Kierkegaard “prophesies” that the democratic
tendencies and the leveling of the present age will make it possible for one to become a
single individual capable of having a genuine relationship with God. The social demands
of the public can make it such that one is satisfied with oneself and one’s relation to God
which in turn forces one to make up one’s own mind rather than submitting to the will of
the public.55 The political revolution effectively would allow for the reintroduction of
Christianity into Christendom. This claim, however, does not imply that Kierkegaard is in
favor of democracy or the new political developments as such. Rather he thinks they have
the means for producing something which is virtually impossible in the cultural
aristocracy of his times: that is to say, a person who is deeply sensitive to the importance
of actually being a Christian in Christendom. But, as I indicated above, Kierkegaard’s
political sympathies lie elsewhere.
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The third point of conflict between Kierkegaard and Monrad concerns the
relationship between Church and State. Kierkegaard criticizes both the establishment and
the reformers for relying on democratic numerical procedures. Kierkegaard worried that
the democratization of Christianity had the potential to undermine genuine religious
commitment, and he feared that the establishment would use its Christianity as a weapon
of cultural hegemony. In such a situation, Christianity would serve as a cultural defence
of the establishment. It would be a tool used to accomplish some other political, social or
cultural goal. Although such an approach is not discussed in the journal entries dealing
explicitly with Monrad, it may be that such a criticism lurks behind Kierkegaard’s
identification of the State Church of Denmark (Statskirke) with the People’s Church of
Denmark (den danske folke-kirke).
Monrad is neither named in Kierkegaard’s discussion of the People’s Church nor
is he the person who coined the term, but Monrad did author the Danish Constitution
where the concept of the People’s Church is employed in a unique way distinct from any
previous uses.56 Monrad found the concept to be appealing to a large, diverse group of
people of influence, and he also thought the concept expressed theoretically the
appropriate relationship between the people, the State, and the Church. I will first discuss
the strategic political decision to use the concept, and then turn to the theoretical
underpinnings of the concept.
The term, the People’s Church [Folkekirke], became very common among the
Grundtvigians and it escaped many of the critiques aimed at the State Church. Grundtvig
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Peter Christian Kierkegaard was the first to use the term, the People’s Church. In 1841, P.C. Kierkegaard
wrote, “Jesus Christ’s Church in the People’s Churches” [“Jesu Christi Kirke i Folke-Kirkerne”] Samlede
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and his followers defended a free church formed by the people rather than the
government or a ruler. The idea is that the communal life of the people, the nation, gives
rise to a national or people’s church rather than it being forced upon the people from
religious authorities. Furthermore, Monrad’s own liberal movement favored a Church
constitution that would be ultimately responsive to the people. The concept of the
People’s Church and an explicit provision guaranteeing religious freedom promised just
this sort of responsiveness.57 In the Constitution itself, Monrad explicitly identified the
Evangelical Lutheran Church as the People’s Church which satisfied the cultural and
political conservatives in the Church who wanted to maintain this established Church
relatively unchanged. Monrad’s description of the Evangelical Lutheran Church as the
People’s Church of Denmark satisfied virtually all of the major political players in 19th
century Denmark. His use of the term, however, conceals a deep ambiguity.58 It is unclear
whether Monrad is emphasizing the fact that the People’s Church is simply another name
for the Evangelical Lutheran Church or asserting that the people have decided, in effect,
that they are evangelical Lutherans and that this decision constitutes the authority of the
Church for the people. The first view would be merely a change in semantics with very
little, if any, change in the actual practices of the Church. The second view would have
constituted a fairly deep break with the traditional understanding of the Danish Church.
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Monrad, however, would reject both of these characterizations of the concept.
Although the term was agreeable to almost everyone of political influence for various
reasons, Monrad had a distinctive Hegelian interpretation of the concept.
Monrad’s vision of the People’s Church is Hegelian: the Church is necessary
because ‘the spirit does not exhaust its whole being [fylde] in some single
individuals [enkelt individ], but in [their] totality’; because to ‘feel the pulse of the
spirit’ the people must be organized as an organism; the Church should follow the
spirit and be sovereign over the State, this organization will not deprive but give
the single individuals [de enkelte] freedom and only by ‘pursuing its own higher
purpose’ does the Church promote ‘the State’s interest.’59
Monrad claims that the State interest is promoted by the existence of the Church since the
Church organizes and structures the life of the people such that the people become good
citizens and promote the good of the whole. Such a situation, it is asserted, does not
deprive citizens of their freedom. Rather, the people voluntarily promote the betterment
of all. It appears, therefore, that Monrad would simply deny the dilemma presented
above, and he would claim that the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the people mutually
presuppose and constitute the other. The Church builds the people, and the people have
decided that they are Evangelical Lutherans.
Kierkegaard, however, does not seem to recognize any distinction between the
People’s Church and the State Church. Kierkegaard only uses the term the People’s
Church [Folke-Kirke] in a negative light and only in six journal entries, and in all but one
of those entries there is an explicit identification of the State Church and the People’s
Church.60 There are two ways to interpret this identification. On the one hand, one can

59

P.G. Lindhart Den Danske Kirkes Historie, v. VII, ed. Hal Kock and Bjørn Kornerup (Copenhagen:
Gyldendal Boghandel Nordisk Forlag, 1958) p. 16. The translation from the Danish is my own.
60
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this entry does not undermine the claim that Kierkegaard fails to make a distinction between the People’s
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take it as evidence that Kierkegaard simply did not understand the difference between the
People’s Church and the State Church. Just as there is a difference between a government
of the people (e.g., the people’s assembly [Folketing], which is the Danish parliament),
and the State as such, so is there a difference between the People’s Church and a State
Church. A Church of the people would, ideally, be set up in such a way where there
would be little or no conflict between the Danish people as a whole and the religious
authorities. The people could demand, through the government, religious reformation if a
situation arose where Christianity was undermined by the religious practices in the
Church. According to this interpretation, the Church not only functions as the means for
developing the people into a nation, but it is also the product or result of the collective
will of the people. The evidence for this interpretation of Kierkegaard’s equivocation is
that (1) Kierkegaard never explicitly distinguishes between the two concepts and (2) his
criticisms of the People’s Church are identical to his criticisms of the State Church. It is
rather strange that Kierkegaard never directly addresses the constitutional
characterization of the Church, since many of his criticisms are more applicable to the
People’s Church than the State Church (e.g., Kierkegaard’s critique of determining
religious truth by means a vote).
On the other hand, it may be that Kierkegaard was aware that some political and
religious figures attempted to distinguish between the two concepts, but he thought such
an attempt was doomed to fail. According to this interpretation, Kierkegaard recognized
the political nature of Monrad’s redescription of the State Church. The very same
institution of the State Church is called the People’s Church as a political ploy designed
Church and the State Church: JP 5, 6786 / Pap X-6 B 145, p. 213; Pap X-6 B 212, p. 335; JP 5, 6932 / Pap
XI-2 A 206; JP 4, 4222 / Pap XI-2 A 291; JP 4, 4503 / Pap XI-2 A 373.
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to bring Grundtvigians, Monrad’s own liberal movement, and the conservatives together,
and ultimately the State Church as a institution would remain exactly the same as before.
The only result would be that whatever form of criticism left to the people would be
ideologically undermined since any criticism would be directed against one’s own
church, the People’s Church. One of Kierkegaard’s greatest fears is that Christianity
would become merely a cultural phenomenon used as a means to accomplish some other
end rather than an expression of the truth, and it may be that the renaming of the State
Church as the People’s Church is a turn in that direction. Thus, it is not surprising that
Kierkegaard identifies both the State Church and the People’s Church as a single object
of his criticism. This view is a coherent reconstruction of a position that would explain
many of Kierkegaard’s criticisms of the State Church and his equivocation between the
two terms. Nevertheless, there is no direct textual support for this interpretation and
Kierkegaard, who regularly describes his own methods of attack, never explicitly
articulates this strategy.
Kierkegaard’s relationship with Monrad is complicated by their personal
relationship, but Kierkegaard’s reaction to Mynster’s ordination of Monrad as Bishop of
Lolland-Falster, his criticism of the Danish constitutional committee, his criticism of the
People’s Church reveal two facets of Kierkegaard’s political thought. First, it shows that
Kierkegaard separates the religious from the political. The means of operation in the
political arena (e.g., voting, ballots, etc.) are inappropriate for determining religious truth,
and any attempt to popularize Christianity through political means falsifies the sanctity of
that religious truth. Kierkegaard never venerates democratic procedure, even though he
does hope that some good will come of it. Second, Kierkegaard’s critique of political
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cooption is applicable to both Mynster’s ordination of Monrad and Monrad’s
characterization of the Evangelical Lutheran Church as the People’s Church. On the one
hand, Kierkegaard thinks Mynster’s ordination of Monrad exemplifies Mynster’s
commitment to his own religious authority and power rather than to God alone. On the
other hand, clothing the State Church in a new name, the People’s Church, ideologically
insulates the religious establishment from criticism, and thereby coopts for itself critiques
of the religious establishment. Since it is no longer the King’s Church, the State Church,
or Mynster’s Church, but the Church of the people, any criticism of the Church is
effectively undermined since it would also constitute a criticism of oneself.
Since Kierkegaard’s critique of the numerical – which he sees as endemic to the
democracy itself – and his more specific criticism of Monrad’s union of Christianity and
politics are directed at both the establishment and the reformers, it is evident that this
criticism should not be understood as a corrective. The three features of the
Kierkegaardian corrective are that it must be one-sided, aimed at reforming the whole,
and it cannot become normative. If any of these three features are absent in a particularly
argument, then Kierkegaard is not presenting the argument as a corrective. Kierkegaard’s
polemics against democratic procedure may exhibit the first two characteristics, but they
are presented normatively insofar as they give reasons to reject voting on any matters
beyond trivial issues like sanitation and public lighting.
In cases where Kierkegaard wants to preclude others from adopting his view, he
will aggressively and often preemptively reject any attempt to coopt his views for ulterior
motives. This approach is most evident when Kierkegaard rebuffs Rudelbach for
appropriating his work to advance the political cause of civil marriage and religious
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freedom, but there is nothing even remotely similar regarding Kierkegaard’s polemics
against voting and democracy. Kierkegaard never criticizes the political, cultural or
religious aristocracy for fighting democratic change. On the contrary, he is often critical
of “the old vanguard” for capitulating to the demands of the reformers as Mynster did
toward Monrad.
Although Kierkegaard’s belligerent tone and his disdain for the democratic
reformers and their ideas may be one-sided and aimed at reform, he never attacks the
cultural and political aristocracy for fighting against democratic developments. As such,
it appears as if Kierkegaard’s contempt for democracy is a genuine expression of his
views, and it is offered as a reason for rejecting democratic procedure. Furthermore,
Kierkegaard never explicitly mentions, as he does regarding other issues, that he is
employing the method of the corrective in his polemics against voting and democracy.
For these reasons, Kierkegaard’s anti-democratic views ought not be understood
ironically or as a corrective
The three features of the corrective serve as criteria for evaluating whether
Kierkegaard’s arguments are intended to be correctives. By establishing a basis for
judging whether an argument is presented as a corrective, one is able to preclude
hermeneutical cherry picking where problematic views are merely interpreted as an
exaggeration or “corrective.” Reading some of Kierkegaard’s arguments as correctives
does not imply that all of them are presented in this way, and a proper understanding of
the concept of corrective show that some of his arguments are not correctives (e.g., his
criticisms of democracy, the liberal Democratic movement, and his criticism of Monrad).
Furthermore, even if, as this section has shown, Kierkegaard is distrustful of politics and
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democratic institutions and procedures, there could still be room for a distinctive social
dimension to his thought.
2.4. Kierkegaard, Community, and Corrective
Many people understand Kierkegaard’s criticism of the masses, the crowd and the
numerical as a wholesale rejection of sociality as such. I have argued that Kierkegaard’s
criticism of the numerical, voting and Monrad’s political work is tied to an antidemocratic stance, but I maintain in spite of this that Kierkegaard’s defense of the single
individual and any criticism of sociality or community ought to be understood as a
corrective. That is, Kierkegaard eschews politics, particularly democratic procedures, but
his views do not preclude a social dimension to his thought. In this section, I will sketch a
preparatory defense of the claim that one can understand Kierkegaard’s polemics against
sociality as a corrective which will only be completed in subsequent chapters.
A social dimension to Kierkegaard’s thought is implicit in the concept of the
corrective in general and his more specific criticism of mere numerical strength.
Kierkegaard’s elaborate strategy for administering the corrective shows that he was
deeply aware of the contours of his social environment and that his polemics were
intended to improve that environment, and he even explicitly describes the role of the
corrective in the formation of community in one journal entry.61 He claims, “To defend
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the established order with my polemics on the numerical, the crowd, the inorganic, the
mass, the evil in society: that was my task.”62 He conceives of his work as a necessary
therapeutic device that (1) always takes place from within the establishment and (2)
temporarily weakens the establishment in order to make it stronger. He writes, “Either the
established order-or the single individual, unconditionally the single individual, but
nothing in between for that is half-and-half, parties, sects, etc. That is how I support the
established order, for there is scarcely one in any generation who manages to be
unconditionally the single individual, the all want to dabble around in parties, etc..”63
Kierkegaard directs his attack at the numerical, the crowd; but his criticism is from the
inside. His goal is to reform the establishment by unequivocally criticizing the power it
gives to statistics and popular appeal. His criticisms are one-sided against the
establishment. That is, he continues to offer his polemics again and again, and he never
retracts them.
But he is also critical of those who intend to enlist Kierkegaard’s work for their
own purposes. He is critical of the liberals who sought to appropriate his ideas for their
political agenda. “What I wrote about ‘the crowd’ was understood at the time by the
liberals, by the opposition…now they presumably understand it no more. That means
they never have had any essentially ethical outlook. They want to have the crowd on
their side – otherwise they are angry with it. But it is not understood that the crowd itself
is the evil.”64 In one case in particular, he publicly repudiated A.G. Rudelbach, a
prominent supporter of pietistic religious awakening movements in Denmark, for
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claiming that Kierkegaard’s criticism of “habitual Christianity” supported the political
cause of religious freedom and allowing for civil marriage.65
He was also critical of solidifying Denmark and Christianity around nationalist
ideas. “The Grundtvigian nonsense about nationality is also a retrogression to paganism.
It is unbelievable what foolishness delirious Grundtvigian candidates are able to serve
up… [saying] that no one can be a true Christian except through nationality. And
Christianity specifically wanted to do away with paganism's deification of
nationalities!”66 Kierkegaard’s criticism of the liberal and Grundtvigian reformers shows
that he does not regard his own position as normative. It is not designed to promote or aid
one of the opposition movements. As a result, Kierkegaard criticizes those people and
groups who might use his ideas to promote external political changes to the Church or
government. This strategy reveals that he does not want his arguments and positions to
become universally adopted. Kierkegaard wants to preclude his defense of the single
individual from becoming “normative” so that it will not become confusing to subsequent
generations who lack the object of correction.
Kierkegaard’s conception of the relationship between the individual and the
community is already implicit within the concept of the corrective. A person’s
community and culture functions most effectively when the individuals within the
community are sufficiently developed intellectually, ethically and spiritually. The
possibility of offering a corrective presupposes this existence of such an individual.
Kierkegaard explains:
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In the "public" and the like the single individual is nothing; there is no individual;
the numerical is the constituting form and the law for the coming into existence
[Tilblivelse] of a generatio aequivoca; detached from the "public" the single
individual is nothing, and in the public he is, more basically understood, really
nothing at all. In community [Menighed] the single individual [den Enkelte] is;
the single individual is dialectically decisive as the presupposition for forming
community, and in community the single individual is qualitatively something
essential and can at any moment become higher than "community," specifically,
as soon as "the others" fall away from the idea. The cohesiveness of community
comes from each one's being a single individual, and then the idea; the
connectedness of a public or rather its disconnectedness consists of the numerical
character of everything. Every single individual in community guarantees the
community; the public is a chimera. In community the single individual is a
microcosm who qualitatively reproduces the cosmos; here, in a good sense, it
holds true that unum noris, omnes. In a public there is no single individual and the
whole is nothing; here it is impossible to say unum noris, omnes, for here there is
no one. "Community" is certainly more than a sum, but yet it is truly a sum of
ones; the public is nonsense--a sum of negative ones, of ones who are not ones,
who become ones through the sum instead of the sum becoming a sum of the
ones.67
Human relationships are not grounded on the numerical or the public, but Kierkegaard
distinguishes between the concept of the public and the concept of community. The
single individual is a fundamental component of community who stands against mere
numerical strength and pseudo-unity. Kierkegaard also implies in this passage that the
strength of the communal bond is found in the ethical commitment that individual’s make
to one another rather than by being jointly directed toward a common end (though in
particular cases these need not be antithetical to one another).
These comments have not established that there is in fact a social dimension to
Kierkegaard’s thought. I have merely shown how Kierkegaard’s arguments, understood
properly, do not preclude the possibility. In the next chapter, I will examine three
Kierkegaardian views on the subjective self, the one-to-one God relation, and the
problem with the Danish Church in order to show that those three views do not preclude a
67
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social dimension to Kierkegaard’s thought. Chapters two and three jointly serve to defend
my negative thesis that Kierkegaard’s does not reject sociality as such. This negative
thesis prepares the way for chapters four and five where I show that there is, in fact, a
social dimension to Kierkegaard’s thought that can be conceptualized in philosophically
interesting ways.
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Chapter Three: Inwardness, The One-to-One God-Relation, and The Attack on the
Church
Three themes in Kierkegaard’s thought – the emphasis on subjectivity or
inwardness, his description of the unique one-to-one God-relation, and his final attack on
Christendom at the end of his life – jointly present the strongest case against there being a
social dimension to Kierkegaard’s thought. The attack on Christendom is an attack on the
dominant cultural and social institution in 19th century Denmark, and Kierkegaard’s
concern with inward deepening is often set in opposition to any external social changes.
Inwardness, in fact, is most fully realized in the individual whose faith is in opposition to
the social and ethical order. The figure of Abraham is the father of faith, and his sacrifice
of Isaac sets Abraham against the ethical order, his community, and it even requires that
he hide his act from his spouse. Although I agree that these themes are dominant within
Kierkegaard’s thought, and although I maintain that they have a deep insight into the
nature of selfhood, I will argue in this chapter that none of these three views preclude a
social dimension to Kierkegaard’s thought. My claim in this chapter is not that there is a
social dimension to Kierkegaard’s thought. Rather it is only that such a view is not ruled
out by his view of the single individual, the one-to-one God-relation, or his final attack
on the Church.
In order to show this, I will first examine how Kierkegaard characterizes the
development of the single individual (the single self) as a process of inward or subjective
deepening via the one-to-one God relation, represented in Fear and Trembling by
Abraham’s relation to God. I maintain that such a relation does not preclude meaningful
human relationships. I will also show that Kierkegaard’s rejection of the People’s Church
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of Denmark is not a wholesale rejection of all forms of sociality. The ultimate aim of this
chapter is to show how Kierkegaard’s views on community and sociality can be
incorporated into his already well-developed views about Christianity and the single
individual. Only in subsequent chapters will I show that Kierkegaard, in fact,
incorporates his earlier characterization of the single individual into his “social
authorship” in 1846-1847.
3.1. The Single Individual and the One-to-One God-relation in Fear and Trembling
One of the most difficult challenges for articulating a Kierkegaardian
understanding of sociality is the priority he places on the God-relation. The usual
portrayal of Fear and Trembling is that it expresses how God’s commands take priority
over moral obligations such as a person’s familial duties or societal norms.1 Under such a
reading, Fear and Trembling illustrates the primacy of the God-relation, and the character
of Abraham is portrayed as being an outsider to his society, ethics and his family. This
understanding of the text and the God-relation is, at the very least, partly responsible for
why the life of faith appears to be a solitary life. Because of the prevalence of this
understanding of the text, I will begin Section 3.2 by describing the structure and
arguments presented in Fear and Trembling. Although I reject the common reading of the
work, there are still a number of arguments and passages that, at the very least, seem to
preclude a social life for those who follow Abraham as the father of faith. These passages
will show the exegetical motivation for understanding the Kierkegaardian single
individual in opposition to other people. In response to these challenges, I will describe
three strategies for responding to this challenge: (1) the incognito response, (2) the
1
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September 2004.
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pseudonym response, and (3) the absolute relation response. Each of these strategies
considered individually have significant problems, but when evaluated collectively they
show that the one-to-one God-relation2 presented in Fear and Trembling does not
preclude a social dimension for the one who takes Abraham’s faith seriously. The
ultimate aim of this section is to illustrate how Kierkegaard’s social thought coheres with
his already well-developed views on faith.
3.1.A. The Structure and Arguments in Fear and Trembling
Fear and Trembling is best understood as an attempt to express the character and
life of the person of faith. Rather than presenting a comprehensive account of the nature
and character of faith, Silentio studies an individual, Abraham – an exemplar of faith.3
The work starts with an examination of the individual rather than a particular concept.
2

So far as I am aware, Kierkegaard never uses this language himself, though it is at least an appropriation
characterization of the God-relation in works prior to 1847. Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s characterization of
the God-relation seems to suggest that he thinks of it as the most significant relationship a human being has
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Johannes de Silentio is the pseudonymous author of Fear and Trembling. Kierkegaard’s use of
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The discussion of Abraham is situated in the context of how Kierkegaard’s
contemporaries discussed the notion of faith in two respects. First, Silentio references
Martensen who is aware of the trends in modern philosophy and he “goes further” in
doubt than his predecessors.4 The operative notion of faith here is understood both as
mere belief and as the Christian faith. People are born with faith, that is, they are both
born as Christians and they treat faith as something that is clarified and examined so that
it can become knowledge. Hegel characterizes faith in a similar fashion saying, “[T]he
relation of the individual to this object [truth in religion] is an obligation based on
authority, and the witness of his own spirit and heart, as that in which the moment of
freedom is contained, is faith and feeling [Empfindung].”5 Faith is a subjective, inward
relation to truth, but when it is expressed externally in Church doctrine and social mores,
it becomes the object of rational, public scrutiny so that it can become knowledge.
Silentio contrasts this characterization of faith as something to be overcome on
the path to knowledge with the more thoroughgoing doubt and faith of the Ancients that
can only be achieved over the course of a lifetime. Silentio portrays Descartes comments
about faith as a more contemporary instance of the doubt and faith of the Ancients.6 He
refers to Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy where he accepts faith and revelation as
authoritative, but he also claims in his Discourse on Method, “My design is not here to
teach the Method which everyone should follow in order to promote the good conduct of
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his Reason, but only to show in what manner I have endeavored to conduct my own…”7
The task of faith for Silentio is one approached as an individual – it is not for everyone,
and it is certainly not the state where everyone begins. He wants to distinguish this
concept of faith from the one articulated from the standpoint of “the system.” It is this
model of faith exemplified in Abraham that Silentio finds puzzling rather than the
Hegelian/Martensen conception of faith.
In order to more fully express what he finds particularly difficult about
understanding Abraham, Silentio describes four alternative versions of the Abraham story
that – in contrast to the actual story – can be understood. In the first, Abraham in a loving
and fatherly way tells Isaac that he has received a command from God to offer Isaac as a
sacrifice. Isaac is, like Silentio, unable to understand how his loving father could offer
him as a sacrifice to their loving God. Because Isaac fails to understand, Abraham
changes his demeanor, feigns wildness and proclaims himself a madman in order to
protect Isaac’s faith.8 A person can understand why Abraham acts as he does in this
account, but he is not the father of faith.9
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In the second version of the story, Abraham was silent, made the journey to
Moriah, and was about to sacrifice Isaac. He then spots a ram and sacrifices it instead;
Abraham from that point on could not forget that God had ordered him to sacrifice his
son, and there was no joy for him in having Isaac even though Isaac “thrived as before.”10
This Abraham is not the father of faith because he becomes disillusioned with God – the
God who could command him to sacrifice his son. He did not believe that God would
fulfill his promises to him to make him a father of many nations through his son Isaac.
That is, he thought Isaac would ultimately be lost. Lippitt suggests that what Abraham
lost in this situation was his capacity to understand the loss and turmoil of others.
Because of his own inner turmoil, his own disillusionment with his God, he is unable to
interact with Isaac. He sees nothing but “Isaac thriving.” In this version of the story,
Abraham has his son, but he has lost his compassion for others and the joy of living.11
The third version of the story is the antipode to the second. Just as before,
Abraham takes Isaac to Moriah but on the way, he repents of his willingness to sacrifice
his son and he repents of denying his fatherly duty; but afterwards, Abraham cannot
reconcile God’s clear, unmistakable and justified command to offer up his son with his
later understanding of it as a sin. Abraham is not the father of faith in this example
because he is unable to retain Isaac and his relationship to God.12 Rather than losing his
compassion for his son as in the second story, Abraham’s relation to God suffers in this
10
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one. In both stories, however, the initial problem in the father-son relation or the Godrelation respectively undermines the other relation.
In the fourth version of the story, Abraham proceeds to Moriah, but he is
internally torn about it (represented in the narrative by his left hand being clenched in
despair). Abraham, just as in the Biblical narrative, is just about to kill Isaac when he is
stopped. Abraham passed God’s test for him by being willing to offer Isaac, but Isaac
always remembers that his father despaired. In this example, Abraham maintains his
God-relation and he apparently even maintains his relationship with Isaac. In reality
however, Isaac lost his faith because he saw that Abraham was not able to live with the
conflicting demands put upon him.13
In each of the four narratives, there are three common elements. Lippitt mentions
the first two: (1) Abraham in all four accounts is willing to sacrifice Isaac and he also
ultimately acts according to what he perceives to be God’s will. (2) Abraham in these
four stories fails to live up to the exemplar of faith – the Abraham of the Biblical
narrative. Silentio is able to understand how each of these alternate Abrahams deals with
the dilemma insofar as he is able to put himself in their position and comprehend why
each of them acted as they did. He is not able to do that for the real Abraham – he is
unable to understand him. The upshot for Lippitt is that a “simple willingness to obey
God’s command is no guarantee of what Johannes [de Silentio] means by ‘faith.’”14 The
most important point, however, and the reason why each of these Abrahams fail to live
up to the exemplar is that they are not able to maintain the relation to God and the
relation to the world represented in Isaac when faced with Moriah. Each figure either
13
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gives up the finite for the sake of God or he gives up his relation to God for the sake of
the finite ultimately resulting in the loss of both. Abraham is the “father of faith” not
because he gave “up [his] desire…” (i.e. Isaac) but because “... [he held] fast to it after
having given it up; it is great to lay hold of the eternal, but it is greater to hold fast to the
temporal after having given it up.”15 On the one hand, Abraham as the father of faith
never questions whether God has, in fact, called him to sacrifice his son and he is willing
to do so. On the other hand, Abraham loved Isaac and believed that he was the promised
child who would make Abraham a father of many nations in accordance with God’s
promise. Abraham renounces his desire in that he is willing to sacrifice his son, but he
has faith that God will fulfill his promise to him. It is also important to note that his faith
is not an otherworldly faith that is only completed in eternity. Rather, the content of his
faith was that “he would grow old in this country, be honored among the people, blessed
by posterity, and unforgettable in Isaac, [who is] the most precious thing in his life,
whom he embraced with a love that is inadequately described by saying he faithfully
fulfilled the father’s duty to love the son…”16 Abraham does not reject his fatherly duty
or his moral obligation for the sake of some otherworldly reunion with Isaac or for the
sake of being vindicated in the afterlife. He holds fast to the finite, the temporal, and his
faith is for this life including the life of his son and the esteem of the world. Some might
suggest that Abraham’s faith is great because he was “willing to offer his best,” but
Silentio claims that this “omits… the anxiety, because to [a possession] I have no ethical
obligations but to the son the father has the highest and holiest [obligation].”17 The
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difference between Abraham and the four pseudo-Abrahams is rightly understood as a
precursor to the distinction between the knight of faith and the knight of infinite
resignation .
3.1.A.1. Distinguishing the Two Knights
Silentio describes the difference between the two knights by means of a story about a
young lad and a princess. The boy’s love for the princess was “the entire substance of his
life,” but his love could not be realized in actuality. He had neither a relation to the
princess nor the means for acquiring a relationship with her. “The slaves of the finite, the
frogs in the swamp of life” tell the boy that such love is folly and that he should be
satisfied to marry a more ordinary girl – a more equitable arrangement.18 Although the
young boy knows that it is highly unlikely, and perhaps impossible, for him to be in a
reciprocal relationship with the princess, he still maintains his care for and attachment to
her.
This parable sets the stage for Silentio’s description of the knight of infinite
resignation who renounces his desire for a finite end for the sake of an infinite end. This
act of renunciation presupposes a deep attachment to the finite end rather than a stoical
rejection of attachment. “The knight of infinite resignation… does not give up the love,
not for all the glories of the world,” because for such a person, attachment and care for its
object are identity constituting. That is, the young boy “assures himself that it actually is
the substance of his life…” and “he does not lack the courage to attempt and to risk
everything…” for his love.19 Nevertheless, the boy “renounces” his attachment. Rather
than directing one’s care toward a finite object, it is aimed at an eternal object. The knight
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of infinite resignation shapes his desires into one single desire – the desire for the
beloved, but it is redirected toward another object. “His love for that princess would
become for him the expression of an eternal love, would assume a religious character,
would be transfigured into a love of the eternal being, which true enough denied the
fulfillment but nevertheless did reconcile him” to a love “that no actuality can take
away”; and even when the princess marries, the young lad maintains his attachment to the
princess and his resignation of his own desires “for one who has resigned infinitely is
sufficient to oneself… What the princess does cannot disturb him; it is only the lower
natures who have the law for their actions in someone else, the premises for their actions
outside themselves.”20 The person’s single desire is still for its object, but the person
experiences the pain and hardship associated with never acting on that desire. In the end,
renouncing one’s cares for any particular, finite object achieves a painful peace secured
from the caprice of daily life. As a result, the one who does so leads a “solitary life” since
attachment is directed toward the eternal rather than the finite.21
Thus, there are three key features of the knight of infinite resignation: (1) the
person deeply cares for the particular object of his affection. (2) This care for the other is
the constitutive-feature of the person’s identity. That is, if the person did not care for the
other in this way, the person would not be in some very important sense the same person.
This care is the source of the pain that is inherent in the act of resignation. (3) The person
realizes that his most important desire cannot be fulfilled in the here and now, so it is
directed toward the eternal, the universal. As a result, the attachment remains but it “is
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transformed – infinitised; eternalised, transcendentalised.”22 One’s care remains, but one
has given up the former object of one’s care. In fact, Silentio mentions in one
illuminating passage that it would be embarrassing and “awkward” if the one who
infinitely resigned Isaac received him back – even though this was what was so easy for
Abraham.23
The knight of faith takes up where the knight of infinite resignation leaves off.
Silentio explains, “He does exactly the same as the other knight did: he infinitely
renounces the love that is the substance of his life, he is reconciled in pain. But then the
marvel happens; he makes one more movement even more wonderful than all the others,
for he says: Nevertheless I have faith that I will get her – that is, by virtue of the
absurd…”24 Faith is described as a double movement: “Infinite resignation is the last
stage before faith, so that anyone who has not made this movement does not have
faith…,”25 but the second movement is that of faith. Faith in this sense takes place after
resignation but it continues to trust and believe that one’s greatest hopes and desires will
be fulfilled in this world. The movement of faith is when Abraham believes that Isaac
will be returned to him even when he is willing to kill Isaac himself. The return in faith
does not mean that everything is just as before – though it may appear to be so from an
external perspective.
The two distinguishing features of the knight of faith are (1) that she believes on
the strength of the absurd and (2) that she has made the movement of infinite regression
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and then a subsequent movement of faith. Though these two claims are crucial for
understanding Silentio’s characterization of faith in Fear and Trembling, both are
difficult to explain. Nevertheless, as I have indicated above, if one can make sense of
these two claims and still maintain that the person of faith retains the world, if Abraham
has Isaac returned to him; then there is a presumptive reason for thinking that regarding
faith understood in this sense, one is firmly connected to one’s family and social
community. It is the movement of infinite regression that separates the single individual
from other people and the world, but this movement is negated and transcended in the
movement of faith.
In fact, Kierkegaard’s most lengthy treatment of the knight of faith as a character
describes how the knight is incognito. Consider the following three descriptions of what
John Lippitt calls the “mundane knight of faith”26:
I may very well imagine him [the knight of faith]. Here he is. The
acquaintance is made, I am introduced to him. The instant I first lay eyes
on him, I set him apart at once; I jump back, clap my hands, and say half
aloud, “Good Lord, is this the man, is this really the one – he looks just
like a tax collector!” But this is indeed the one. I move a little closer to
him, watch his slightest movement to see if it reveals a bit of
heterogeneous optical telegraphy from the finite, a glance, a facial
expression, a gesture, a sadness, a smile that would betray the infinite in
its heterogeneity with the finite. No! I examine his figure from top to toe
to see if there may not be a crack through which the infinite would peek.
No! He is solid all the way through. His stance? It is vigorous, belongs
entirely to finitude… He belongs entirely to the world; no bourgeois
philistine could belong to it more. Nothing is detectable of that distant and
aristocratic nature by which the knight of the infinite is recognized. He
finds pleasure in everything, takes part in everything and every time one
sees him participating in something particular, he does it with an
assiduousness that marks the worldly man who is attached to such things.
He attends to his job. To see him makes one think of him as a pen-pusher
who has lost his soul to Italian bookkeeping, so punctilious is he. Sunday
is for him a holiday. He goes to church. No heavenly gaze or any sign of
26
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the incommensurable betrays him; if one did not know him, it would be
impossible to distinguish him from the rest of the crowd… He finds
pleasure in this way…
On the way [home], he thinks that his wife surely will have a special hot
meal for him when he comes home – for example, roast lamb’s head with
vegetables… It so happens that he does not have four shillings to his
name, and yet he firmly believers that his wife has this delectable meal
waiting for him. If she has, to see him eat would be the envy of the elite
and an inspiration to the common man… [If his] wife does not have it –
curiously enough, he is just the same.
He drains the deep sadness of life in infinite resignation, he knows the
blessedness of infinity, he has felt the pain of renouncing everything, the
most precious thing in the world, and yet the finite tastes just as good to
him as to one who never knew anything higher, because his remaining in
finite would have no trace of a timorous, anxious routine, and yet he has
this security that makes him delight in it as if finitude were the surest thing
of all… He resigned everything infinitely, and then he grasped everything
again by virtue of the absurd.27
This knight of faith exhibits the relationship between resignation and faith. Resignation is
recognized by what it gives up for the sake of some higher purpose. In faith, however,
that which is given up is returned. Thus, the knight of faith appears to be just like
everyone else’s. His faith, as opposed to the life of resignation, is hidden. He appears just
as a tax collector, a bourgeois philistine. He takes his family and social obligations
seriously and he discharges them appropriately. He enjoys life to its fullest – even when
his faith, say his hope for roast lamb’s head, turns out to be disappointed. Despite
appearances, this man has inwardly renounced that which is most important to him – his
attachment to his family, his job, his community, etc.; but he grasps it again “by virtue of
the absurd.” It is clear according to Silentio that the mundane knight of faith, if not
Abraham as well, is deeply attached to one’s ethical obligations, family and social life.
But it is not clear why this is so, nor is it obvious that this attachment is maintained
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throughout the double movement. As a result, it is not clear what getting it back “by
virtue of the absurd” means, and it is not clear what exactly the double movement is.
3.1.A.2. The Absurd and the Double Movement
Silentio characterizes his own presentation of faith as the perspective of an
outsider to faith. “By no means do I [Silentio] have faith.”28 He claims that he is unable
to make the movement of faith, though he does not disparage it.29 Thus, it may very well
be the case that Silentio’s characterization of faith as “absurd” is a result of his status as
an outsider to faith. It is not clear that the same could be said from Abraham’s point of
view (or from Kierkegaard’s). A number of scholars have made this point30, but it is also
well supported in Kierkegaard’s journal entries. In the journals, Kierkegaard regularly
distinguishes between the outsider’s perspective presented in the pseudonymous
authorship including Fear and Trembling and the perspective from the standpoint of
faith. He writes:
When the believer has faith, the absurd is not the absurd – faith transforms
it, but in every weak moment it is again more or less absurd to him. The
passion of faith is the only thing which masters the absurd – if not, then
faith is not faith in the strictest sense, but a kind of knowledge. The absurd
terminates negatively before the sphere of faith, which is a sphere by
itself. To a third person the believer relates himself by virtue of the absurd;
so must a third person judge, for a third person does not have the passion
of faith. 31
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This passage explicitly claims that the absurd is recognized as the absurd only from a
third-person standpoint, and it is not absurd from the standpoint of faith. Additionally, the
term “the absurd” is further described in Kierkegaard’s journals. The concept applies
neither to direct contradictions nor to mere nonsense. On the contrary, it is described as
that which “… is composed in such a way that reason has no power at all to dissolve it in
nonsense and prove that it is nonsense; no, it is a symbol, a riddle, a compounded riddle
about which reason must say: I cannot solve it, it cannot be understood, but it does not
follow thereby that it is nonsense.”32
Despite these clues from the journals, making sense of how Abraham’s faith
advances “on the strength of the absurd” and how it is a “double movement” is a
notoriously slippery concept. In particular, it is difficult to make sense of two claims
expressed throughout Fear and Trembling. On the one hand, Abraham knew that he had
to sacrifice Isaac. According to the first movement, which is a necessary condition of
faith, he “gives up Isaac.”33 That is, Abraham “does indeed know that God demands Isaac
as a sacrifice, and he knows that he himself in this very moment is willing to sacrifice
him.”34 On the other hand, he believed that Isaac would still live even if he acted on
God’s command. He believed that God would honor his promise to make him a father of
many nations through Isaac.35
These two belief are incommensurable because it is Abraham who has been given
the task of taking Isaac’s life; he has already made his decision concerning whether he
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will perform the action in accordance with his understanding of God’s command. “But
given the task as assigned to Abraham, he himself has to act; consequently, he has to
know in the crucial moment what he himself will do, and consequently, he has to know
that Isaac is going to be sacrificed.”36 If Abraham was not charged with the task of taking
his own son’s life – if God had told Abraham that God would take Isaac’s life from him –
then Silentio could understand how Abraham could believe that God had made his
intention known that he would take Isaac’s life, but Abraham could still trust and hope
that God would relent. But since Abraham is the agent and since he acts in accord with
his understanding of God’s command even as he is about to plunge the knife into Isaac,
one is unable to understand how it is that Abraham believed that God would relent.
It is simply not clear how we can understand Abraham’s actions on Moriah if he
genuinely believed that Isaac would not be taken from him even if he acted on God’s
command. Silentio comes closest to an explanation when he posits two ways in which
Abraham could still believe in God’s promise. In the first, he says, “He had faith by
virtue of the absurd, for human calculation was out of the question, and it certainly was
absurd that God, who required it of him should in the next moment rescind the
requirement. He climbed the mountain, and even in the moment when the knife gleamed
he had faith – that God would not require Isaac.”37 Thus, the incommensurability
between Abraham’s action and his belief is operative even as ‘the knife gleamed’ just
before he was to kill Isaac. In the second, following the suggestion of the author of the
book of Hebrews, he writes that if Isaac had been sacrificed, then Abraham believed that
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“God could give him a new Isaac, could restore to life the one sacrificed.”38 In the first
account, Abraham cannot simultaneously believe that God will requires him to sacrifice
Isaac as his course of action suggests and also believe that God will not require him to do
so. And although the second account is a common view among theologians primarily
because the author of Hebrews (11:19) suggests the interpretation, Silentio only presents
it flippantly with no explanation.
Given the multiple ways that Abraham seems to have understood his own action,
it is difficult to address the problem presented above. On the one hand, it is clear that
Abraham believes that he has been commanded by God to kill Isaac and he is willing to
obey God’s command throughout the ordeal. On the other hand, Abraham believed God’s
promise – that is, he thought that Isaac would still live in order to fulfill God’s promises
to him in this world even if he obeyed God. The two accounts above describe how
Abraham might suppose that God could fulfill his promise even if Abraham obeys, but
Abraham did not have a definitive view about how God would fulfill his promise. He
merely believed that God would fulfill his promise, but he did not know how that would
be accomplished. As such, Abraham’s infinitely resigns himself continually by acting in
accord with God’s explicit command, but in reality he believes that Isaac will still fulfill
God’s promises to Abraham. Abraham acts in such a way that conflicts both with his
commitment to his family as well as his belief that God will fulfill his promise.
There are two things that should be noted here: first, this action is not a case of
akrasia; that is, it is not a case where a person is unable to direct one’s actions in accord
with one’s deepest commitment. Rather, the person expresses the strength of one’s
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resolve by being able to maintain one’s commitment in the face of one’s actions. Second,
the situation is also not an instance of hypocrisy. If an action is hypocritical but not an
instance of akrasia, then the action reveals that the person thinks that there is sufficient
warrant for overriding his purported beliefs or commitments. The implication is that the
person does not genuinely believe what he claims to believe. The way in which
Abraham’s actions deviate from his commitment to Isaac and his belief that God will
fulfil his promise is neither a case of akrasia nor a case of hypocrisy.
The struggle for Abraham is to remain in finitude, to embrace the world fully,
when he knows full well that his course of action opposes such an embrace. Because of
the explicit conflict between one’s actions and one’s beliefs in this peculiar sense, one is
unable to adopt Abraham’s perspective. Silentio says, “I am constantly aware of the
prodigious paradox that is the content of Abraham’s life, I am constantly repelled, and,
despite all its passion, my thought cannot penetrate it, cannot get ahead by a hairsbreadth.
I stretch every muscle to get a perspective, and at the very same instant I become
paralyzed… I think myself into the hero; I cannot think myself into Abraham…”39
3.1.B. Challenges From Problemas I, II, and III
The account in the last section is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of
attempts to understand Abraham’s moral psychology. Rather, I merely want to show how
a knight of faith – whether the mundane knight of faith or Abraham – can fully embrace
the world including one’s family and society even when, as in the case of Abraham, one’s
action are contrary to this way of caring for the world. Although the case is far from
unproblematic, Silentio presents the situation as if it is only the knight of infinite
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resignation who gives up that which is cared about most deeply, but that Abraham who
“had faith for this life” as well as the mundane knight of faith who is indistinguishable
from an ordinary citizen embrace the entirety and fullness of the finite world including
one’s relationships with others. This initial characterization, however, is problematized in
each of the three Problemas. Nevertheless, each of the three exhibits the same structure
outlined above – that is, the person acts in such a way that conflicts with the person’s
deepest commitments and beliefs.
The difficulty is that it is all too easy to take what Silentio considers the easy
route: the path of resignation. One can understand and make sense of an Abraham who is
willing to sacrifice his family for the sake of God, even if one pities him or thinks him
deluded. The challenge is to explain how one can still have “faith for this life”, how can
one fully embrace one’s own Isaac, when one’s own action militates against such a
commitment. One must continually reject the tendency to understand this particular
course of action as an act of renunciation. This struggle is apparent in Problema I, II, and
III, and there are a number of passages that suggest that it is impossible for the knight of
faith to embrace the world in this way. In Section 3.1.B, I will examine those passages
that appear to preclude a social life for the knight of faith, and in Section 3.1.C, I will
argue that there are good reasons for thinking that the presumptive case described above
can be maintained in spite of these difficult passages.
The first Problema “Is there a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical?” analyzes
the issue of faith in terms of the relationship between the single individual and the
universal (that is, the ethical which is applicable to all people at all times). Each human
person has the ethical task of continually “express[ing] himself in [the universal]…
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annul[ling] his singularity in order to become the universal.”40 A single individual can
assert his singularity against the universal in two ordinary ways: first, the individual who
sins implicitly, if not explicitly, places himself above the universal. The individual acts in
such a way that the maxim of his will cannot be made into a universal law and he,
therefore, places himself above the universal. Second, one may choose to make a decision
according to one’s feelings – according to aesthetic categories – rather than according to
the universal. In which case, one is privileging the single individual’s unique
particularities over the universal. Both of these cases are instances where ethics
condemns the single individual, and according to Silentio this is rightfully so.41
The case of faith – where the single individual is higher than the universal – is
distinct from both of the two instances described above. First, Abraham recognizes the
domain and pull of the ethical life, even though he violates it. He understands his actions
are being justly condemned from the standpoint of the ethical, and he also has the
strength of will and character to fulfill the demands of the ethical though he acts against
it. Second, his immediate desire is not to take his son’s life. In fact, if it were his
immediate desire and he acted on his desire, it would indicate that Abraham understands
neither his fatherly duty to love Isaac nor the domain of the ethical within his own life.
Abraham does not make an exception of himself before the moral law; rather his situation
“contains… a teleological suspension of the ethical.”42 That is, “By his act he
transgressed the ethical altogether and had a higher telos outside it, in relation to which
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he suspended it.”43 His situation – the incongruity between, on the one hand, his desires,
his recognition of the ethical demand in this particular case, his strength of will for
following the demand of the ethical, and on the other hand, his action which violates the
ethical – reveals how the domain of the ethical is not the totality to which all of human
life is directed.
Nevertheless, there is no justification outside the individual for Abraham’s action:
he does not act to save a nation as Agamemnon does, nor does he act to uphold justice
when his son has acted against his duty as Brutus did with his two sons, nor is he acting
to appease an angry God as Jephthah did.44 Each of these three figures can cloth
themselves in the ethical – their actions are understandable given the social and moral
community of which they are a part, but Abraham’s actions do not make sense in this
way. In faith, Abraham’s actions are described as being higher than the universal, the
state, and society – which all jointly condemn his course of action.
Ordinarily Problema II “Is there an Absolute Duty to God?” is understood as a
defence of the claim that there is, in fact, an absolute duty to obey God which transcends
the demands of the ethical. I have already suggested that there is much more to Silentio’s
argument, since none of the other four accounts of Abraham are instances of faith even
though each one is willing to obey God. The crucial question in this Problema is whether
a person’s most deeply held commitments must be expressed externally in action. If they
must, then Abraham is lost. There is no way for him to act externally in accord with
God’s command to sacrifice his son while simultaneously believing inwardly that he will
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not ultimately lose Isaac. Silentio explicitly frames the discussion in these terms in the
following passage:
[I]n the ethical view of life, it is the task of the single individual to strip
himself of the qualification of interiority and to express this in something
external. Every time the individual shrinks from it, every time he
withholds himself in or slips down again into the qualifications of feeling,
mood, etc. that belong to interiority, he trespasses… The paradox of faith
is that there is an interiority that is incommensurable with exteriority, an
interiority that is not identical, please note, with the first but is a new
interiority.45
It follows from this account that faith is not identical to acting on one’s feelings or
immediate desires. Just as Abraham’s faith begins only with an understanding of the
ethical, so it also presumes that one has applied reason and understanding to the content
of faith. That is, Abraham appears as if he has no understanding of ethics and lives in
immediacy, but that is not true. He understands, believes, and desires to uphold the
ethical, but he coordinates his action according to his unmediated relation to the absolute.
Faith is described as a second immediacy, a new interiority because it is mediated by
neither ethics, reason, nor understanding; but the person of faith understands the value
and importance of each. Abraham’s explicit, external action is to take Isaac’s life, but he
at the same time loves his son and he believes that God will honor his promise.
Since the inward commitment conflicts with Abraham’s course of action, it
cannot be expressed externally in his action. There is no way for Abraham to make his
course of actions consistent with his beliefs and commitments, and there is likewise no
way for him to make others understand why he is acting as he is. As a result, “The one
knight of faith cannot help the other at all… partnership in these areas is utterly
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unthinkable.”46 A partnership with another person requires that one’s goals and intentions
be commensurable with one’s actions. Furthermore, in certain circumstances if one has
Abraham-like faith, one’s commitment to one’s family, friends, etc. may not be able to be
externalized in actions. One may, in fact, be required to act in such a way that it appears
that one hates one’s own family.47 The end result, according to Silentio, is that “the
knight of faith is always absolute isolation… simply and solely the single individual
without any connections and complications.”48 Thus, not only is the knight of faith
outside the framework of the ethical and his social community, but in certain
circumstances, he will act as if he has no commitment to that which he values most
deeply.
The situation becomes even more dire for the possibility of social relations in
Problema III as Abraham is fundamentally incapable of communicating with others
concerning his ordeal. The question that orients Problema III is “Was It Ethically
Defensible for Abraham to Conceal His Understanding from Sarah, from Eliezer, and
from Isaac?” The problem arises because the universal is publicly available and disclosed
to all, whereas the single individual understood as “immediate, sensate, and psychical, is
the hidden. Thus, his ethical task is to work himself out of his hiddenness and to become
disclosed in the universal.”49 A necessary condition for one’s actions being moral is that
one’s reasons for acting should be universal and publicly accessible. That is, one must
explain or be able to explain how it is that one’s action is justified. This basic
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characterization of the difference between hiddenness and silence on the one hand, and
discovery, recognition and disclosure on the other frames the quandary in which
Abraham finds himself.
Rather than desiring to hide his understanding of the ordeal, Abraham is simply
unable to communicate it to others. Silentio does not mean that Abraham is unable to tell
others about his situation; rather, he is unable to help them understand why it is that he
acts as he does given (1) his love of and commitment to Isaac, and (2) his belief that God
will keep his promise to make his ancestors as numerous as the stars through the lineage
of Isaac. “Abraham cannot speak, because he cannot say that which would explain
everything (that is, so it is understandable): that it is an ordeal such that, please note, the
ethical is the temptation.”50 This situation is described explicitly in the first pseudoAbraham story where Abraham tried to explain his situation to Isaac, “[b]ut Isaac did not
understand him.”51 One can imagine how the conversation might go, and Silentio tries to
do just that: “To the question ‘Why?’ Abraham has no other answer than that it is an
ordeal, a temptation...”52 If Abraham believes that God is going to spare Abraham, then
why does Abraham continue to act on God’s command to kill his son? Likewise, if he
believes that God will raise Isaac from the dead after Abraham kills him, then in what
way has Abraham made the movement of resignation? In either case, the
incommensurability between Abraham’s actions and his beliefs result in others being
incapable of understanding him.
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Because of this fact, Abraham does not speak on the trip to Mount Moriah – to
Sarah, Eliezar, or Isaac except for one time – and at that one time, he really “does not say
anything.”53 Isaac asks Abraham: “Where is the lamb for the burnt offering?” And
Abraham responds: “God will provide himself a lamb for the burnt offering.” This
response is understood as an indication, first, that this is Abraham’s only utterance on the
trip to Moriah. He has not informed the fellow travelers – Isaac and Eliezar about his
‘ordeal.’ Second, Abraham’s response is given mere moments before he intends to take
the life of Isaac. If one is considering the trajectory of Abraham’s actions, then the
response to Isaac appears as nothing short of a direct lie. Nevertheless, despite his own
actions, Abraham believes that God will fulfill his promises.54
Silentio claims that this concealment expresses an absolute relation to the absolute
rather than to the ethical.55 Ordinarily this claim is thought to mean that Abraham’s
relationship to God takes precedence over his familial duties to Sarah and Isaac and his
duty to his social community. I will return to this issue in the next section, but it is
important to note that such an interpretation leaves out crucial elements of Silentio’s
argument. First, each of the four alternative accounts of Abraham likewise places the
obligation to God over the obligation to ethics and one’s family. Each one is willing to
sacrifice Isaac, if God requires it; yet each of these Abrahams lacks faith. Second,
Silentio is adamant that the absolute relation to the absolute is not mediated in external
practices or institutions. That is, one’s relation to God need not be manifest in a particular
course of action and it need not be expressed publicly. A person relates to God through
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an inward relation, and a person’s ethical actions or participation in social institutions
should only be a product of that inwardness.
Each of these claims in Problema I, II and III raise the issue of whether the person
who has Abraham-like faith is able to fully participate in social relationships of any kind.
The preceding description of each of the Problemas is not to be understood as an
exhaustive analysis of the contents of those chapters. Rather, I only mean to express the
difficulties one has in finding room for community and interpersonal relationships for the
knight of faith. The possibility is bleak in each of these three respects: (1) Abraham as the
single individual is higher than any ethical obligation he has to other people; (2) Abraham
acts in such a way that is contrary to having meaningful familial or social relationships;
and (3) Abraham is unable to communicate his situation to any other person.
Nevertheless, I will argue that one can be a knight of faith as described in Fear and
Trembling and also be constituted as a self in one’s relationships to others. This claim is
rather weak insofar as I am only defending the view that there is no direct contradiction
between being a knight of faith and having meaningful relationships with other people. I
will make three arguments that jointly support this claim – the incognito response, the
pseudonym response, and the absolute relation response.
3.1.C. Can the Knight of Faith Maintain Relationships with Others?
I claimed previously that the initial characterization of the difference between the
knight of faith and the knight of infinite resignation portrays the latter knight as the one
who is unable to engage in meaningful interpersonal relationships. Perhaps the strongest
support for this way of understanding faith and sociality is Silentio’s portrayal of the
mundane or simple knight of faith as incognito. An individual is “incognito” when “[the
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individual] lives in the finite, but he does not have his life in it. His life, like the life of
another, has the diverse predicates of a human existence, but he is within them like the
person who walks in a stranger’s borrowed clothes. He is a stranger in the world of
finitude, but he does not define his difference from worldliness by foreign dress… he is
incognito, but his incognito consists in looking just like everyone else.”56 The mundane
knight appears just like everyone else and is unrecognizable as a knight of faith. There
are no external characteristics of renunciation that set her apart from other people. The
knight of faith could be any person who appears to be completely caught up in one’s
social environment, occupation, etc., etc. The incognito knight of faith engages with and
fully embraces the members of her social community.
If this type of faith were the only form, then there would be no question about
whether the knight of faith can be a full participant in family and community life, but the
case of Abraham precludes this possibility. Abraham is a knight of faith who appears
from every conceivable point of view to be the knight of infinite resignation as he is
deliberately planning to kill his son, but he believes somehow that God will fulfil his
promise and thus, in the end Isaac will not be lost. The problem of community arises for
Abraham in a way that it does not arise for the mundane knight. The incognito response
fails to show how every knight of faith can embrace human relationships and the finite
world.
The second strategy for answering the objection is the pseudonym response.
Kierkegaard’s wrote Fear and Trembling using a pseudonym – Johannes de Silentio.
Silentio writes explicitly from the perspective of an outsider to Christianity. As such, one
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must ask to what extent we should take Silentio’s characterization of faith and Abraham
as indicative of Kierkegaard’s (or the character of Abraham’s) views. If Kierkegaard’s
views were radically different from Silentio’s, then the characterization of Abraham’s
isolation may be overstated or completely absent for Kierkegaard.
As I mentioned above in section 3.1.A.2, Silentio’s description of faith as the
absurd is from the standpoint of an outsider, and Kierkegaard explicitly make this point
in a journal entry on the topic.57 Even though Kierkegaard argues that faith from the firstperson standpoint is not inherently absurd, he never suggests that the other aspects of
Silentio’s account are inaccurate. C. Stephen Evans explains, “[T]he fact that Johannes de
Silentio writes from an “outsider’s” perspective does not mean he does not accurately
describe faith as seen from that perspective. Furthermore, that perspective is an
illuminating one. By and large, I think Johannes’s understanding of what faith is not is on
target…”58 Thus, even if the term “absurd” is problematic, Silentio’s portrayal of
Abrahamic faith shows the risks and implications for the person who has that type of
faith.
The key question, then, is: is Silentio’s characterization of the social isolation of
the knight of faith inaccurate? My own view is that Silentio accurately describes how
someone whose actions are incommensurable with his or her beliefs will impede his or
her own person’s social relationships. My earlier account of the problems presented in
each of the Problema above describes how Abraham’s incongruence would make it
impossible for him to express his faith in action, in language, or even in discursive
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thought. As a result, Abraham’s relationship to Isaac, Sarah, and his servants would all be
undermined, even if he were able to hide the truth of his actions from them. Thus, if I am
to maintain my position, I must be able to explain how one can maintain a strong view of
both the one-to-one God relation and the importance of one’s social relationships.
Such an account is possible if one has a proper understanding of what it means to
be in an “absolute relation to the absolute.” This characterization of “faith” is included in
each Problema: (1) “[T]he single individual as the single individual stands in absolute
relation to the absolute.”59 (2) [T]here is an absolute duty to God, for in this relationship
of duty, the individual relates himself as the single individual absolutely to the
absolute.”60 (3) [W]e are face to face with the paradox. Either the single individual as the
single individual can stand in an absolute relation to the absolute, and consequentially the
ethical is not the highest, or Abraham is lost…”61 The ordinary way of understanding this
phrase – where the God-relation is thought to trump all other relations – derives largely
from the way it is characterized in the second Problema. As I mentioned above, this
interpretation cannot be correct because each of the pseudo-Abrahams prioritize
obedience to God above all else.
A better way to understand this idea is to explicate it as an unmediated or a direct
relation to God. That is, Abraham’s actions cannot be understood in terms of the ethical
structures and institutions (Problema I). Furthermore, Abraham’s commitment to his son
and his trust in God’s promise cannot be externalized in actions (Problema II) or
language (Problema III). The form of faith as Silentio understands it involves a direct,
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unmediated relation to God. As such, the faith relation is neither determined by social
morality and conventions, nor is it externalized in actions or language. Of course, it could
be the case that an individual only comes to understand his or her faith relation in a
community and it may also be the case that social relationships are developed and
maintained by the knight of faith.62 Thus, although the form of the faith relation does not
require a person to externalize one’s belief in moral actions, ethical institutions, language,
or even discursive thought, the content of a person’s faith may very well require it. The
formal characteristics of faith are exhibited in the figure of Abraham – that is, there is a
direct conflict between his course of action and his inward, subjective commitment; but
the particular conflict exhibited in the figure of Abraham is not one that arises for all
knights of faith. The demand of the absolute may very well be different from the demand
given to Abraham. The mundane knight of faith is one example of a person whose faith
relation allows him to pursue and engage in social relationships, and for another example,
“God may bring the knight of faith to give his love to the neighbor – an expression
opposite to that which, ethically speaking, is duty.”63 This second example figures
prominently in Kierkegaard’s characterization of love, and if indeed it were the case that
God demanded that a person love the neighbor, then “the ethical receives a completely
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different expression” that is dependent on having single individuals who understand the
importance of inwardness.
This interpretation of Fear and Trembling shows two things: (1) the
characterization of the one-to-one God relation does not preclude an account of the
importance the social. The account is, at the very least, consistent with the knight of faith
having meaningful and important interpersonal relationships. (2) This way of
understanding Fear and Trembling anticipates some of the developments during the
social period of Kierkegaard’s thought in 1846-1847. Specifically, he makes an explicit
reference to the connection between the God-relation and neighborly-love which will
receive extensive treatment in the next chapter. This issue is described differently in this
later period, but one can see even in Fear and Trembling – perhaps one of the most
problematic texts for my thesis – that there are indications of a more fully developed
account that is to come. The implication is that there is no fundamental contradiction
between the characterization of the single self in the pseudonymous authorship here in
Fear and Trembling and the later characterization of the social self in, say, “On the
Occasion of a Confession” and Works of Love.
3.2. The Attack on the Church
The image of the faith as a solitary sojourn is commonly attributed to
Kierkegaard. I have already indicated how one of the texts – Fear and Trembling –
thought to support this image actually indicates ways in which it is ultimately consistent
with Kierkegaard’s later, more developed account of the social. In this section, I will
show that Kierkegaard’s critique of Christendom is not inherently anti-social. This task is
more difficult than revealing the social dimension of Fear and Trembling, since even if
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Kierkegaard’s social thought was percolating in the early pseudonymous authorship and
even if it receives extensive treatment in the middle authorship, the final attack on the
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Denmark may show that, in the end, Kierkegaard’s
conception of faith and religiosity leave no room for a social dimension. In fact, it has
been very common among Kierkegaard’s critics to suppose that Kierkegaard’s critique of
the church is indicative of his view of community. They maintain that Kierkegaard has no
role in his thought for sociality just as he has no role for the church. This critique has
historically been one of the most prominent objections to Kierkegaard’s community and
ecclesiology.
As a contemporary, Hans Lassen Martensen thought Kierkegaard was wholly
against any form of society or congregation. Kierkegaard, according to Martensen, denied
all forms of association. He wrote, “He [Kierkegaard] did not want to found a
congregation or establish any new society. He totally denied every notion of society or
associations, and he looked only to individuals….”64 Martensen was, however, quite
hostile to Kierkegaard because he perceived the ‘attack’ literature65 as being directed at
himself.66 He thought Kierkegaard was exaggerating the differences between New
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Testament Christianity and the established religion in Denmark in part because of a
personal grudge with Martensen. Martensen explained, “Søren Kierkegaard’s attack….
was tantamount to an attack on me.” Even though Kierkegaard’s critique was explicitly
directed at the established religion, Martensen felt that “personal issues nonetheless play
an important role.”67
There are many Kierkegaardian scholars who are in agreement with Martensen on
his diagnosis of the social in Kierkegaard. Bruce Kirmmse claims, “In the last part of his
life it looked as if Kierkegaard opposed not only the Danish State or People’s Church, but
also the very concepts of Church and congregation as such.”68 Kirmmse’s entire article is
a very detailed defense of the claim that Kierkegaard’s emphasis on a private, individual
religiosity is antithetical to any church. One scholar summarizes Kirmmse’s position as
such, “[A]ny version of “church” we apparently know would appear to be rejected by
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him [Kierkegaard] as hindering Christ’s invitation to each individual, cluttering it with
clergy and ceremony.”69
Defenses of Kierkegaard’s theological focus have taken many forms. Many
defenders have sought to downplay the significance of the ‘Attack’ as mere exaggeration
and to contextualize Kierkegaard’s critiques. Martensen, for example, thought
Kierkegaard has misunderstood his ‘calling’ to attack the establishment. He said, “To the
extent that Kierkegaard thought that he had a mission in his activity, it must certainly be
said that he missed his calling. His true calling was to be quietly active as an author, as he
had been earlier.”70 Martensen’s sentiment is popular among at least some Kierkegaard
scholars. One Lutheran theologian, who is very sympathetic to Kierkegaard’s
philosophical theology says, “There are several blind spots in his (Kierkegaard’s)
thought, notably the individualism and subjectivism which have prevented most of his
followers from articulating an adequate doctrine of the Church.”71 Another sympathetic
Kierkegaard scholar defended Kierkegaard’s Church by saying that it is indeed defective
when compared to the New Testament but certainly not non-existent.
One of the ways in which the Kierkegaardian stress on ‘the individual’ has
been misunderstood…. is in the contention, constantly recurring, that
Kierkegaard had no essential place in his thought for the Church. I too
maintain that, measured by the New Testament conception of the Church,
Kierkegaard’s ecclesiology is defective. But to assert that his doctrine of
the Church is defective is different from asserting that he had no doctrine
at all.72
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The suggestion is that it would be difficult for anyone to maintain that there is adequate
room for social institutions and a social life if one takes the later attack literature
seriously. Kierkegaard’s attack on Denmark’s most prominent social institution is
thought to reveal the essential and individualistic character of Kierkegaard’s view of the
faith and religiosity.
Although an interpreter could marshal much support for this claim, there are
reasons for thinking that this understanding of Kierkegaard’s later authorship is
problematic. In order to defend this claim, I will offer three arguments that mitigate the
force of these objections. Although these arguments do not show that Kierkegaard, in
fact, has a social dimension to his thought, they do show that Kierkegaard’s criticism of
the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Denmark is insufficient for demonstrating either (a)
that Kierkegaard is unconcerned about sociality or (b) that he rejects every social
institution. As I make my case, I will examine the dominant themes in the final attack
period. I will conclude by examining what I take to be the most difficult passage from
Kierkegaard concerning the possibility of community.
3.2.A. Kierkegaard’s Critique in The Fatherland and The Moment
Much of Kierkegaard’s work, particularly the work published after the 1848-1849
political revolution, is seen as a response to a decadent religious culture. Denmark had
come to be dominated by a mob of ‘Christians’ who were designated as Christian because
of their citizenship in Denmark. The most dominant religious influence was the
traditional Lutheran orthodoxy, and throughout the 17th and 18th centuries attending
Sunday church was compulsory and only those confirmed in the Lutheran church were
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recognized as Danish citizens.73 Kierkegaard sarcastically commented, “Calling oneself a
Christian has become such an important condition for advancing in the world that most
likely one could not get permission to earn his living by maintaining a house of
prostitution without proving that he is baptized and is (that is, calls himself) a
Christian.”74 During Kierkegaard’s lifetime there were political and religious
controversies over compulsory paedobaptism, the Free Church movement, and civil
marriages for non-Lutherans. Each of these issues highlights how the established church
tried to retain power and authority by making everyone Lutheran – the Baptist’s children
were forcibly baptized as Lutherans against their parent’s wishes, prominent members of
the Free Church movement were given their own parishes within the Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Denmark, etc. Kierkegaard writes, “In the interest of the established
order, orthodoxy fights to maintain the appearance that in a way we all are Christians,
that the country is Christian and the congregations are Christian.”75 Kierkegaard often
criticizes the claim that Denmark was a Christian country, with millions of Christians. He
laments, “[H]ow profane Christianity has been made now by the slipshod way in which
everyone is made a Christian as a matter of course and everyone is assumed to be one!”76
These comments are representative samples of a great body of work published after the
political revolution of 1848-1849 up through the final attack on Martensen and the
Danish Church.
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These themes come to a head during the attack period when Kierkegaard brings
his case to the “common man.” Kierkegaard’s final attack on the Evangelical Lutheran
Church is one of three public encounters brought not to the literary establishment in
Denmark but to the common person. The first was in The Corsair affair, the second was
his response to and criticism of Rudelbach’s appropriation of Kierkegaard in order to
promote a free church, and the last is the attack literature. Although the attack literature
may appear on an initial glance to be deeply political, a closer analysis reveals a more
complex situation. I will now examine this situation as well as a number of common
themes in the attack literature.
First, Kierkegaard’s initial critique of applying the label of “truth-witness” to
Mynster is written very shortly after Mynster died and Martensen gave his truth-witness
eulogy concerning Mynster. But Kierkegaard refrained from publishing this piece for
eleven months until well after all the political decisions had been made concerning
Martensen as Mynster’s successor to the Bishop of Zealand, the highest Primate in
Denmark. If Kierkegaard had intended his attack to produce a political result, he would
have led the assault on Martensen well before his ascension to the Bishopric. By
withholding his critique during a period of political transition, Kierkegaard demonstrates
the truthfulness of his claim that he does “not in the remotest manner [want to] clash…
with any civic arrangement whatever…”77 He further demonstrates the truth of this
assertion by continuing to pay the Church taxes just “as everyone else does.”78
Kierkegaard did not want life to become difficult politically for the clergy; rather, he
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wants the Danish Church to admit that it does not represent the Christianity of the New
Testament.
Kierkegaard further distances himself from some political program just as he did
in the Rudelbach controversy by disavowing all “popular movements.”79 Kierkegaard did
not want to be associated with Rudelbach or the free church movement in Denmark, and
vowed that he would not “counter-demonstrate” any government action against him by
mobilizing or aiding a popular movement. Thus, Kierkegaard demonstrates by his actions
that he neither has distinct political motives nor sympathy for the reform movements of
his day. This strategy is similar in structure, if not identical to Kierkegaard’s concept of
the corrective where the aim is to reform from the inside rather than through political
opposition.
These declarations do not necessarily show that Kierkegaard is apolitical, though
it may do so. It could also lend more plausibility to Kierkegaard’s characterization of his
own position as a defense of the establishment. The only way for the established to be
restored and improved is through proper internal development; it is necessary for the
people to develop themselves as selves. The only sense in which the attack literature can
be understood as political is negatively; that is, Kierkegaard thinks that the political
arrangement between the Danish government and the People’s Church of Denmark
precludes the proper development of the individual and inwardness and likewise it
precludes genuine religiosity. In one article, he presents his task as bringing
“amalgamation or alliance of Church and state” to “the most extreme decision.”80 In fact,
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much of the attack literature is directed against the union of Church and state in Denmark
– particularly priests being state functionaries.
The idea that the priest is a state functionary – protected and secure in his faith –
is contrary to Kierkegaard’s conception of genuine New Testament Christianity. Perhaps
the most consistent theme in the attack literature is that New Testament Christianity
involves suffering and that the clergy and “Christians” in 19th century Denmark did not
suffer at all but instead prospered because of their faith. Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s
conceives of his own work as a sort of sacrifice intended to force the establishment to
admit that it fails to live up to the New Testament ideal of the Christian life.81
Kierkegaard claims that he only wants honesty from the establishment and he
expresses Christianity as an entirely separate domain from any political program. His task
is not to fracture the opposition and strengthen his own movement (since he disparages
movements, parties, and the like); in fact, he claims that “to be a Christian” is to have
“the willingness to be sacrificed,” and he explicitly says that this notion is in opposition
to the numerical increase or extensiveness of Christianity. Rather than propagating
Christianity as the early Church did, it is now vital to develop intensiveness by
emphasizing the difficulty of Christianity.82 Just as the faith of Abraham was manifest
inwardly, so Christianity in the New Testament is about inwardness.
Although the attack literature is directed against the most prominent social
institution of 19th century Danish society, there are good reasons for thinking that
Kierkegaard’s critique of this institution is compatible with attributing a higher degree of
importance to the social element within his thought. First, simply because Kierkegaard
81
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rejects one social institution, even an especially prominent one in 19th century Denmark,
does not imply that he rejects all social institutions. His criticism of one particular social
institution is not a rejection of every social institution nor is it a rejection of social
institutions in principle. His criticisms are particular to the religious establishment in
Denmark.
Second, the attack literature also shows that Kierkegaard is concerned with the
political and social events of his day. He does not advocate a specific external change,
but he thinks that there must be an internal change before any external political change
takes place. This internal change may or may not result in any external changes.
Kierkegaard’s political position is essentially a negative one – that is, he is critical of his
contemporary social and political institutions because they preclude the development of
inwardness and genuine religiosity insofar as they declare everyone a Christian because
of one’s citizenship in the country.83 Kierkegaard’s position here does not establish a
positive account of the value and place of interpersonal relationships or community, but it
does not explicitly preclude such an account.
Finally, even if it turns out that Kierkegaard’s criticisms of the Danish Church are
applicable to a significant number of social, political and/or religious institutions, it still
need not imply a rejection of sociality and community as such. It could very well be the
case that interpersonal relationships and community function more appropriately when
they are not established and codified in institutions. Perhaps Kierkegaard prioritizes the
domain of personal human relationships over the propagation of social and political
83
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institutions. My own view is that Kierkegaard is merely critical of the propagation of the
Church numerically or extensively without any attention to inwardness or intensiveness.
In a revealing footnote, which I mentioned briefly above, he writes:
When Christianity entered the world, the task was to propagate the
doctrine. In “Christendom,” where the evil is precisely the untruthful
extensiveness brought about by an untruthful propagation, the
counteracting of this evil (extensiveness) must above all be careful lest it
itself have the form of extensiveness – therefore the fewer the better,
preferably literally a single individual, because the evil is due to
extensiveness (the extensive); thus the counteraction must come from –
the intensive.84
This passage pits New Testament Christianity (which is often praised by Kierkegaard)
against Christendom. The former gained a number of adherents by teaching a doctrine,
and Kierkegaard makes no negative comments about this method or extensiveness within
the New Testament. Kierkegaard implicitly suggests that the extensiveness of New
Testament Christianity is accompanied by an appropriate inwardness or intensiveness.
Extensiveness and numerical success, however, ultimately eliminated the role of
inwardness within Christianity. As a result, Kierkegaard thinks it best to raise the issue
from the standpoint of the single individual. Until intensiveness is recovered one must not
align oneself with movements, parties, institutions, or any such thing. This account does
not in principle preclude these forms of social organization, but the growth of these
organizations without a properly developed sense of the single individual is the antithesis
of genuine sociality and community. In the next chapter, I will argue that there is an
implicit social ideal that justifies Kierkegaard’s criticism of the Danish Church, but first I
will address what I consider the most problematic passage for defending my thesis.
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3.2.B. “An Alarming Note”
Though I have argued that Kierkegaard’s criticism of Christendom ought not be
thought of as a rejection of sociality and community as such, there is one important
passage that seems to suggest otherwise. The passage titled “An Alarming Note” is as
follows:
Those three thousand who were added en masse to the congregation on
Pentecost-is there not something dubious here at the very beginning?
Should the apostles not have had misgivings about the appropriateness of
Christian conversions by the thousands auf einmal? Has not something
human happened to the apostles, so that, remembering all too vividly their
despair over Christ’s death when everything was lost and now
overwhelmed with joy over the effect they have brought about, they forgot
what Christianity really is, forgot that if true imitation is Christianity, such
an enormous conquest as three thousand at one time will not do?
It is very difficult, because there is a curious meeting of two thoughts,
something like the meeting of two persons in a bottleneck where they
cannot pass each other. In Christ Christianity has the orientation of
intensity, that is, it is the pure intensity. The apostles’ task seems to be
oriented toward extensity, the more extensity the better. But to the degree
that intensity is accentuated, extensity is diminished and – yet it was
surely true Christianity the apostles were to spread.
In Christ Christianity is the single individual; here is the one and only
single individual. In the apostle there is at once-community. But in this
way Christianity is transposed into an entirely different conceptual sphere.
This concept has been the ruination of Christendom. This concept is
responsible for the confusion that whole states, countries, nations,
kingdoms are Christian.
*in the margin
Then there is the question whether the principle of hating oneself, which
belongs to Christianity, is not so asocial that is cannot constitute
community. In any case we can get some idea from this about what nonsense this is about state churches, folk churches, and Christian countries.85
Bruce Kirmmse claims this passage presents “Kierkegaard’s final view of the Church: 1)
true Christianity is too unsocial for any concept of congregation; and 2) the concept of
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congregation has been ‘the ruination of Christianity’.”86 The passage is the centerpiece of
his claim that Kierkegaard relegates all considerations of the social and the political
outside the scope of his project. Kirmmse’s claim is provocative, and this passage is an
extremely difficult one. Before examining the passage, it is important to note some
relevant important details. First, the passage is written during the attack period, but it was
never published. It may be suggested, since it is a journal entry, that it expresses
Kierkegaard’s actual views about the relationship between the single individual and the
community. According to my earlier account of Kierkegaard’s work as a corrective, this
claim may have some merit; but it is also the case that Kierkegaard often wrote portions
of his published work in his journals prior to publication, and he would even sometimes
work out the implications of a viewpoint differently from his own in journal passages
(e.g., a position of a pseudonym). Regarding this particular entry, however, there is never
any indication that Kierkegaard intended to publish it. That is, he never revises it or alters
it substantially, and he never suggests that the view he articulates is anyone’s other than
his own.
It is also quite clear that Kierkegaard does not present the passage as a corrective
or a case of intentional exaggeration. First, it is not expressed in a public forum as his
other “correctives” are. Second, he makes mitigating claims and explanations internally
within the text, and this fact suggests that his argument in this passage should not be
understood as a corrective, which is intentionally and explicitly one-sided. These
mitigating claims, however, illustrate how one can understand this passage without
86
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ascribing to Kirmmse’s interpretation that in Kierkegaard’s final analysis Christianity
(and likewise the single individual) is too unsocial to be involved in congregations or
communities.
The passage begins with a series of provocative questions that appear to suggest
that the Apostles’ were wrong to allow “Christian conversions by the thousands.”
Although the questions seem rhetorical, the basic position is very strange since
Kierkegaard regularly promotes “New Testament Christianity” as an ideal to which
Christendom has failed to attain. As I mentioned above regarding the attack literature,
Kierkegaard expressed no reservation about the Apostle’s propagation of Christianity as a
doctrine because it was accompanied with appropriate intensiveness. Furthermore, the
only statement he makes in response to his series of questions is to explain how resolving
the issue “is very difficult.” Though he explicitly characterizes Christ’s Christianity
according to its intensity, he also thinks that the Apostle’s task, which was “oriented
toward extensity,” was surely spreading “true Christianity.” Thus, Kierkegaard explicitly
allows for the possibility that intensity is compatible with extensiveness in some cases,
even if the general rule is that intensiveness diminishes extensiveness. Thus, there is
nothing fundamentally incompatible with Christianity being the single individual in
Christ but also the community in the Apostles.
Nevertheless, Kierkegaard also asserts that the apostolic method of propagation
transposes Christianity “into an entirely different conceptual sphere.” In this sphere,
extensiveness is the most important characteristic of Christianity rather than
extensiveness grounded in inwardness. This ruin of Christendom is attributed to this
subtle shift in that it allows for “whole state, countries, nations [and] kingdoms” to be

97

Christian. Kierkegaard’s final conclusion is not that Christianity is too unsocial for
community or congregation, but it is merely that Christian states and nations are
incompatible with genuine Christianity. This conclusion is much weaker than the one
suggested by Kirmmse, though it is the only conclusion Kierkegaard draws in this
passage. Furthermore, this theme is a consistent one throughout the latter part of
Kierkegaard’s authorship, and it is not surprising to see it expressed here. Now it may be
that Kirmmse sees a stronger premise which could support a stronger conclusion, but
Kierkegaard simply does not make the move that Kirmmse suggests.
The marginal note on the entry – probably written sometime after the original
entry – asks whether the principle of hating oneself precludes community. Once again,
Kierkegaard expresses this issue as a question and he only concludes from it that it is
nonsense to talk about “state churches, folk churches and Christian countries.” There is
no reason to think that Kierkegaard actually thinks that genuine Christianity is anti-social.
Furthermore, if my analysis of Fear and Trembling is correct, then hating one’s family
and oneself (according to Luke 14:26) is not, in fact, incompatible with valuing social
relationships and community.
3.3. Conclusion
In chapter one, I argued that Kierkegaard’s concept of the corrective provided a
basic outline for where one could find features of Kierkegaard’s social thought implicit in
his works that appear to militate against social relationships or community. In this
chapter, I am arguing that Kierkegaard’s concept of the single individual, the one-to-one
God relation, and his final attack on the Church are not fundamentally at odds with any
conception of sociality or community. That is, there is an implicit subtext that reveals a
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social dimension to Kierkegaard’s thought that is not ordinarily recognized. Approaching
the issue in this way accomplishes two goals: (1) it lays the foundation for future chapters
where I will defend my claim that there is, in fact, a positive social dimension to
Kierkegaard’s thought, and (2) it shows how one can incorporate the social dimension of
Kierkegaard’s thought into his already well-developed views of the single individual,
faith and religiosity.
In Section 3.1, I accomplished these two goals by showing that the knight of faith,
in order to actually be the knight of faith, must fully embrace the finite world including
one’s relationships to others. In short, one must be fully committed to one’s own Isaac.
Furthermore, my characterization of “the absolute relation to the absolute” referenced
throughout Fear and Trembling does not preclude social relationships, though it indicates
the importance of the single individual and inwardness in the development of oneself as a
social individual. This theme will receive further treatment in the next chapter where the
single individual and the community mutually develop one another. In Section 3.2, I
defended the claim that the later attack on the Church is not an attack on the concept of
community as such, and I indicated how there is an implicit concept of a community
grounded in intensiveness or inwardness even during Kierkegaard’s most vile attack on
19th century Denmark’s most important social institution. My argument in this chapter is
a modest one where I am only showing how three of the most “anti-social” aspects of
Kierkegaard’s work are not, in fact, anti-social.

Copyright © J. Michael Tilley, 2008

99

Chapter Four: The Primacy of the Social 1846-1847
Kierkegaard’s most extensive consideration of the concept of community or
society occurs after the publication of Concluding Unscientific Postscript in 1846 and
before Kierkegaard’s voluminous writings in 1848 (Christian Discourses, Sickness Unto
Death, Practice in Christianity, Point of View). This period is a brief interlude expressing
the importance of sociality and human relationships rather than either his earlier emphasis
on the individual and the distinction between self and God, as well as other humans, or
his later portrayal of the ideal Christian who takes a stand against Christendom and
society. The former is thought to posit a fundamental split between individuals, and the
latter rails against perhaps the most important social and cultural institution in 19th
century Denmark. If these two views were examined individually or collectively, one
could easy construe the entire authorship as a sort of antisocial diatribe. This middle
period, however, makes the issue much more complicated.
There are two ways to understand these rather different points of emphasis in
Kierkegaard’s authorship. On the one hand, it could be that Kierkegaard considers the
social dimension in terms of the existing human subject, but then ultimately abandons
this element of his thought for some reason, perhaps partly because of the 1848-1849
revolutions across Europe and more particularly in Denmark. Kierkegaard found the
liberal movement in his own country to be odious, and his reaction may shape his final
attack on Christendom. On the other hand, one could advance a developmental thesis
such that although there are different treatments of various topics within the authorship,
each period builds on the insights from the previous one. If one adopts this sort of view,
then it is incumbent upon the interpreter to show how each period of the authorship
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builds on previous stages. It is not uncommon to interpret Kierkegaard’s authorship
developmentally, particularly concerning Kierkegaard’s use of irony and aesthetics on his
path toward authentic Christian existence. Kierkegaard not only suggests such an
interpretation in Point of View, but there are a significant number of Kierkegaard scholars
who defend this view as well.1 Although in recent years the social dimension to
Kierkegaard’s has received much attention, there has been little to no discussion of how
Kierkegaard’s understanding of sociality develops throughout his authorship, how it
relates to other themes within Kierkegaard’s authorship, or how it develops in relation to
the views of his contemporaries and intellectual ancestors.2
In this chapter, I propose a developmental thesis concerning the role of sociality
and community in Kierkegaard’s authorial efforts in 1846 and 1847. In order to provide a
successful account, I first must explain how the earlier characterization of the individual
who is radically alone before God, separate from all others, is further developed by
Kierkegaard’s discussion of sociality. Furthermore the ideas expressed in 1846 and 1847
should at the very least cohere with and render intelligible the developments in
Kierkegaard’s later authorship, including the infamous attack literature. Otherwise, the
social direction in his thought would seem to be a dead end that Kierkegaard pursued at
one point and later abandoned. Additionally, it would add considerable weight to my
claim if an internal connection can be shown between the major works of this period
1
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including A Literary Review, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, and Works of
Love. In this chapter, I show not only the development of Kierkegaard’s expression of the
role of community and society within these three works, but also that this view will
cohere with and form a complete whole with the earlier and later writings.
I will show that the three works of this period build on one another, and this
development mirrors an important journal entry written during this same time period
concerning the dialectic of community. This journal entry suggests a strategy for
understanding not only the connection between these three works but also the role of
sociality in Kierkegaard’s overall authorship. The cumulative effect of this journal entry
and each of these three works suggests that community or society plays a larger role in
Kierkegaard’s thought than ordinarily assumed. This understanding of Kierkegaard’s
social thought illustrates a new facet to our understanding of Kierkegaard, but it also
shows how his thought is related to his contemporaries and immediate predecessors
including Hegel.
4.1 “The Dialectic of Community”
In a significant journal entry written sometime between January and September of
1846, after Kierkegaard had written Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard
discusses “the dialectic of community or society.” This journal entry is helpful for
illustrating both the prevalence of the concept of community during this period, and also
for establishing the connection between the various characterizations of human
relationships and community in the various periods of Kierkegaard’s authorship. The
entry is as follows:
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The Dialectic of Community [menighedens]
or Society [samfundet] Is as Follows:
(1) the individuals who relate to each other in the relation are individually
inferior to the relation.
Just as the separate members of the body are inferior to the body; the
particular heavenly bodies in the solar system.
(2) the individuals who relate to each other in the relation are individually
equal in relation to the relation.
Just as in earthly love each one is a separate entity, but the need for
the relationship is the same for both.
(3) the individuals who relate themselves to each other in the relation are
individually superior to the relation.
As in the highest form of religion. The individual is primarily related
to God and then to the community [menighedens], but this primary
relation is the highest, yet he does not neglect the second.
See also Concluding Postscript, p. 327 [1.428]---that the task is not
to move from the individual to the race but from the individual
through the race to reach the individual.
See an article by Dr. Bayer, “Der Begriff der sittlichen
Gemeinschaft” (in Fichte’s journal, 1844, XIII, p. 80). His
tripartition is: Beziehung, Bezug, Einheit [connection, relation,
unity]. (See pp. 80 and 81.)3
The first line of the journal entry, “The dialectic of community or society is as follows”
indicates the theme for this passage. Here Kierkegaard develops his own dialectic of
community, though it still leaves much to be desired in terms of a coherent development
of a distinct theory of community. This entry purports to show how the individual
becomes progressively more important as the community develops. Ultimately, the
dialectic culminates in a stage where the individual is more important than the
individual’s relations. Kierkegaard explains this concept by pointing out how the Godrelation is more important than other relations but then stresses that this does not
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undermine one’s other relations. This claim is fascinating given Kierkegaard’s
elaboration of the God-relation, and it also opens up the possibility for a theory of
community that is consistent with Kierkegaard’s conception of the God-relation. This sort
of account indicates that for Kierkegaard there is an intimate connection between the
earlier authorship’s focus on becoming the single individual and the later emphasis in
1846 and 1847 on human relationships and community. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard’s
development here is unclear and provides very little in terms of a positive account of
community.4
Kierkegaard does, however, provide two helpful clues for understanding his
presentation of the dialectic of community. First, he suggests that we look at a passage in
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, which says, “the task is not to move from the
individual to the race but from the individual through the race to reach the individual.”5
This reference establishes that the race, the universal, the community are not only ends in
4

The Danish terms used for “community” (menighedens) or “society” (samfundet) are somewhat
ambiguous in the passage. It is not clear whether Kierkegaard means to distinguish the two terms or not.
Menigheden can be translated a variety of ways but it, almost without exception, has a distinctive religious
character as a religious community or congregration, and this word is used in the third numbered stage of
community when Kierkegaard writes, “The individual is primarily related to God and then to the
community, but this primary relation is the highest, yet he does not neglect the second.” It appears, then,
that Kierkegaard is illustrating his point here by describing how the individual can be higher than any of his
or her relations yet not demean the relation by claiming that one can have a one-to-one relation to God, and
yet that will not demean one’s relation to one’s religious community. “Samfundet” also has a multitude of
meanings. It can mean community, society, a religious society, an association, a communion, or the entire
social system. It is not clear in the journal entry whether Kierkegaard intends the terms to be
interchangeable or whether it begins as samfundet and culminates in menigheden. Although the use of
menigheden in the third stage may lend some credence to the latter view, I do not find it definitive. It must
be remembered that each of the sentences where Kierkegaard glosses his description of the status of the
individual vis-à-vis the relation are merely illustrative. They are not intended to capture the entire content
or to limit the application of the concepts. Furthermore, Kierkegaard also fails to use either of the terms in
any other place throughout the journal entry. For this reason, it appears most likely that Kierkegaard is
using the two terms interchangeably. There are only a handful of other passages where both menighed and
samfund are mentioned. They are neither consistently distinguished nor consistently used interchangeably.
There is simply no consistent usage of these two terms for Kierkegaard. The two terms are used together in
each of the following passages, and there is no consistent distinction used throughout each of these
passages. In CI 249 / SKS 1, 288; EO1 48 / SKS 2, 56; EO2 102 / SKS 2, 104; FT 28-29 / SKS 4, 124-125;
MLW 259-258 / SV XIV 271-272; MLW 343-344 / SV XIV 354
5

JP 4, 4110 / SKS 18, 283, JJ:430. CUP, 428 / SKS 7, 389.

104

themselves but also a means for developing the individual in some capacity. The
individual is both the prerequisite for and the product of community. This passage
emphasizes Kierkegaard’s conception of the development of self as a process, and it
illustrates a further connection between the earlier authorship and Kierkegaard’s writings
about sociality and community.
The second suggestion Kierkegaard gives for deciphering this passage is a
reference to Karl Bayer.6 Kierkegaard specifically suggests that we “See an article by Dr.
Bayer, ‘Der Begriff der sittlichen Gemeinschaft’ [“The Concept of the Moral
Community”] (in Fichte’s journal, 1844, vol. 13, p. 80). His tripartition is: Beziehung,
Bezug, Einheit. (See pp. 80-81.)”7 Not only does this suggestion provide a clue for
understanding what Kierkegaard is trying to accomplish in this passage, but it also shows
that Kierkegaard is not directly comparing his dialectic of community to Hegel’s in The
Philosophy of Right. Although the comparison to Hegel’s dialectic of community might
seem initially plausible, and it may be quite philosophically fruitful, it is quite clearly not
Kierkegaard’s source or inspiration for the passage, though Bayer’s theory of community
is distinctively Hegelian in many respects.8

6

Karl Bayer was a 19th century German philosopher and teacher who later became an important political
figure in Bavaria in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Bayer studied philosophy and theology at both
Erlangen and Berlin working with both Friedrich Schleiermacher and G.W.F. Hegel. Bayer made a name
for himself philosophically by writing books such as Betrachtungen über den Begriff des sittlichen Geistes
und über das Wesen der Tugend [Contributions to the Concept of the Moral Spirit and the Nature of
Virtue], and by publishing regularly in some of the more prominent philosophical journals in the midnineteenth century such as the “anti-Hegelian” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie
[Journal of Philosophy and Speculative Theology]. Dictionary of German Biography, ed. Walther Killy and
Rudolf Vierhaus, vols. 1-10, Munich: K.G. Saur 1995-2003, vol. 1, p. 359.
7

JP 4, 4110 / SKS 18, 283, JJ:430.

8

Although it is quite evident that Bayer’s thought deviates substantially from Hegel, it is equally true that
Bayer was heavily influenced by Hegel’s thought and methodology. This is evident in the types of
questions Bayer addressed (e.g., the relationship between freedom and thought, and the relationship
between community and morality) as well as the dialectical approach he employed. If one, however, were
to compare Kierkegaard’s and Hegel’s dialectics of community, then one should be clear about the
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4.1.A. Karl Bayer’s Theory of Community
Because Kierkegaard explicitly references Bayer as an interpretive clue to this
passage, it is important to examine Bayer’s theory of community and Kierkegaard’s
relationship to it. Bayer’s theory of community as Kierkegaard knew it is expressed in
“The Concept of Moral Community,” so I limit my description of Bayer’s theory to this
particular work.9
Kierkegaard’s explicit reference to Bayer’s article and the overall similarity
between each of their theories of community strongly supports the claim that Bayer is
influential at least for this journal entry but also perhaps for Kierkegaard’s own
conception of community. Both of their theories emphasize the importance of the
individual for the community, and they also criticize other conceptions of community for
leaving out an adequate concept of the individual. They also both identify the production
and development of individuals as an important task of community. Furthermore, the
structural differences between them. In Hegel’s view, the stages in the dialectic represent the development
of a particular type of freedom and the reconciliation of unity and individuality. Kierkegaard’s conception,
however focuses on the development of the individual in her relation to others.
9

Kierkegaard only appears to have been marginally acquainted with Karl Bayer’s works. He explicitly
references Bayer’s article, “The Concept of the Moral Community” in two journal entries (JP 4, 4110 / SKS
18, 283, JJ:430. JP 5, 5883 / SKS 18, 284f., JJ:433), and he references, but does not cite, the same article in
Works of Love. Both journal entries are undated though they were written between January and September
1846, and Works of Love was completed in 1847 so it most likely written at approximately the same time.
Although Kierkegaard only mentions this one article, there are some good reasons for thinking that
Kierkegaard was at the very least acquainted with four other works by Bayer. First, in one of the two
references to “The Concept of the Moral Community” there is an allusion to one of Bayer’s previous works
Die Idee der Freiheit (The Idea of Freedom); thus, Kierkegaard was most likely aware of this particular
work even though there is no evidence that he actually read it. Second, Kierkegaard subscribed to the
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie where “Der Begriff der sittlichen Gemeinschaft” as
well as three other Bayer articles were published. Thus, it is likely that he was also aware of these other
three articles even though they are never mentioned. Despite the possibility that Kierkegaard was aware of
Bayer’s other works, one can only reasonably assume that Kierkegaard read and studied “Der Begrifff der
sittlichen Gemeinschaft.” It may be possible to make a more definite statement about this topic by
examining Kierkegaard’s own copy of Bayer’s other articles in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative
Theologie volumes 10, 11, and 18. Depending on the markings in the text, if there are any, one could
determine more precisely if Kierkegaard examined Bayer’s other articles in more detail than I suggest here.
Unfortunately, I have been unable to find these resources since they were sold to a second-hand bookseller
in Copenhagen after Kierkegaard died. I do not know of any way to determine more fully whether
Kierkegaard read Bayer’s other work, Die Idee der Freiheit, since Kierkegaard did not own the text.
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specific three-fold structure of Kierkegaard’s dialectic of community is structurally
similar to Bayer’s three-fold classification in “The Concept of the Moral Community.”10
For both Bayer and Kierkegaard, the free individual who is able to enter into a
social relationship is the central feature in the structure of community. This notion of a
free individual is undermined in both mechanical and organic forms of unity because
both of these types of unions lack a developed notion of this free individual.11 On the one
hand, Bayer thinks that mechanical views of community, such as an account of human
community based solely in terms of economic laws and principles, improperly conceive
of these free individuals as mere parts of the whole. On the other, Bayer asserts that
“organic” theories of communities where solidarity arises out of “common values”
minimize the relative importance of the individual. Bayer directly asserts that the “space”
of community is the individual, and that the individual is essential if one is to achieve a
genuine sense of unity.12 No shared end, territory, language, values, etc. supplant free
individuals as the ground of community. In Kierkegaardian language, solidarity in this
sense is only in the “externals” rather than a product of “inward deepening.” Kierkegaard
is very sympathetic to Bayer’s critique of organic theories of unity as is evident in his
criticism of Grundtvig’s emphasis on Scandinavian nationalism and “common values.”13
These similarities, however, only indicate broad agreements between Kierkegaard
and Bayer. The structural similarities between Bayer’s threefold classification of the

10

Bayer, “Der Begriff der sittlichen Gemeinschaft,” p. 80.

11

Bayer, “Der Begriff der sittlichen Gemeinschaft,” p. 74.

12

Bayer, “Der Begriff der sittlichen Gemeinschaft,” p. 83.

13

Cf. JP 4, 4121 / SKS 20, 193, NB2:131. Bayer’s criticism of an organic community also functions to
undermine virtually any inherently teleological notion of community where individuals are united together
insofar as they have a common commitment to some idea or goal. A similar criticism is operative in A
Literary Review. TA 61-64 / SKS 8, 61-62
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different forms of being-together and Kierkegaard’s dialectic of community reveal
Kierkegaard’s use of Bayer even more clearly. Bayer’s threefold classification of
“Beziehung, Bezug, Einheit” represents different forms of being-together, and the
development from connection to unity constitutes Bayer’s dialectic of community.
“Connection” (Beziehung) is the type of relation that is merely externally in nature, and
Bayer gives the example of a planetary system where entities are related to one another
simply because they are on the same planet.14 “Relation” (Bezug), for Bayer, is the
relationship that exists in a living community. Within this type of community, there is a
unifying principle which directs all of the members of the community toward the same
ultimate end.15 The common end unites the members of the aggregate, and if the
members are aware of the common end then this form of being-together would most
closely resemble Bayer’s description of organic unity, but if they are unaware of the
shared end, then it more closely resembles mechanical unity. Although Bayer does not
say this explicitly, he seems to have animal communities in mind, i.e., an ant colony or a
wolf pack when discussing this form of being-together. Presumably animals do not think
about why they are united in the common endeavor to protect and provide for one
another, in which case this form of being-together would most closely resemble
mechanical unity. The final type of community is characterized by a relationship of
“unity.” This type of community is the only fully realized and genuine community. Bayer
says that this type of community is realized in the realm of spirit. It is the moral-spiritual
community grounded in the free acts of its members.16
14

Bayer, “Der Begriff der sittlichen Gemeinschaft,” p. 80.

15

Bayer, “Der Begriff der sittlichen Gemeinschaft,” p. 81.

16

Bayer, “Der Begriff der sittlichen Gemeinschaft,” p. 81.
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There are two things I would like to point out about this notion, which
Kierkegaard seems to stress as well: first, there is a ambiguity about the relationship
between the moral and the spiritual at least in regards to the community. It is not clear
how to distinguish the moral realm from the spiritual. It could be that adequate moral
practices would suffice to establish a moral-spiritual community, or it may require more
concrete religious practices. Kierkegaard maintains this ambiguity in some places as well,
e.g., in A Literary Review he claims that to be religiously educated is to “become
essentially human in the full sense of equality.”17 Second, autonomy is a key
characteristic of Bayer’s concept of community. Although it is lacking in the planetary
system or a pack of animals, it is a constitutive character of human community.
Kierkegaard stresses this same concept by arguing that the individual is higher than the
relation in the third stage of community and that a decision on the part of the whole can
limit one’s freedom and call into question the extent of one’s freedom.18
Kierkegaard’s three stages of community express his view about the essential
connection between the development of individuals and the development of community.
In the first stage, the relation to others is more important than the individual (as in the
relation of parts of the body to the whole). In the second stage, the individual and the
relation to others are equally valued (as in the relation of “earthly love”). The first stage
is comparable both to Bayer’s organic view of, whereas the second stage is comparable to
Bayer’s mechanical view of community. In Kierkegaard’s final and third stage, the
individual is more important than the relation to others. Kierkegaard’s explanatory

17

TA 88 / SKS 8, 84-85. Though Kierkegaard’s concept of “equality” is deeply religious in the sense that
God-relation or the possibility of the God-relation is the ground of human equality.
18

TA 85 / SKS 8, 81-82.
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comment about the third stage, however, suggests that there is still no ultimate conflict
between the individual and the community. He writes, “The individual is primarily
related to God and then to the community, but this primary relation is the highest, yet he
does not neglect the second.”19 This is a very odd claim, since as many have pointed out,
if one is fundamentally related only to God, then all relations to others are merely
secondary, i.e., God could require that an individual give up her relationships with
others.20 Although this view is no longer the standard view among Kierkegaard scholars,
it is still operative in many contexts.21 In the next section, I address this sort of concern
by using Kierkegaard’s dialectic of community as a model for constructing an
interpretation of the nature of the social relations and their importance in Kierkegaard’s
authorship.
4.1.B. Self and Others in Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Community
Kierkegaard’s description of the dialectic of community displays much more
complexity and development than ordinarily assumed. Within this short journal entry,
one sees aspects of his overall theory of community as well as a historical connection
between developments within German social philosophy.22 Most importantly, however,
this journal entry provides an interpretative framework for understanding the role of
community in Kierkegaard’s overall authorship. I maintain that this entry is instructive in
19

JP 4, 4110 / SKS 18, 283, JJ:430.
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Cf. Martin Buber’s critique of Kierkegaard in “The Question to the Single One,” in Between Man and
Man, trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: MacMillan 1948) pp. 46-93.
21

This view is perhaps the dominant lense through which Kierkegaard is filtered when he is taught to
philosophy and religion students in the U.S., and it reinforces the common conception of Kierkegaard as
not only an antipode of Hegel, but also a critic of any form of sociality or community.
22

This entry shows that Kierkegaard appropriates concepts and ideas from a Karl Bayer, who is a student
of Hegel. Thus, there is some connection between Kierkegaard’s own views of sociality and Hegel’s.
Establishing theoretical connections between the larger developments within German social philosophy,
and Kierkegaard’s thought requires a more detailed analysis.
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establishing the connection between the early, middle, and later authorship, and
furthermore that the middle period where Kierkegaard explicitly and primarily thematizes
questions of human relationships and community has its own internal developmental
structure. In Section 4.2 through Section 4.4, I will discuss how three prominent works of
the middle period deal with the subject matter by developing the insights from the
previous works of the period. That is to say, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits
builds on the results of A Literary Review, and Works of Love takes up where Upbuilding
Discourses in Various Spirits leaves off. I will now outline Kierkegaard’s three stages in
the dialectic of community as it pertains to each of these three works. Each stage involves
a choice such that the individual and the community are both progressively developed.
The first stage, where the individual is inferior to the relation, is where one
initially finds oneself. A person comes to consciousness already, for instance, a member
of a family or perhaps even as a member of public. When one first considers one’s
relationships with others, one is already within a social relation that privileges the relation
over the individual. This form of existence lacks a developed concept of self; the one
living in this form of existence has no self in the Kierkegaardian sense. The choice that
confronts the individual is whether one’s self is determined by external factors such as
one’s feelings, environment, etc., or whether one makes a choice to be a self, to be an
individual. This choice is not a necessary result of one becoming conscious of one’s
predicament, though becoming conscious of one’s situation is a necessary condition for
choosing to be a self. Furthermore, the choice to be a self in this stage does not have any
particular content; it does not matter what sort of self one chooses to be, though the
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second and third stages deal with this question; but if one does remain selfless, then one’s
entire existence is determined by external, contingent factors.
The second stage begins in the position of the egoistic self who looks to provide
for nothing higher than oneself or one’s own (one’s family, friends, etc.). The choice here
is whether the individual will pursue some end higher than him- or herself or remain
committed to those ends justified only in terms of self-interest. Everyone is equal in this
stage, insofar as everyone is thought to be (or rather it is presumed that they should be)
egoistic, rational actors. For Kierkegaard, the highest possible “something” to which one
could be devoted is God, though there are certainly numerous other ends one could
pursue. Still whatever these other ends may be, it is crucial, if one indeed chooses to
pursue an end higher than oneself, that the end is chosen for some reason other than mere
self-interest. Here the self develops a higher degree of agency, insofar as an individual’s
actions are not determined solely out of self-interest. But if one chooses to remain in the
second stage, the self is modeled on others. Aping the interests and desires of others
forms the self. That is to say, one’s desire for objects is derived from the desires of others
just as one’s own desires are partly constitutive of the desires of others within this stage
of being. Modelling the behaviors and desires of others is precisely what leads to the
Hobbesian “war of all against all.” Not only is the use-value of an object fixed by one’s
relation to others, but many objects are desired not primarily for their use-value but
because they are valued by others. Once again, as was the case with the choice to become
a self, the choice to appropriate freely some end higher than one’s own self is not the
necessary result for all who find themselves in this situation.
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The third stage is the position of the person who has chosen to dedicate oneself to
God. As such, the individual’s relation to God has primacy over the relation to others.
Although this is the highest stage, there is also a choice that presents itself within this
stage. And just as in each previous stage, autonomy and agency play a central role. Will
the God-relation render one incapable of having relationships with others, or will it
overflow and make one more responsible for one’s frame of mind and relationships to
others? Guilt plays a central role in a person’s response to this question. Will one’s
failure to live up to the moral or religious ideal isolate and alienate oneself from others
and even oneself, or will it spur one to strive even more strenuously toward the ideal? For
Kierkegaard, the latter choice represents a more developed form of selfhood such that the
individual is responsible for one’s relationship to others, even though the individual may
not always fulfill those responsibilities.
Autonomy and choice, freedom and responsibility, are shot through each of these
stages. The development of the self is the key feature of each stage such that the self-less
(rather than the self-denying) individual becomes, first, a self-seeking egoist, and then a
self who appropriates a higher purpose. This higher purpose then heightens one’s
responsibilities toward others. No stage necessarily develops to the next one, but in each
one, a person is confronted with a choice that will radically change one’s perspective on
oneself and others. This account maps nicely onto Kierkegaard’s dialectic of community,
and it coheres well with the role of autonomy within Bayer’s “moral-spiritual
community.” One can also find this sort of development in the progression from A
Literary Review through “On the Occasion of a Confession” to Works of Love. In the next
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three sections, I will show how each of these works provide support for the tentative
outline presented here.
4.2 The Individual and Sociality in A Literary Review
A Literary Review is a book review of Two Ages written anonymously by
Christine Gyllembourg-Ehrensvaard, the mother of J.L. Heiberg, a member of
Copenhagen’s cultural elite. Kierkegaard was greatly attracted to the book for theoretical
and aesthetic reasons. The book tells the story of people whose lives spanned the end of
the 18th century and the “present age” in the early- to mid-19th century. The former age
represents a passionate age where action reigned over reflection and indecision. The
French Revolution is the archetype of the passionate age. The present age, on the other
hand, is dominated by reflection, envy, and indecision. Committee meetings and
theoretical discussion are preferred over genuine action. Kierkegaard portrays the former
age in a more positive light than the present age, but the present age does have a positive
upshot even though it is in itself negative.
A Literary Review is also Kierkegaard’s most concentrated attempt at describing
the relation between individuals and political phenomena. Section A outlines
Kierkegaard’s account and explains why the present age is unable to regress to a previous
form of communal life, say antiquity. The situation Kierkegaard describes is one where
the ties that once bound us together, such as clan, tribe, nation, etc., no longer function. In
their place, there is an amorphous “public” which both includes and excludes everyone. I
conclude in section C by examining Kierkegaard’s description of the benefits of the
public and the present age, his generally negative portrayal of the same notwithstanding.
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4.2.A. Types of Societal Relations
In his first characterization of society, Kierkegaard develops his concept of the
public through a consideration of three different types of societal relations. The first, he
says, is that which is found “[w]hen individuals (each one individually) are essentially
and passionately related to an idea and together are essentially related to the same idea,
the relation is optimal and normative.”23 In this conception individuals are related to one
another through some medium, i.e., the same idea, and this medium constitutes the
connection between the members of the aggregate. This sort of union is “optimal”
because it recognizes the diversity of the members insofar as each of the participants is an
individual him- or herself, and it recognizes the unity in the relation to the ideal.
Although Kierkegaard does not explicitly say so, he seems to think that the binding
together of clan, tribe, or nation in the past exemplifies this form of society even though it
may seem odd to 21st century ears to hear the structure of clan, tribe, and nation
described as “optimal,” “normative,” and as recognizing the diversity of its members.24
Kierkegaard contrasts this notion with two other alternative notions: first, it could
be that instead of individuals relating themselves to the same idea, the aggregate as a
whole, the masses, are devoted to the same idea. This notion, however, is problematic
because “we get violence, anarchy, riotousness.”25 Since it is the masses rather than
individual that are related to the idea, there is no respect for the diversity of individuals,
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In Section 4.2.B. I argue that Kierkegaard does not intend to defend a return to these sorts of societies.
Although the language is laudatory, Kierkegaard does not envision that a return to these forms of societies
is possible or preferable. Kierkegaard’s failure to criticize these types of societies should not be understood
as an endorsement; in fact, his proclamation of the benefits of levelling and the public as described in
Section 4.2.C. illustrate implicitly his criticism of these types of societies.
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and the result is violence against the one outside the masses. Although this may sound
like an accurate description of some political phenomena today, and although
Kierkegaard is critical of this sort of relation, it is not the object of Kierkegaard’s primary
criticism.26 Rather, it is directed at a third type of relation where the masses, rather than
individuals, fail to be related to any idea. Thus, there are neither individuals nor are there
ideas. The result, Kierkegaard tells us, is “crudeness,” which is pointless externality,
mere custom, levelling, and it also blocks any further access to a unifying and shared idea
by which one could solidify a community. In other words, it precludes the possibility of
returning to forms of society exemplified in his first characterization of society above. In
such a situation there is neither respect for the diversity of individuals nor is there unity
since there is no shared idea.27 The majority of the third part of A Literary Review is
directed against this third conception.
4.2.B. The Impossibility of Retrieving a Unifying Idea
The second account of the development of community or society is really a threeterm “dialectic” of antiquity, Christendom, and the present age. In antiquity, Kierkegaard
says that the culmination of the dialectic was in the eminent. The great individual is
produced by the crowd, and the great individual then educates the crowd. Christendom is
grounded in representation where the people see themselves in their representative. And
finally, the present age is based in equality with levelling as the primary vehicle for
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Kierkegaard does not think that this is an accurate characterization of modern society. A genuine
aggregate where a crowd forms is absent in modern society. If he were rewriting the work in our present
age, it would be fascinating to see a study of how the second and third views relate to one another. What is
the result when there is no shared idea but there are multiple ideas that are shared by ideological groups,
and an attempt is made to institute such an idea as normative for the whole? Kierkegaard criticism of sects,
schismatic movements, and characterless reformers suggests that he would find it problematic.
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producing “the negative unity of the negative mutual reciprocity of individuals.”28 The
final culmination of each stage respectively is the great individual, the representative, and
“negative unity.” It is a negative unity because it is purchased at the expense of
individuality. “The category ‘generation’ [is placed] over the category ‘individuality’.”29
Kierkegaard primarily compares the first and the last stages, antiquity and the present
age. The members of the crowd determined the worth of the great individual in antiquity.
Whereas in the present age, there is no distinction between individuals, one merely needs
to be in the majority or to be represented by public opinion in order for one’s views to
have merit.
One way to read Kierkegaard’s critique of the present age is as a sort of nostalgia
for antiquity. If one could only recapture the communal spirit of antiquity and really be
directed toward some shared goal, then the public, the numerical, and the present age
would lose its strength. Kierkegaard even suggests just this at various points. He says that
in a passionate age, natural relationships are restored such that people have felt
connections between them.30 He also claims that the lack of a strong communal life is
what allows for the rise of the press and the abstraction “the public.” Since the public is
made of particular numerical units rather than genuine individuals, those units can never
experience genuine unity and they can never create a community. A common relation to a
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TA 84 / SKS 8, 81. It is somewhat confusing to me that Kierkegaard refers to both Christendom and the
“present age” as being present. I suspect he means that his society is in a transititional stage from
Christendom to what will become the present age. This notion would explain Kierkegaard’s “prophecies”
toward the end of A Literary Review.
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shared idea on the other hand, Kierkegaard says, would preclude the rise of such a
monstrosity.31
Although Kierkegaard may have some sort of nostalgia for the past and certainly
had negative experiences with the press of his day, he by no means thought a return to the
model of society in antiquity was possible. Not only is access to the idea blocked, since
any attempt to produce a unifying idea would be levelled (cf. Kierkegaard’s claim that
the idea is blocked in his initial characterization of the development of society), but
Kierkegaard also explicitly states that it is “very doubtful… that the age will be saved by
the idea of sociality, of association.”32 In the present age, people would rather watch,
reflect, envy, and criticize any proposed idea rather than participate in its promotion and
development. This sociological condition makes a return to past notions of communal
identity impossible.
Furthermore, Kierkegaard thinks that it is only through levelling that the split
between inwardness and externality or publicity is achieved, and this split is a necessary
condition for the development of the individual. It opens the path to a new type of
relationship grounded on the existing individual. In the next section, I discuss
Kierkegaard’s defence of the public in its production of individuals.
4.2.C. The Importance of the Public in the Production of The Individual
Kierkegaard’s diagnosis of the problem of the present age is that people are
related to one another in a sort of false relation in the public and it is impossible for our
society to return to the communal idea of old. The public is not a real connection between
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people like family, tribe, or even nation.33 Individuals are only united through an
imaginative construction in the various forms of media. The “union” requires no work, no
sacrifice, and no genuine social interaction with actual persons. The way to move beyond
the public and levelling is for there to be genuine individuals who do not need a unifying
idea. It is interesting that Kierkegaard never directly portrays this as a fourth sort of
relation in the opening pages of the third part of A Literary Review, and I suggest it is
because he presents it as the solution to the problem of the present age, the problem of the
crowd, of levelling.
The third category, where there are neither individuals nor unifying ideas, is what
gives rise to the public and levelling in A Literary Review. Levelling, Kierkegaard says, is
produced when the “friction that occurs when the separateness of individual inwardness
of religious life” is absent.34 If differences between individuals are non-existent or
ignored, then the result is that any difference is eliminated through a process of levelling.
For levelling to take place, there must be a “public”.35 The concept of the public is a
distinctively modern phenomenon where particular human beings are merely connected
in the abstract, for example, in public opinion. “‘[T]he public,’” Kierkegaard writes, is
“made up of unsubstantial individuals who are never united or never can be united in the
simultaneity of any situation or organization and yet are claimed to be a whole.”36
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Nation would in contemporary society be a false sort of relation as well. Rather than contemporary forms
of nationalism, I have in mind city-nations in Ancient Grecian society, e.g., Athens, Sparta, etc.
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I am not claiming that diversity is respected when there is no concept of the ”public”. In fact,
Kierkegaard’s second account of society in Section 4.2.A. where the crowd is as an aggregate driven by a
shared idea is portrayed as destroying diversity. The public, however, is more invidious in that it gives the
impression of diversity while eliminating it.
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Although Kierkegaard’s description of the public and its implication for genuine
individuals is bleak, he does ultimately conclude that the development of the public in the
present age contains within it the possibility of producing “a religiously educated”
individual who is able to make a stand against even the whole world.37 The lack of both a
proper respect for the individuals and an adequate conception of a unifying idea for the
aggregate is what gives rise to the public. The public by its very nature precludes any
further access to a unifying idea since the idea itself would collapse under the weight of
the public. The only solution to the problem of the public, then, is to retrieve the
individual.
Levelling, Kierkegaard says, makes “… it such that every individual, each one
separately, may be religiously educated in the highest sense by the rigorous examination
of levelling.”38 The very principle which levelling undermines, that is to say the principle
of individuality uses the process of levelling itself “and thereby religiously develops the
cooperating individual into an essential human being.”39 By finding an eternal or
religious perspective, one is able to escape the temptation of the public, and this eternal
perspective is what makes one an essential human being. To be religiously educated,
according to this passage, is identical with becoming an essential human being. In fact,
Kierkegaard explicitly makes this claim: to be educated means to become an “[essential]
human being in the full sense of equality. This is the idea of religiousness.”40 To be
satisfied with oneself and one’s relation to God which in turn forces one to make up one’s
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own mind rather than submitting to the will of the public portrays a state of affairs that is
possible, though difficult to attain, for each and every human being. This form of
existence is possible only as a result of the public and levelling. Thus, the public and
levelling turn out to have a positive consequence.
The choice to be an individual – to not merely be an anonymous member of the
public – confronts the individual. The existence of the public and the practice of levelling
forces the question upon the individual. In this way, the situation as described in A
Literary Review exemplifies the first choice outlined in Section 4.1.B. If one never
extricates oneself from the public, then one’s beliefs and even one’s entire life is always
determined by the public. Since an individual is the determining factor in one’s self and
one’s beliefs, one cannot simultaneously be merely a member of the public and an
individual.41 Nevertheless, the nature of the individual is ambiguous; in a certain respect
the individual is cut off from “others” represented in the public, but this individual’s
existence has a deeply rooted social conscience, which is manifested in the desire to see
others become individuals.42 The social conscience of the individual becomes more
prominent in Kierkegaard’s next work, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, and it
does so from the perspective of the single individual.
4.3 The Social Responsibility of the Confessor
Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, which includes the abnormally long
“On the Occasion of a Confession,” is a series of religious discourses on various topics.
They are edifying discourses meant to enliven and strengthen Christian believers. “On the
Occasion of a Confession” considers the role and importance of confession and preparing
41
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for confession on the part of individual Christian believers. The primary focus of the
discourse concerns the process of becoming a single individual by means of
unconditionally willing the good in truth. It is only through being a single individual,
alone before God, and knowing the demand of unconditionally willing the good in truth
that one can be adequately prepared for confession
In order to understand not only Kierkegaard’s account of confession but also how
it is that single individuals can relate to one another, one must first understand
Kierkegaard’s account of what it means to have “purity of heart,” which is accomplished
by “willing one thing” or “willing the good in truth,” which are two ways of saying the
same thing. “Double-mindedness,” a term Kierkegaard draws from James 4:8, is really
another term for sin, and it is willing the good plus something else. To be double-minded
is essentially to have two wills that are or could be in conflict with one another.
Kierkegaard illustrates what it means to have purity of heart by contrasting willing one
thing with double-mindedness. In many respects, Kierkegaard’s presentation of willing
one thing and his criticism of double-mindedness is similar to Kantian deontology. To
will one thing, to will the good in truth, requires that one “do everything for the good.”43
Although this characterization alone does not show the Kantian character of willing one
thing, the contrast between willing one thing and being double-minded shows a deeply
Kantian aspect of Kierkegaard’s comprehensive ethico-religious thought in “On the
Occasion of a Confession.”
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Kierkegaard claims that “the good is unconditionally the one and only thing that a
person may will and shall will, and is only one thing.”44 In all cases of doublemindedness there is a possible conflict between one’s willing the good and another desire
or will to something else. To will the pleasures of the world, i.e., sensous pleasure,
wealth, honor, or power, is double-minded since pursuing the good can conflict with
flourishing in each of these respects.45 To will that which is great, no matter whether it is
good or evil, is also double-minded.46 To will a specific task or goal, e.g., winning one’s
beloved, is double-minded insofar as winning the beloved may be best accomplished
through immoral means.47 To pursue the good solely because of the reward one receives
for pursuing the good is double-mindedness if the “reward” is itself not intrinsic to the
good pursued.48 Likewise, to avoid evil and to will the good merely out of a fear of
punishment is double-mindedness.49 To will the good so that the good may be victorious
in the world is also double-mindedness since a person’s commitment to the good is
conditioned by its successfulness. 50 All of these cases are examples of doublemindedness or failing to have purity of heart, but the most common form of doublemindedness is to will the good but only to a certain degree.51 Weakness of the will is an
example of this form of double-mindedness since hardship, temptation, difficulty, or
suffering may alter a person’s commitment of pursuing the good unconditionally and
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without reservation. Compromise, at least as it pertains to pursuing the good, is also an
example of this type of double-mindedness. In all of these cases, it is possible to
distinguish willing the good and willing one’s own happiness, wealth, reward, etc.52 In
order to have purity of heart, one must will one thing – that is, one must will the good in
truth. This means, for Kierkegaard, that one’s commitment to the good must be active in
all times and places, effective for all of one’s relationships, and it must be retained
without compromise or condition. There can be no evasion of one’s responsibility to will
the good. This standard is the one used in preparation for confession.
Although there is a much more lengthy description of one’s obligations to others
in “On the Occasion of a Confession, the situation of the confessor as a single individual
can be understood as an instance of the more general description of the single individual
found in A Literary Review. Kierkegaard’s description of the public and his criticism of
its merely numerical strength in the latter is similar to his attempt to isolate the single
individual from the crowd in the former.53 He presents that single individual as a person
who is fundamentally alone. Not only is there a “remoteness of separation”54 in the single
individual’s understanding and inwardness, but “other people” are presented as obstacles
one must overcome in order to be an actual single individual and in order to will one
thing. The desire to be in accord with the numerical, the crowd, is presented as double-
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mindedness55, and thus, “the good person, if he is also sagacious, will realize that if
anything can be done for the good, he must get people separated as individuals. The same
people, who as individual are able to will the good in truth, are immediately corrupted as
soon as they unite and become many…”56 The crowd cannot even be used to split up the
crowd. “[God] does not want the crowd. He wants only the single individual…”57 And
being a single individual is a necessary condition for willing the good in truth – since one
is not even something “definite” unless one extracts oneself from the crowd.58
Kierkegaard even goes so far to suggest this as a test of whether one has actually willed
the good in truth. You should first make the decision yourself and then determine
whether the masses are in agreement with your decision. If they are not in agreement,
then you most likely have willed the good in truth.59
This image of the individual set against the public and “the whole world” would
seem to preclude any sort of genuine human relationships. For these individuals, there
can be no shared idea which draws them together because the very nature of the public
and the isolated character of human existence in the present age precludes this possibility.
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But finding oneself in this way is precisely the situation found in “On the Occasion of a
Confession.” The discourse is about preparing oneself adequately for confession. To do
so, one must be “conscious of being a single individual,”60 and one must compare one’s
ethical and spiritual life to the concept of willing the good in truth. Confession, at least
within the Christian tradition, is between an individual and God (or God’s representative
in the form of a priest); it is not a corporate practice. To be a single individual
presupposes that one extract oneself from the crowd, and this question is central to the
discourse.61 Being a single individual is the condition for being adequately prepared for
confession. Kierkegaard situates this question within the confines of recognizing oneself
as a single individual in one’s relationships with other people.62
Such statements, however, conceal an ambiguity within Kierkegaard’s
understanding of the relation between the single individual and other people. On the one
hand, to be a single individual is to be alone before God, and that is the prerequisite for
confession. On the other hand, Kierkegaard explicitly states that one’s relationship with
other people should be markedly affected by willing the good in truth. To be aware of
oneself as a single individual is to be “…living in such a way that this awareness can
acquire the time and stillness and liberty of action to penetrate [gjennemtrænge] your life
relationships…”63 This attitude has a number of implications. First, it means that one
cannot will the good or be a single individual and ignore the needs of others. When
Kierkegaard describes weakness of the will as double-mindedness, he says that the
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person who is aware of the good and ignores the sufferings of others, even if he or she is
also suffering, does not will the good in truth. This person merely wills the good to a
certain degree insofar as one is supported by others.64 Second, it does not require that one
withdraw from one’s previous life or occupation. Rather one’s frame of mind toward
other people is shifted such that one’s relationships with other people are illuminated and
transformed.65 Kierkegaard discusses the implications of such a perspective for a person
in a family, a parent, and even one’s everyday social relationships. It is clear from the
text that while the crowd is an obstacle to willing the good in truth, it is not the case that
all human relationships fall into the category of the crowd. Thus relationships with others
may constitute an obstacle to becoming a single individual and willing the good in truth,
but they need not.
4.3.A. Relationships Precluded by the Nature of the Single Individual
In order to clarify which relationships are excluded and which ones are possible
for the single individual, I will first discuss those relationships which are ruled out for the
single individual who wills the good in truth. Then by means of this negation, I hope to
illumine the sort of human relations that are not only consistent with but required by
Kierkegaard’s description of willing the good in truth. First, Kierkegaard distinguishes
these higher forms of human relationships from those who unite in a crowd. Numbering
oneself within the crowd prevents one from willing the good in truth, because it precludes
one from becoming a single individual. Kierkegaard’s criticism of the numerical strength
of the public in A Literary Review helps clarify his notion here. The crowd is simply a
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numerical or physical association and contains no real commitment or connection to other
people. There is no unifying idea and there are no individuals within the crowd. The
crowd is a sort of totality much like the stars in the sky or nature itself are a totality, but
there is no understanding or “mutual agreement” between them.66
Furthermore, the sort of social relationships for the single individual, the one who
wills the good in truth, are not grounded on some telos toward which all the members are
directed. This move is anticipated in A Literary Review because in the present age there is
no access to a shared conception of the good which could unify individuals around some
common idea. A common project does not ground these authentic relationships. Unity
based on some common goal is but another form of the crowd.67 Furthermore, just as
willing the victory of the good is double-minded, in that one separates the good’s victory
from whatever the good actually is, so is unity at the level of a common project separate
from and often purchased at the expense of an actual commitment to other people.68
Genuine relationships are not grounded on common causes, some sort of legislative
agreement, or even a doctrine which gains adherents.69 Common goals do not constitute
genuine human relationships, and Kierkegaard is also clear that disputes and
disagreements do not necessarily preclude relationships. Kierkegaard writes, “A person
66
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can dispute with someone, dispute to the extreme, as long as it is assumed that ultimately
there is something common, a unity in something universally human, in paying attention
to oneself.”70 Thus, just as becoming a single individual is a necessary condition for
willing the good in truth, so is becoming a single individual a necessary condition for
genuine human relationships.
Kierkegaard is also critical of relationships grounded in competition. The first
reason given for this criticism is related to his criticism of a teleological form of unity.
Since there is no goal to which all must strive and attempt to accomplish, there is no need
for comparisons between single individuals. Furthermore, each person, individually,
stands alone before God, and thus, any sort of relationship forged through each individual
pursuing her own self-interest and thereby promoting the “overall good” is inadequate as
an account of human relationships. Any comparison between individuals relative to some
goal does not create and sustain a relationship. On the contrary, it is the undoing of a
genuine relationship. To compare oneself to another is to make them a standard for
judging oneself rather than maintaining the standard of willing the good in truth as the
single standard by which one should be judged.71
The second choice which confronts a person in Kierkegaard’s second stage of the
dialectic of community, i.e., the choice to pursue some higher end than one’s own self,
moves beyond a model of society or community grounded in competition and selfinterest. Each individual self has very similar, if not the same desires, which are both
produced and a product of the competition-based society, and this uniformity of desire is
tied essentially to the pursuit of egoistic self-interest (cf. 4.1B.) which results in the
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Hobbesian “war of all against all.” That is to say, it is only because of the competition
involved in this form of society that a person’s desires, attitudes, and such are
appropriated from others in one’s society, and furthermore, the similar attitudes, desires,
and the like place others directly in competition with others who share those attitudes and
desires.
Alliances are likewise described as being dangerous because of their divisiveness.
They can exclude the commoner or the noble, the government worker or the beggar, the
wise or the ignorant. They create artificial distinctions between individuals that can often
undermine social relations insofar as this “… divisiveness [is] in opposition to the
universally human.”72 Alliances fail to recognize that every person has the ability to
become a single individual, a position which Kierkegaard also maintains in A Literary
Review, and hence has the ability to form commitments as the ground of a social
relationship. Alliances are ultimately grounded on some idea which, although it may
include a great number of people, also excludes others. Such a union cannot be the
ground of a genuine relationship, since the relationship is formed as much, and often
times more so, by exclusion as inclusion. The criticism of alliances in “On the Occasion
of a Confession” anticipates Kierkegaard’s critique of preferential love in Works of Love.
And lastly, the sort of relationship Kierkegaard imagines cannot be some sort of
mystical unity where the self is lost in a union with an amorphous other. I do not mean to
suggest by this claim that there are not elements in Kierkegaard’s thought that are
consistent with losing one self or self-denial. These portrayals, however, do not
demonstrate a complete account of Kierkegaard’s thought, particularly the relationship
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between the single individual and other people. Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the role of the
single one who chooses to will the good in truth suggests a robust notion of the self is
fundamental in order for one to be properly related to God and also other people. Without
a concept of the self distinct from others, there can be no commitment to another. Such a
relation would merely be like the relationship between two parts of a person’s body or the
relation between, say Mars and Jupiter, and it could not constitute a genuine social
relationship.
4.3.B. The Confessor’s Responsibility to Others
Via negation, Kierkegaard has dismissed each of the following forms of
relationship as incompatible with willing one thing: 1.) it is not the crowd, 2.) it is not a
relationship united through a common commitment to some external end, 3.) it is not
grounded in one seeking one’s own self-interest in competition with others, 4.) it is not
based on a commitment which excludes other people (i.e., loyalty), and 5.) it is not a
selfless, mystic relationship. But what is the positive content of the relationship? If all of
these sorts of relations are excluded, what exactly is left? What sort of relationship is
presupposed by Kierkegaard’s description of the confessor’s attitude toward others?
Kierkegaard deals with these issues when he describes the most important
question for the confessor as “…[W]hat is your frame of mind toward others?”73
Kierkegaard means to suggest by this question that a person’s relationships to others are
fundamental in determining one’s position vis-à-vis God. This frame of mind is
characterized in each of the following ways: being “in harmony with everyone – by
willing one thing”, wanting “for everyone what you want for yourself”, and “doing to
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others what you want others to do to you – by willing one thing.” These images are
contrasted with being “divisively in a faction”, being “at loggerheads with everyone and
everyone with you”, and wanting “the highest for yourself, [only] for yourself and
yours.” Willing one thing where only the good can be willed in truth is what precludes
one from being in a faction or at loggerheads with others. It requires that one will the
good, and insofar as the good is a shared good (which Kierkegaard maintains in this
work), one is in harmony with others. Kierkegaard writes, “This willing [one thing] is the
eternal order that orders everything, that brings you in harmony with the dead and with
the people you never saw, with strange people whose language and customs you do not
know, with all the people on the whole earth, who are blood relatives and eternally
related to divinity by eternity’s task to will one thing.”74 Each of the sorts of
relationships, which are excluded in my analysis above, are inverted and described
positively. In this discourse, social relationships are established by socially-minded
individuals who pursue the good of all. But this passage is perplexing because it seems to
imply that not only are one’s relationships to other people in one’s actual social
environment transformed, but also that one is “in harmony” or in some sort of
relationship with the dead, strangers, foreigners from different cultures and contexts, and
ultimately with every single person – past, present and future. Each person is related by
the “blood” of eternity, rather than by the blood of our ancestors, inasmuch as we each
have (or perhaps had – for the dead person) the same task before us, namely, to will one
thing. But in what sense can a living person be in harmony or in a relationship with a
person she does not know, from a culture to which she is completely unfamiliar? How
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can one be related or united with a dead person? Unfortunately Kierkegaard does not
spell out what he means except to say that one is united in willing one thing. In order to
fully understand Kierkegaard’s claim that individuals can be related to the dead, it is
imperative that this claim be compared with a similar claim made in Works of Love. After
analyzing Kierkegaard’s concept of love, I will return in the conclusion of this chapter to
consider the relation to the dead.
4.4 The Concept of and Obligation to Love
To understand Kierkegaard’s concept of loving the dead, it is essential to examine
Kierkegaard’s concept of love as expressed in his most lengthy exposition on the topic in
Works of Love. This work deals with some of the same content found in “On the
Occasion of a Confession,” though Works of Love is more concrete and explicit about
how one performs or practices love, in that it gives varying degrees of implicit and
explicit instructions in multiple deliberations about how one should go about loving
others. In a journal entry, Kierkegaard even comments directly on the relationship
between the two works:
Despite everything people ought to have learned about my maieutic
carefulness, by proceeding slowly and continually letting it seem as if I
knew nothing more, not the next thing – now on the occasion of my new
upbuilding discourses they will probably bawl out that I do not know what
comes next, that I know nothing about sociality. The fools! Yet on the
other hand I owe it to myself to confess before God that in a certain sense
there is some truth in it, only not as people understand it – namely, that
continually when I have first presented one aspect clearly and sharply,
then the other affirms itself even more strongly.
Now I have the theme of my next book. It will be called:
Works of Love75
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In this entry, Kierkegaard not only predicts that people will criticize his new upbuilding
discourses, of which “On the Occasion of a Confession” is a part, because it appears to
leave out the importance of sociality, but he also expresses his understanding of the
relationship between Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits and Works of Love. It is
only with a proper understanding of one’s status as a single individual who is singularly
responsible for doing the good that enables one to develop a more substantive ethic as is
found in Works of Love. In other words, a person’s social and ethical obligations, as
found in, say, Works of Love, are implicit though in a different context in “On the
Occasion of a Confession.”76 This understanding of the relationship between the two
texts shows that the lack of “sociality” in at least this part of these new upbuilding
discourses is merely apparent, and that preparing adequately for confession by having a
proper understanding of what it means to will the good in truth requires that one have a
deep sense of one’s responsibilities and duties toward others. In order to show the
connection between the two works and to further illustrate Kierkegaard most
concentrated account of ethics (and I do not mean the so-called “ethical sphere;” rather,
this ethic is consistent with and constitutive of the life of the single individual who is
“alone before God”) and sociality within this middle period of his authorship, I turn now
to a discussion of Works of Love.
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Works of Love contains two series of fifteen total “Christian deliberations” which
are “in the form of discourses.”77 They discuss the source and object of love, the practical
application of the concept of love in daily affairs, and a number of difficult Biblical
passages dealing with the subject. There are two Danish terms Elskov and Kjerlighed
translated as love in English. Kierkegaard regularly contrasts three types of love Elskov,
Kjerlighed, and Selvkjerlighed in the course of his deliberations where Elskov is the
normal word associated with love and expressed natural affectation. This form of love is
ordinarily understand only as requited love that provides a mutual benefit of some form
to both participants; Selvkjerlighed is self-love and it is is parasitic of Elskov and reduces
it to mere love of the self, but Kjerlighed purifies and perfects Elskov. It is unlimited in
scope in the sense that anyone and everyone is the object of one’s love, and the demand
to love is not conditioned on reciprocity or mutual benefit.78 It expresses a universal
demand, though the application of the obligation to love may change depending on the
needs of the individual, the circumstances of the situation, or even one’s own limitations
of means and ability. Kierkegaard’s deliberations on the subject challenge ordinary
conceptions of love where little distinction is made between these disparate concepts of
love. Although these deliberations are in the form of discourses, they are not discourses
since the purpose of a discourse is directly to edify the reader whereas the purpose of
Works of Love is indirect and analytic, that is to say, through a clarification of these
important concepts Kierkegaard hopes to challenge readers and to bring them out of
77

WL 1 / SKS 9, 7.

78

When I refer to Kierkegaard’s concept of love or simply use the term love without qualification, I will
consistently use it to refer to Kierkegaard concept of love expressed as Kjerlighed, unless otherwise
indicated in the text. If I mean to distinguish the two terms, I will also make it explicit in the text usually by
referring to another form of love as Hong and Hong do in their English translation of Works of Love. The
title of the book in Danish is Kjerlighedens Gjerninger, literally, Love’s works; and the title gives a good
indication of which form of love figures most prominently in the text.

135

“their comfortable way of thinking.”79 In order to situate Kierkegaard’s concept of love
more precisely, I will discuss the object of love, the duty to love, the role of relationships
for the concept of love, and the various manifestations and critiques of preferential love.
4.4.A. The Object of Love
The object of love is ordinarily understood as the object of an individual’s
affection or desire. In his Lectures on Ethics, Kant discusses love, distinguishing it from
esteem. He describes love as a feeling which “takes delight in others” and explains that
this delight is a “delight in their perfection.”80 The love relation, according to Kant,
differs from “esteem.” “Esteem refers to intrinsic worth; love to the bearing which worth
has on welfare.”81 For Kant, love is a feeling that finds another valuable not because the
other is intrinsically valuable but because of the other’s effect on one’s own perceived
welfare. Harry Frankfurt maintains a similar position, and he defends the view that love is
a subjective feeling that attributes value to the object of love. For Frankfurt, the object of
love is valuable to the one who loves because he or she loves it. A person does not love
another because it is intrinsically valuable; rather the love is the value-maker for the
person.82 The subjective character of love leads Kant to conclude that one is required to
esteem or respect rather than love.83
The object of love [Kjerlighed] for Kierkegaard is not the object of desire or
affection. Rather the object of love is “the neighbor.” Kierkegaard’s initial
characterization of the neighbor is grounded on the command to “love your neighbor as
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yourself” (Matt. 22:39). The Danish term Nœste, translated neighbor, literally means the
next one. The word neighbor, Kierkegaard says, is derived from the term “nearest”
[Nœrmeste].84 Nearness is not described in terms of physical proximity because that
would cast love as merely a form of preferential love.85 Nearness, for Kierkegaard, is
understood in terms of an ethical or spiritual proximity. The neighbor “is nearer to you
than anyone else.”86 Kierkegaard understands this claim to mean that the neighbor is
ethically just as near as one is to oneself. The concept neighbor is the redoubling of one’s
own self; “‘the neighbor’ is what thinkers call ‘the other,’ that by which the selfishness in
self-love is to be tested.”87 The concept of the neighbor recast self-love [selvkjerlighed] in
terms of others such that a person’s concerns and love for oneself is directed toward
others as well as oneself.
Because neighbourly love is to love the “other,” and because it serves as a test of
self-love,88 neighbourly love is primarily a state of mind that in various circumstances
will perform particular types of actions out of loving motives. It is “a state of mind”
because Kierkegaard maintains that “someone living on a desert island” could mentally
conform “to this commandment,” since “by renouncing self-love he could be said to love
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the neighbor.”89 This claim shows that the characterization of having the proper “frame of
mind” toward others by willing the good in truth coheres with and is directly related to
Kierkegaard’s concept of love. In loving the neighbor, one transforms and redirects selflove. But the desert island thought experiment shows that object of one’s love could be
no one at all.
Although it is possible, in such extreme circumstances, that one love in the
Kierkegaardian sense even if there were no others, that is not the final word about the
identity of the neighbor. Indeed, neighborly love could lack an object and still be
neighbourly love. But since there is an other, love has for its object the other. Neighborly
love could have no object, but practically, one is to love all people. The identify of the
neighbor as the “next one” shows that the concept of the neighbor is “a multiplicity, since
‘the neighbor’ means ‘all people.’”90 The very structure of neighborly love is such that “if
there is one other peson whom you in the Christian sense love as yourself or in whom
you love the neighbor, then you love all people.”91 By renouncing, or rather redirecting,
self-love toward the neighbor, the object of one’s love is directed to all those who are
encountered. The “next one” that one meets or encounters is the object of neighborly
love. The result is that if one has encountered only one other person, then only that
person is the neighbor, but if one has met millions, then one has millions of neighbors
that one is obligated to love.
This claim is difficult to swallow as it multiplies one’s responsibilities beyond
one’s imagination. But the most important element in this characterization of love is that
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one is to love the person in front of oneself, the next one. This notion imposes a
limitation that allows for one to perform works of love toward others rather than being
paralyzed with inaction due to the multiplicity of one’s neighbors. Although everyone is
potentially your neighbor, it is the single one before you that is in fact one’s neighbor.
The identity of this person, whether it be one’s beloved, child, parent, friend, or enemy is
unimportant from the perspective of this form of love. Love is not directed at a single
person as the object of one’s affections or desires; rather it is directed to the one that is
encountered whomever that may be.
One has an obligation to love the people one sees. This claim does not mean
simply that you love the person before you, but that you find the person before you
lovable. Seeing a person is not seeing merely their perfections and excellences nor is it
seeing their unworthiness. It is seeing the person as they are. All too often, one looks for
the lovable qualities in others and grounds one’s relationship to the person on those
qualities. Or perhaps one wants to mold the person into an image one has of the person so
that the person will be more lovable in certain respects. But this is not loving the person
one sees; rather it is loving some image one has of the individual. It is a form of loving
oneself. To test the other through some mechanism is also problematic, not inasmuch as it
undermines one’s fidelity to the other, but insofar as it means that one may never have
been bound to the other. To test another’s love is not faithlessness within a loverelationship, but the lack of the love-relationship as such. This love, furthermore, is not a
childish infatuation with the accidents or quirky traits of the beloved. Rather the defects
or problems ought not separate and alienate the two united in love, but the two are to
cling together more closely in order to remove the weakness or defect. One, of course,
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should wish that the object of love have qualities of “perfection,” yet this focus should
not undermine one’s love for the object.92
In light of this understanding, it is simply impossible to question whether a person
is one’s neighbor. The very first person, as well as each additional person, one encounters
is the neighbor. One’s neighbor cannot be confused with anyone else since the neighbor
is “all people.”93 To love one neighbor as a neighbor is from this standpoint equivalent to
loving all people since if one encountered any other person, then one is obligated to love
them in the same way though it may manifest itself differently in particular cases.94
Given that genuinely loving one person as a neighbor, or even renouncing selflove appropriately, entails that one loves all people, it would appear that love is related to
a certain common property of all people. Although this notion is accurate to some extent,
it fails to capture the entirety of the love relation. Kierkegaard writes,
Just look at the world that lies before you in all its variegated
multifariousness; it is like looking at a play, except that the
multifariousness is much, much greater. Because of his dissimilarity,
every single one of these innumerable individuals is something particular,
represents something particular, but essentially he is something else. Yet
this you do not get to see here in life; here you see only what the
individual represents and how he does it. It is just as in the play. But when
the curtains falls on the stage, then the one who played the king and the
one who played the beggar etc. are all alike; all are one and the same –
actors. When as death the curtain falls on the stage of actuality…, then
they, too, are all one, they are human beings. All of them are what they
essentially were, what you did not see because of the dissimilarity that you
saw – they are human beings.95
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This passage expresses two positions that Kierkegaard struggles to maintain: on the one
hand, individuals, at least within temporality, are different. They not only have different
goals, attitudes, desires, vocations, relationships, and even space-time locations, but they
are different in a more fundamental sense as well. Kierkegaard often characterizes this
difference in terms of the God-relation which is different, at least on this side of eternity,
for everyone. But, on the other hand, Kierkegaard also maintains that underlying this
difference is a universal quality of humanity, “which is common to all”, an “eternal
resemblance, the likeness.”96 In this passage, Kierkegaard does not explicitly describe
what this commonality is other than it being one’s humanity. He is much more
descriptive about the nature of difference or dissimilarity than commonality. He claims
that the distinctive characteristic of human beings is that each individual is essentially
different and distinct from all others.97 The relationship between love, difference or
dissimilarity, and commonality or universality is of central importance.
Loving the neighbor, Kierkegaard says, does not “abolish dissimilarity, neither
the dissimilarity of distinction nor of lowliness; nor has it wished to effect in a worldly
way a worldly compromise among the dissimilarities; but it wants the dissimilarity to
hang loosely on the individual…”98 Love is not based on cultural reputation or economic
well-being, and one who loves does not dispense his or her love based on differences
between people. “[I]t surveys equably all the dissimilarities of earthly life but does not
divisively take sides with any single one… [T]here is no temporal dissimilarity, neither
the lowest nor the most acceptable in the eyes of the world with which Christianity sides
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in partiality.”99 The one who loves the neighbor sides neither with the rich or the poor;
rather, he or she provides what the other most needs according to the individual’s
particularity and differences. “To love the neighbor is, while remaining in the earthly
dissimilarity allotted to one, essentially to will to exist equally for unconditionally every
human being.”100 For Kierkegaard, love does not determine its object based on
differences, but it loves according to difference.
To love according to a person’s distinctiveness or difference is what it means to
say that “love does not seek its own.” Rather than being committed to one’s own, one is
devoted to the “other’s own.” The one who loves has “eternally forgotten” the distinction
between “mine and yours,” and is “eternally conscious of loving sacrificially” being
conscious of oneself as being sacrificed. 101 Kierkegaard contrasts love according to
distinctiveness with the rigid domineering person and the small-minded person.
The rigid, domineering person “lacks flexibility, lacks the pliability to
comprehend others” and “wants everyone to be transformed in his image, to be trimmed
according to his pattern for human beings.” 102 On occasion the strong, domineering
person may designate a property of another that is to be valued. This property is valued
because the powerful person likes it, but not according to the others individuality. The
powerful person does not love according to another’s individuality because that would
require that the powerful person not define the object of love.
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Small-mindedness is Kierkegaard’s name for those who “could not bear
distinctiveness;” They lack the courage, humility, and pride to become a single
individual.103 “The small-minded person has clung to a very specific shape and form that
he calls his own; he seeks only that, can love only that.”104 Small-mindedness is an
assumed or second nature, not the universal nature of humans as such. It is created
through habituation and practices. The small-minded person rejects any differentiation
from its norm and only loves others who are small-minded in the same way. Each one
sticks to the others for strength and rejects any difference. The commitment to one
another is based on common characteristics and mutual self-interest as opposed to loving
another according to one’s individuality.105 The resulting alliance of the small-minded
results in a conception of true love, friendship, and community that is debilitating and
destructive.
The practice of neighborly love itself reveals the commonality between humans
insofar as all are the objects of one’s love, but the love is manifest according to an
individual’s dissimilarity or difference. The neighbor is not an exceptional category. It is
not a concept which includes some people and excludes others. “[N]o human being exists
or has existed who is the neighbor in the sense that the king is the king, the scholar the
scholar, your relative your relative – that is, in the sense of exceptionality or, what
amounts to the same thing, in the sense of dissimiarlity – no, every human being is the
neighbor.”106 Insofar as we occupy a particular role, as king, scholar, or relative, we are
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not like others, but this is not the case when one is a neighbor. “[I]n being the neighbor
we are all unconditionally like each other.”107 The practice of loving the neighbor
identifies the universal scope of the concept. But it requires more than simply teaching
about the universality of humanity, it requires that one actually love the one before you.
Both the rigid, domineering tyrant and the small-minded coteries fail to appreciate and
love the distinctiveness and differences of others. The object of one’s love in the
Kierkegaardian sense is recognized and loved according to its distinctiveness and
difference rather than in spite of them or while ignoring them.
The object of love is the person one sees and is, therefore, potentially anyone.
This conception of the object of love allows one to embrace everyone and yet love each
one individually according the other’s particularity while at the same time not making
one person the sole object of one’s love.108 Although I have spent a few pages discussing
the object of love, the result is that in contrast with more traditional notions of love –
romantic love or friendship – this form of love is not known distinctively by its object.
The object is everyone and no one in particular.109
4.4.B. The Duty to Love
Contrary to Kant, who characterizes love as a feeling rather than as an obligation,
Kierkegaard explicitly describes love as an obligation that one voluntarily performs.
Kierkegaard frames a major section of one of his deliberations around this thesis: “Only
when it is a duty to love, only then is love eternally secured against every change,
eternally made free in blessed independence, eternally and happily secured against
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despair.”110 Love is free, when it is understood as a duty, in that it is neither the product
of mere habituation nor given only in reciprocity. The voluntary character of love,
however, does not preclude a desire or need to love others. The form of the obligation is
an obligation grounded in an infinite debt toward others, and it is this obligation that
places one in a proper love-relation with others. Throughout the remainder of this section,
I examine Kierkegaard’s characterization of love as a duty, the requisite concept of
freedom related to the obligation to love, and the results regarding one’s relationships to
others.
Love is a duty – not merely a feeling or desire. This characterization of love is
described in relation to the command “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” The
“shall” indicates the obligatory character of love which overturns traditional conceptions
of love such as romantic love and friendship. Although love has existed through many
millennia, the obligation to love transforms love beyond the usual understanding.111
Kierkegaard considers the case of two people who in love swear fidelity to another
whether in friendship or marriage. According to an ordinary understanding of love as a
feeling or desire, love swears by something higher than itself – namely an oath or
promise. The promise is thought to establish one’s obligation to the other, and it is
thought to be more obligatory than love (if there is any notion of an obligation to love).
Kierkegaard asserts that this is not the case. There is no conflict between the oath of
fidelity and love; love itself is an obligation.112
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Because love is a duty, it is a free and voluntary undertaking. Love as a duty
removes the influence of contingency and chance on love. Love as an obligation is not
established by habit.113 Habituation is always something contingent and open to the
possibility of change whereas an obligation is not subject to such contingencies. Habitual
practices among lovers, friends, or any other groups of people are not works of love. Nor
is spontaneous love free. It is merely the product of one’s emotions and desires, and
hence precludes love as an obligation.
The criticism of spontaneous love does not, however, entail that love is to be
emotionless or that the truly loving person is the one who never actually commits or
binds him- or herself to another. Rather, love is described as “a passion of the emotions”
but it is also a “requirement” that must be learned.114 In fact, love as an obligation is
described as a need. “Love is a need, the deepest need, in the person in whom there is
love for the neighbor; he does not need people just to have someone to love, but he needs
to love people…”115 Kierkegaard first contrasts the freedom found in love with the
emotion or feeling of romance, and then he later contrasts love’s freedom with those who
refuse to obligate themselves to others.
Regarding the former, Kierkegaard says, “To love without passion is an
impossibility.” Nevertheless, Kierkegaard is critical of the poet’s conception of love –
where love is idolized as inclination – and he concludes that given the poet’s conception
of love, the poet is “quite right” to conclude that the “command [to] love is the greatest
fatuousness and the most preposterous talk…” Love in the Kierkegaardian sense,
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however, “dethrones inclination and sets this shall in its place.” 116 Passion is transformed
from being subject merely to the whims of inclination to that which is freely imposed
upon oneself. The free choice, however, does not entail that passion, emotions, etc. are
negated in love. Rather, they are transformed and set in their proper place under the
concept of neighborly love.
Concerning the latter, freedom is expressed in terms of one’s need to love others.
Freedom is not exemplified by the one who refuses to bind him- or herself to anything
and wanders around wherever he or she is taken. Rather, it is an “expression of the
greatest riches to have a need; therefore, that it is a need [to love another] in the free
person is indeed the true expression of freedom. The one in whom love is a need certainly
feels free in his love, and the very one who feels totally dependent, so that he would lose
everything by losing the beloved, that very one is independent.”117 But love does not
mean possessing the beloved. Something is dependent when the “law of existence is
outside itself.”118 Thus, duty is liberating since it is self-imposed. Freedom is not merely
the absence of constraints; rather it is established by law which is self-imposed and
internalized. “ ‘Only law can give freedom.’ Alas we often think that freedom exists and
that it is law that binds freedom. Yet it is just the opposite; without law, freedom does not
exist at all and it is law that gives freedom… it is precisely law that makes all equal
before the law.”119 Freedom, then, does not result in the isolation of individuals, but it
brings them together. As it is inscribed on a city building in Copenhagen, “By law shall
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one build the land.”120 Kierkegaard, as with most 19th century Danes, subscribed to this
understanding of freedom, and it lies at the heart of his characterization of love as an
expression of freedom and obligation.
Kierkegaard, furthermore, contrasts this notion of freedom instituted through the
giving of law with “the proud independence that thinks it has no need to feel loved, even
though it also thinks it ‘needs other people – not in order to be loved by them but in order
to love them, in order to have someone to love.’ ” 121 Kierkegaard criticizes this particular
understanding of “independence.” His asserts that needing another person in this sense is
an attempt to promote and gratify one’s self-esteem. Genuine love, “that has undergone
the change of eternity by becoming duty” does indeed “feel a need to be loved” rather
than just to love others; this need is “eternally in harmonizing agreement with this shall;
but it can do without, if so it shall be, while it still continues to love – is this not
independence?... Unchangingness is the true independence.”122 Love is a need in two
senses: the individual needs to love others, and there is also a need to be loved by others.
But one’s obligation to love is not conditioned or grounded on the performance or love of
others. Love would be dependent on others if it ceased when the beloved stops loving.
It is love’s status as a duty that prevents love from changing. It does not change
itself, and it also does not stop when the beloved does not love. Kierkegaard goes so far
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as to say that it expresses a stronger form of love to love the one who hates one back.
Neighborly love, since it is not based on another performance, merit, rank, etc., also
implies that changes can never take the the object of love away. Though circumstances
and changes can take away the romantic lover, the friend, etc., according to Kierkegaard,
no change, not even death, can take way the neighbor.123 This claim is interesting, in part
because it is a way to understand Kierkegaard’s earlier claim in “On the Occasion of a
Confession” that the one who wills the good in truth is in some type of relation with the
dead, and it serves as a precursor to Kierkegaard’s next to last deliberation on loving the
dead. Kierkegaard, in contrast to his earlier treatment as well as his later treatment, says
that neighborly love does not change even in death, since another neighbor will be given.
In the conclusion of this chapter, I will return to consider more fully the duty to love the
dead.
But why should one’s love remain even if the relationship is terminated?
Kierkegaard’s response to this question depends on one’s understanding of the
relationship as well as the form of the obligation to love. On the one hand, Kierkegaard
denies that a relationship is ever terminated for the one who genuinely loves. This
response is anticipated by his earlier claim that not even death can break the relation
between one who loves and another. Nevertheless, it is, of course, possible for one party
to think of the relationships as sundered, while the love of the other remains. Kierkegaard
contrasts the dyadic contract-like relation of lovers with a triadic relation. In the former,
the relationship can be broken if one party breaks the contract. In the latter, however, love
itself is the third “participant” in the relation, and for the triadic relation to be broken,
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then it requires that one first cease loving not only the other person, but all others as well,
since the nature of love is not directed at a single person, nor does it exclude a single
person from being the neighbor. So long as a person continues to love, even if the
relationship is no longer the same as it was before, then relationship remains, at least
insofar as it pertains to this form of love.124 Kierkegaard, furthermore, says that the one
who remains in love does not conceive of the “break” as a break. Rather it is merely an
incomplete relationship; it has not yet been finished. It is like a compound word with the
second half missing and only a hyphen remaining. The one who abides in love sees the
“break” in these terms; through love, the person sees the relationship as one that has not
been finished, and the relationship remains, though in a different sense. 125
On the other hand, the form of the obligation to love is characterized as an infinite
debt, and this sort of obligation is unable to be discharged, since it always incomplete and
unfinished. One cannot fulfil the demands of the obligation and then dispense with the
relationship. “[L]ove is perhaps most correctly described as an infinite debt; when a
person is gripped by love, he feels that this is like being in an infinite debt.”126 The idea is
not that we have received love, and are therefore obligated to repay love; Kierkegaard
says, “[S]uch talk is all too reminiscent of an actual bookkeeping arrangement: a debt is
incurred and it must be paid off in instalments; it is love that is shown to us, and it must
be paid off in instalments with love.”127 One receives the debt by “feeling [oneself]
gripped by love” and by loving others.128 The one who gives love is the one who runs
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into debt – an infinite debt – rather than the one who received love. This sort of
obligation conceives of love as a task and an obligation rather than a mere feeling. This
fact, however, does not deny the possibility of reciprocity in relationships; but reciprocity
is not pursued for reasons of fairness and justice; rather reciprocity of this type of love is
possible only if the love is “infinite from both sides.”129 That is to say, both parties in the
relation must love the other regardless of the other’s love. The relationship is infinite in
commitment, asymmetrical from both perspectives, and is not conditioned on the
performance of the other.
4.4.C. The Role of Relationships in Kierkegaardian Love
Kierkegaard’s notion of a relationship is, at the very least, somewhat strange, and
at the worst non-sensical. I have already indicated how Kierkegaard believes that not only
can one be in a relationship with someone when there is no physical or even virtual
contact between the individuals (as in the case of many “break-ups”), but one can also be
in a relationship to the dead. Although I will not fully discuss the basis for or implications
of this view in Section 4.4.C., I will discuss more ordinary, relationships such as the
marriage relation, and I will also contrast one’s relationship to “the others” with
Kierkegaard’s characterization of one’s relationship to the community at large. Finally I
will consider the importance and characterization of the God-relation in terms of the
obligation to love.
Kierkegaard claims that “Christianity transforms every relationship between
person and person into a relationship of conscience, this also into a relationship of
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love.”130 This claim is the reason why love is a matter of conscience. To characterize love
as a matter of conscience is to remove it from the realm of mere feeling and to make a
person understand that he or she is a single individual who is accountable primarily to
oneself and to God. The love relation as a matter of conscience has an effect on all human
relationships as well as one’s relation to God. In what follows I explain how love
understands and transforms some of these relationships.
Perhaps the most important relation to consider is the marriage relation. This
particular relation is reflected upon often by Kierkegaard, possibly for merely
biographical reasons, but perhaps also because of other reasons. In Either/Or it is
famously written, “Marry or do not marry, you will regret it either way.”131 Kierkegaard’s
authorship, including not only the pseudonymous authorship but also his other
philosophical and edifying works, seems to defend various positions on the marriage
question. In some places, it seems as if the authentic Christian life is antithetical to
marriage which subverts a person’s singular devotion to God, while in other places,
marriage is praised and defended as the result of faith.132
Although Kierkegaard does not have an entirely consistent position regarding
marriage throughout his authorship, his position in Works of Love and also in “On the
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Occasion of a Confession,” which deals with the subject at some length, shows a
commitment to marriage as a justified institution for the faithful Christian. But the love of
one’s spouse is to be understood in the context of one’s primary obligation to love one’s
neighbor. Love [Kjerlighed] for the beloved [Elske] must first and foremost be
neighborly love, and the fact that the other is the beloved is a further specification of
one’s particular relationship to the other.133 To say this does not imply that one loves
one’s spouse in precisely the same way that one expresses love toward others. Love is
manifested differently in the various kinds of relationships, and therefore, the marriage
relationship will be different than, say, a friendship or being brothers. But love within a
marriage must be understood within the framework of neighborly love. To love one’s
spouse is not to forego the love of others, and although it may create additional
obligations toward one’s spouse, it does not create a higher obligation to love. The
change that this conception brings about is not necessarily, or primarily, a change in the
external customs, habits, and practices of a couple; rather it is fundamentally an internal
change in conscience or in the way one thinks of and understands one’s love for one’s
spouse.
This general framework – where love transforms the basis for as well as one’s
understanding of a relationship such that the relationship is a further specification of
one’s obligation to love, even if there are no external, visible changes in the actual
relationship – is applicable to all human relationships. The framework separates the
single individual and holds one individually responsible for one’s fulfilment of the
obligation to love. It is because of this notion of love, obligation, and responsibility that
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Kierkegaard is both critical of a relation to “the others” and also finds a place for
community. Kierkegaard is explicitly critical of relationships to others, first, insofar as it
evades responsibility, and secondly, when it creates an alliance that includes some people
and excludes others. “The others” is a term of derision for Kierkegaard. It signifies
evasion of responsibility and the loss of selfhood. Kierkegaard explicitly states that
reliance on “the others” transforms “all human life… into one big excuse…”134 The
appeal to the “the others” like the “the public” is antithetical to genuine selfhood.
Kierkegaard illustrates the point by saying it is like the case where seven people are
accused of a crime that only one of the seven could have committed. Each says that “the
others” committed the crime; but then it turns out that each one separately said “the
others” did it. The resulting impression, Kierkegaard says, is that it “conjure[d] up a
mirage that has multiplied the actual seven in an attempt to fool us into thinking that there
were many more, although there were only seven…”135 The result is that “the others,”
“the public,” and “the race” all give the impression that there is some entity that stands
apart and that exists independently from the individuals who make it up.
Furthermore, Kierkegaard claims that the rhetoric of love often refers only to
loving someone preferentially, such that one is allied with some human beings against
others. Kierkegaard discusses the usual understanding of marriage as this sort of love.
Marriage understood in this way reveals a love where one’s spouse is loved in such a way
that “one has nothing at all to do with other human beings.”136 Kierkegaard is critical of
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“culture” for similar reasons.137 The cultured or those who desire to be cultured exclude
those who are uncultured. Culture has never “taught [the cultured person] to love the
neighbor…” but instead it “…develop[s] a new kind of distinction, the distinction
between the cultured and the uncultured…”138 This dissimilarity between persons
generates a great division among the people, and even if there is a certain social grace
and polite condescension from the cultured ones, this type of relationship is
fundamentally at odds with actually loving the neighbor – including the uncultured – as
oneself. In both his criticism of a certain understanding of marriage and his criticism of
19th century Danish culture, Kierkegaard draws attention to the dissimilarity between
alliances directed against others and neighborly love.
Despite this criticism, there is ample room in Kierkegaard’s ethics of love for
community. There is, he says, an “innate need for companionship.”139 Of course, this
need must be understood in its proper context, but many confuse a distaste for “the busy,
teeming crowd, which as companionship is both too much and too little” with a distaste
for society or community as such.140 Kierkegaard’s idea of genuine companionship,
however, can be constituted by only genuine individuals, rather than people consumed
and defined by the crowd or the public. This understanding of community is operative as
a background concept in A Literary Review and “On the Occasion of a Confession,” but it
is expressed explicitly in Works of Love. Kierkegaard, in his final deliberation in the work

137

The term ”culture” in Danish is Dannelse. It, like its German counterpart Bildung, is a much deeper term
than its English translation. It could be translated education, development, or culture. 19th century
Denmark is regarded as being the most ”cultured” period in Danish history, and Kierkegaard thought the
emphasis on this form of culture and education was problematic for the common person.
138

WL 59 / SKS 9, 66.

139

WL 154 / SKS 9, 155.

140

WL 154 / SKS 9, 155. Kierkegaard himself may be subject to this criticism in certain passages.

155

says that since love is a work pertaining to the universally human as opposed to the
various differences among humans, then the praise of love brings all together in the
“community of the highest,” since it neither sows dissension between the gifted and the
ungifted, cultured and uncultured nor does it unite some in a common poverty or
mediocrity.141 Rather, each individual loves all others as her neighbor, and people are
united in virtue of one’s status as a neighbor rather than in terms of one’s commonalities
with other human beings, whether the commonalities are religious or political, national or
cultural. It is this universal obligation to love as well as the performance of one’s duty
that unites human beings in genuine companionship. “Only when all of us, each one
separately, receive our orders at one place, if I may put it this way, and then each one
separately unconditionally obeys the same orders, only then are there substance and
purpose and truth and actuality in existence.”142
Despite the language of universality and his account of a common duty to love for
all people, this obligation should not necessarily be understood as dictating the specific
actions that one takes toward others. When describing the importance of internality
versus externality, Kierkegaard says that it is possible for two individuals to do opposite
things and yet both be “honest, upright, respectable, God-fearing…” This, he concludes,
precludes the possibility that all of one’s obligations find their “completion paganly in
political or social life” since if one’s obligations are formed in virtue of one’s legal,
political, or social situation then one would have more specific descriptions of one’s
obligations to others according to the legal or political code of one’s government, or the
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social norms of one’s society.143 The multiplicity and differences among persons
corresponds to a multiplicity of ways for people to fulfil the obligation to love the
neighbor as oneself.
As was the case with the marriage relation, a person’s relationships to others as
members of one’s community are not precluded by the obligation to love. Rather, those
relations are transformed and understood in terms of the overall obligation to love the
neighbor as oneself. There is a place, then, for ordinary human relationships and
community within Kierkegaard’s ethics of love, and the changes that his ethics of love
are to make are primarily internal, that is to say it changes the way one understands one’s
relationship with others, rather than external changes in the actual practices or customs
within the relationship itself. Changes in practices and customs may occur, but they need
not.
Throughout this section, I have been discussing a person’s obligations to other
human beings. The relationship between one’s obligations to others and the God-relation,
however, has been largely ignored, even though it is a central concept throughout Works
of Love. Kierkegaard’s understanding of the relation between the God-relation and works
of love toward other human beings is described in various ways in different deliberations.
In what follows, I will synthesize these descriptions with an eye toward demonstrating
that the God-relation does not undermine one’s other, human relationships. Kierkegaard’s
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view as expressed in Works of Love vindicates the explanatory sentence in the journal
entry on the dialectic of community, where he says that the primary relation is to God,
but it does not demean other relations.
The God-relation in Works of Love is characterized as the “middle term” for
neighborly love.144 This description is used in multiple places with multiple shades of
meaning. In one passage, one loves God foremost, and this love of God enables one’s
love for the neighbor.145 In another, equality before God is understood as the middle term
such that one’s equality to all other humans before God is that which makes one a
neighbor.146 Expressed another way: Genuine love, Kierkegaard argues, requires
threeness - the lover, beloved, and love itself, i.e., God. Without the third element, love
itself, Kierkegaard asserts that it is impossible for love to move beyond mere
mutuality.147 In another passage, God is described as the judge who guarantees and
upholds an individual’s commitment of love to other people.148
When describing the connection between the God-relation and a person’s
obligation to love others, Kierkegaard hovers between two extremes. He often
emphasizes the importance of the God-relation, and he claims that without having a Godrelation, it is impossible for a person to genuinely love another. “The God-relationship is
the mark by which the love for people is recognized as genuine.”149 The claim is that
unless one’s love toward another ultimately points the others toward God, then it is not
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genuine love, no matter the level of affection and the quality of one’s commitment to the
other. Kierkegaard furthermore says, “[T]o help another person to love God is to love
another person; to be helped by another person to love God is to be loved.”150 This
conception of the God-relation and love for others would, at the very least, seem to
preclude the atheist or even the non-Christian from being able to love in the
Kierkegaardian sense. But it is important to note that Kierkegaard’s most extreme
comments of this sort are primarily only found in a single deliberation in Works of Love –
the third deliberation in the first series entitled “Love is the Fulfilling of the Law.”
I do not mean to diminish the significance of Kierkegaard’s claims here, but it is
also important to read the passages above alongside of Kierkegaard’s other, more
inclusive passages about the connection between the God-relation and love of one’s
neighbor. Thus, on the other extreme, Kierkegaard claims that the more one loves the
“unseen God” the more one “will love the people [one] sees.”151 The reverse, he says, is
not true; it is not the case that the more one rejects those one sees one demonstrates or
establishes one’s relationship to the unseen. If someone maintains that one loves the
unseen God but is unable to love those one sees, then the person, Kierkegaard says, has
replaced the merciful God who always points “away from himself… saying, ‘If you want
to love me, then love the people you see; what you do for them, you do for me… into an
unreal something, a delusion.’”152 Contrary to the usual understanding of many portions
of the overall authorship, Kierkegaard claims, “God is too exalted to be able to receive a
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person’s love directly, to say nothing of being able to take pleasure in what can please a
fanatic.”153
This transposition of human relationships through the image of the God-relation is
not an isolated comment in Works of Love. It is a relatively consistent theme, and it is
strongly expressed in the conclusion of the book. Kierkegaard claims that a Christian
like-for-like, where every single one of a person’s human relationships are transformed
and made into a God-relationship, has replaced the Jewish Taleonic law.154 This means,
for Kierkegaard, that although “a person ultimately and essentially has only God to deal
with in everything,” one must still remain “in the world and in the earthly circumstances”
to which one is assigned.155 The transformation of all human relationships into the Godrelation by means of the command to love ensures that the one-to-one God-relation does
not exclude and dispense with one’s obligations and relationships to others. On the
contrary, it means that there is an identity established between loving God and loving
other people. That is to say, to love people is to love God, and likewise, to love God is to
love people.156 The one-to-one God-relation is described as an educator that ultimately
brings it about that the pupil has a proper love-relation to other people. Such a
characterization is, of course, ambiguous in that one could be devoted to God in such a
way that one does not demonstrate love for others (except perhaps in trying to help others
into a genuine God-relation, that is, loving another by proselytizing), or one could
dispense with belief and love of God altogether and claim that the only important thing is
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that one love others. Kierkegaard’s comments on the topic, however, seem to preclude
both of these possibilities. Devotion to and love of God is described as being ultimate and
essential, and, in Works of Love, God is the source of the command to love one’s
neighbor, and love of God is the motivation behind obedience to the command. This love
of God flows over into one’s relationships to others, and one’s love of others is evidence
of one having a genuine or proper God-relation. God is neither to be dispensed with nor
are human relationships to be eliminated.
It turns out, then, that the example of marriage is instructive, and the God-relation
does not expel and reject these more ordinary social relationships. Although love is a
matter of conscience rather than a matter of drives and inclinations, feelings, or
intellectual calculation, these features of human life – drives and inclinations, feelings,
intellectual calculation, etc. are not supposed to be eliminated. Rather, an internal change
– “infinity’s change in the inner being” – is sought.157 External circumstances and
institutions may be transformed by the internal change, but it is not necessary that they be
changed. For this reason, Kierkegaard is able to claim that Christianity is not indifferent
“to friendship, family relationships, to love of the fatherland,” that is to say, to patriotism
and nationalism. Instead it is concerned with all of them in a “spiritual way.” The goal is
not to change the externals but to “seize [them], purify [them] , sanctify [them], and make
everything new while everything is still old.”158
4.4.D. The Concept of Preferential Love, Its Manifestations, and Kierkegaard’s Critique
Although ordinary human relationships including marriage, friendship, and even
patriotism and nationalism are not excluded by love, many of the reasons for entering
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into these sorts of relationships are displaced by love. Kierkegaard’s critique of
“preferential love” in it many manifestations demonstrates this fact. In this section, I
describe the characteristics of preferential love, its various manifestations and forms, and
elaborate on Kierkegaard’s critique of these forms of love. The result of this analysis is
that one has a more distinct picture of what a relationship or union grounded in
preferential love is like as compared to a union founded in love as such.
Works of Love itself is best understood as an analysis and evaluation of two
different understandings of love. First, an attempt is made to clarify and distinguish
preferential love, which is ultimately merely a form of self-love in the negative sense, and
love itself [Kjerlighed]; and second, by means of the command to love, we are to displace
and redirect self-love outward toward others.159 Both erotic or romantic love and
friendship are described as forms of preferential love. That is to say, the idea of love in
both forms of love is “to love this one person above all others, to love him in contrast to
all others.”160 The object, form, and results of preferential love are all fundamentally
different from its genuine counterpart. Instead of love being directed toward all others, it
is directed singularly at a particular individual or group of individuals rather than other
individuals. Instead of love being an infinite debt that never ceases, it is established and
maintained only in mutuality. Instead of love transforming one’s understanding and
perhaps even one’s practices regarded the other, the ordinary understandings of romantic
love and friendship, for instance, remain the same.
Kierkegaard’s most lengthy treatment of an preferential love concerns the
examples of erotic or romantic love [Elske] and friendship. He claims that passionate
159

WL 20-21 / SKS 9, 28-29.

160

WL 19 / SKS 9, 27.

162

preferential love is ultimately a form of self-love. Self-love “selfishy embraces this one
and only self that makes it self-love,” and it is, therefore, not other-regarding.161
Passionate preferential love, e.g., erotic love and friendship, are likewise interested only
in one’s own self even though it may appears otherwise on a superficial level. “[E]rotic
love’s passionate preference selfishly encircles this one and only beloved, and
friendship’s passionate preference encircles this one and only friend. For this reason the
beloved and the friend are called, remarkably and profoundly, to be sure, the other self,
the other I… [and self-love] resides in the I, in the self.”162 Although one can seemingly
give selflessly toward to object of erotic love or friendship, even give away all of oneself
and one’s own, it is still a form of self-love. There is a distinct class of subjects or
perhaps one subject who is the object of one’s affection, and the relationships are
grounded on the qualities of the person or persons. In itself, Kierkegaard says, admiration
for another is not necessarily a form of self-love, but when it is directed at a single object
with the expectation that the object of one’s admiration will return the admiration in a
singular way, it is a form of self-love.163
It is also a form of preferential love when one substitutes an imaginary idea of
how one thinks or wishes the other should be for how the other actually is. Such a love is
an expression of self-love insofar as one is not loving the other person but instead only
loves one’s idea of how the other should be.164 This sort of love is similar to the rigid,
domineering person’s love discussed above, where the beloved or the friend is loved only
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insofar as he or she fulfils the wishes and thoughts of the tyrant. The idea of the beloved
or friend having a distinct and developed self independently of the tyrant is
fundamentally at odds with this sort of love.
Kierkegaard’s description of love is often presented as a critique of preferential
love. “[T]he spirit’s love,” he says, replaces “erotic love and friendship [on] the
throne.”165 Neighborly love is set against love based merely on drives and inclination.
One is forced to choose between practicing preferential love and neighborly love.166 In
the remainder of this section, I will explain two ways in which Kierkegaard’s account of
love is a critique of preferential love. The first way is that preferential love relies on good
fortune or luck. Love is not characterized as a “moral task” since any such task would be
determined purely based on one’s circumstances and inclinations rather than a universal
obligation. To fall in love or to find a great friend “is a stroke of good fortune,” and if this
is the case, then within the parameters of preferential love there can be no universal
command to love – either in the sense of erotic love or friendship – since an individual is
not able to fulfil the command if it so happened that the person did not fall in love or find
the friend.167 To conceive of love as obligatory, one must dispense with the notion of
preferential love in favor of neighborly love.
But why, one may ask, should love be thought of as obligatory? The issue was
primarily addressed in Section 4.4.B. on the duty to love, but Kierkegaard also thinks it
reshapes and transforms human relationships in a meaningful and important way. In order
to justify this claim, I will examine the type of union possible for preferential love and
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compare it to the union grounded in neighborly love. There are two major passages where
Kierkegaard compares relationships of preferential love to those of neighborly love.
In the first, Kierkegaard claims that there are not two distinct selves in the case of
erotic love and friendship. Rather, people only love “each other by virtue of the
dissimilarity or by virtue of the similarity that is based on dissimilarity (as when two
friends love each other by virtue of similar customs, characters, occupations, education,
etc. that is, on the basis of the similarity by which they are different from other people, or
in which they are like each other as different from other people).”168 The union of the two
entities forms, according to Kierkegaard, a single self. What Kierkegaard means by this is
not merely that the two share the same desires, goals, lifestyle, etc., though these are
often the same in these cases, but that the joining together is also such that the more
united and joined the two become the more divided and separate the two are from
others.169 The two are one self in the sense that the two only look after the self-interest of
the members of the union, and therefore, their love is only self-love expanded to include
one other (or a group of others) in distinction from everyone else. They represent a single
self as it pertains to love understood as a natural determinant, that is to say, love
grounded in drives and inclinations.
Neighborly love does not unite two in the same way that preferential love does,
since it presupposes two distinct selves. “[L]ove for the neighbor cannot make me one
with the neighbor in a united self. Love for the neighbor is love between two beings
eternally and independently determined as spirit; love for the neighbor is spirit’s love, but
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two spirits are never able to become one self in a selfish sense.”170 Neighborly love is
neither grounded solely in drives, inclination, nor a similarity of dissimilarities since it is
a command; nor is this form of love such that the more one loves one person (or group of
persons) the more one draws away from others. This understanding of neighborly love
does not, however, preclude the possibility of reciprocity, though in any particular
instance it is accidental; that is to say, the love relation does not require or demand
reciprocity. If reciprocity exists in a genuine love relation, then it is “infinite from both
sides.”171 Each individual in such a relationship makes the decision to fulfil one’s
obligation to love the other, but the decision is not conditioned on the decision of the
other (otherwise it would not be neighborly love).
In his second passage dealing with the comparison of the types of unions that
come about through preferential love and neighborly love, Kierkegaard focuses on the
external products related to a union, the “mine and yours,” or personal property. In both
preferential love and neighborly love, he says that there is a cancelling of “mine and
yours” in a union of two, but the cancelling is in different respects. To say that “mine and
yours” is cancelled is to say that the two properties mine and yours are interrelated and
that to dispense with one term is to dispense with the other, since the two only exist in
relation to one another. The thief, for instance, discards any notion of what is yours, and
therefore, even if the thief fails to recognize this fact, justice demands that there is no
“what is mine” for the thief (at least until the punishment is finished).172 The same is true
if what is mine is removed from the equation. Removing what is mine is a form of love
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that is self-sacrificing and self-denying which dispenses with “yours”. To deny in the
practice of love what is mine is to make mine yours, but it cannot be yours since the
concept of what is yours is only in opposition to what is mine. By doing away with any
notion of what is mine, the union that come about because of neighborly love cancels
“mine and yours.”173
Preferential love, on the other hand, cancels mine and yours in, for example, the
experience of erotic love or friendship. The experience is such that the person “feel[s]
outside himself, outside what is his own, carried away in blissful confusion, so that for
him and the beloved, for him and the friend, there is no distinction mine and yours,
‘because,’ declares the lover, ‘all that is mine is his….. and what is his….. is mine!’”174
This cancelling is different from neighborly love’s cancelling in three related respects:
first, it is an experience that one undergoes rather than a choice to love that cancels the
distinction between mine and yours in preferential love. Second, the cancelling in the
latter is only related to the distinction between what is the lover’s and what is the
beloved’s, but it is not a total renunciation of what is mine in relation to all others. The
cancelling in the former is complete, but in the latter is it limited to a particular
relationship. Third, because in preferential love the distinction is abolished only for the
lover and the beloved, the union of the two results in a communal “mine” distinct from
all others. What is “ours” in the relationship is for us the same way that what is “mine” is
for me. The two, once again, seemed to have formed a single self, and erotic love and
friendship are in the end “only enhanced and augmented forms of self-love.”175
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It is important to note that although Kierkegaard is sharply critical of relationships
based purely on preferential love, he never advocates that a person abandon those
relationships. Rather, he suggests, as I argued in the previous section, that neighborly
love has the ability to transform and purify these relationships. It is not the case that one
should stop loving the object of one’s preferential love. “Far from it,” Kierkegaard says;
rather, only the preferential love for the beloved or the friend should be removed such
that one’s love for the beloved does not become mere self-love.176 Furthermore, the
command to love the neighbor means that one should love the beloved faithfully. The
“love for the neighbor [should] be the sanctifying element” in one’s relationships. One is
to love one’s friend honestly and devotedly, but this love is always grounded in
neighborly love.177
4.5 Conclusion
Kierkegaard’s model of love presents an ideal that, however impractical or
perhaps impossible to practice, underscores the importance of human relationships, not
within the so-called “ethical sphere” of human existence, but as an outgrowth of the Godrelation itself. It is an ethic on the other side of the religious for Kierkegaard. It is neither
completed nor does it find its ultimate purpose in the community or the nation in the form
of laws or customs. It shows that for Kierkegaard, an authentic God-relation does not
preclude one from being in relationships with others. On the contrary, not only is one’s
“frame of mind” toward others transformed by being a single individual alone before
God, as “On the Occasion of a Confession” explains, but one’s actual relationships and
ethical practices toward others are also fundamentally changed as a result of being a
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single individual. In order to further clarify the connection between the three works
examined in this chapter – A Literary Review, “On the Occasion of a Confession,” and
Works of Love – I will first show how the latter two works deal with Kierkegaard’s
problematic claim that one can be united to the dead. This notion further illustrates the
extent of one’s ethical and social obligations to those radically different from oneself. In
the second part of the conclusion, I show how each of the three works relate to
Kierkegaard’s “Dialectic of Community.” In the third part, I examine how my account of
Kierkegaard’s social thought and his relationship to Karl Bayer sheds light on his
relationship to Hegel’s social thought.
4.5.A. Loving the Dead and Being United with the Dead
I now turn to Kierkegaard’s discussion of loving the dead in the ninth deliberation
of Works of Love. I begin by clarifying Kierkegaard’s claim that remembering the dead is
the highest ideal of love, and I respond to the charge that this claim makes Kierkegaard’s
ethic in Works of Love unresponsive and asocial. I conclude by drawing out the contrast
between loving the dead in Works of Love and being in a relationship with the dead in
“On the Occasion of a Confession.”
In the next to last deliberation in Works of Love, Kierkegaard claims that
remembering or recollecting the dead is a work of love, and that it, in fact, is the most
unselfish, freest, and faithful form of love.178 Kierkegaard praises recollecting the dead
because it most evidently involves no mutuality. The individual who recollects the dead
receives nothing in return from the dead, and the dead person him- or herself does not
178
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motivate one by guilt to remember like one’s living parents, child, or beloved. In the
deliberation Kierkegaard compares two forms of mutuality: heterogeneous and
homogeneous reciprocity. The heterogeneous form of reciprocity is when an individual
receives some form of direct payment or repayment for love bestowed. The payment is
heterogeneous insofar as it is an external good attached to particular sorts of apparent
works of love. The homogeneous form of reciprocity occurs when an individual is loved
in return in a loving relationship, in short requited love.179 Although one may disagree
with Kierkegaard’s suggestion that requited love is a form of “payment” and grounded on
some notion of reciprocity, that is not his main point in this passage.180 He merely wants
to establish that recollecting the dead is a more unselfish form of love than reciprocal
love, since remembering the dead does not necessarily produce an external good or
requited love from the deceased.
Love for the dead, Kierkegaard comments, is similar in many respects to love for
children. A helpless child who needs constant care and nurture, yet who, at least at first,
does not provide any particular reward for the care and nurture seems to be unselfish in
the same way that recollecting the dead is. Yet there are important differences. First,
Kierkegaard points out that a child can motivate his or her parents through guilt. A baby’s
crying serves to motivate parents to provide for the baby’s needs, but a dead person does
not have a similar motivational device. The absence of a motivating factor in the case of a
dead person, according to Kierkegaard, makes loving the dead a freer form of love than
loving a helpless child. Second, there is, in most cases, a bright future for a child, where
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the child will love his or her parents and even sometimes care for and provide for them in
old age. Furthermore, even the smaller pleasures of seeing an infant smile are compelling
the parent to care for and nurture the child. But there is no future possibility for the dead
person to compel others to remember him or her, and even if there were, say in the form
of a will or trust, there would be no requirement to remember the dead lovingly.
Furthermore, there is also no possibility of improving one’s relationship with the person.
One cannot extract a smile from the dead. Kierkegaard concludes that recalling the dead
is the most unselfish and freest form of love since it, first of all, does not depend on any
form of reciprocity and secondly, it is not likely to be motivated by external factors (e.g.,
the baby’s crying).181
Kierkegaard even goes so far as to suggest this as a test for one’s love. The test is
mentioned in various places and it shows that recalling the dead is the most unselfish, the
freest, and the most faithful form of love.182 In his most lengthy description of the test,
Kierkegaard compares examining a person loving the dead to watching a person dance
alone or shadowbox. This examination allows one to isolate all the appropriate variables
such that one is merely examining how it is that a person loves without one’s
observations being tainted by the influence of another “actual person.” These sorts of
observations where the other is absent reveal the first person in the clearest possible light.
And examining how one loves the dead removes any possible mechanism for repayment
or selfishness, for requited love, for being compelled through guilt, etc., and it shows
most clearly how one loves since “… a person [who] relates himself to one who is dead
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[is the] only one in this relationship, inasmuch as one who is dead is no actuality; no one,
no one can make himself no one as well as the one who is dead, because he is no one.”183
All too often, a person’s actual love for another is obscured by external motivating
factors and the reciprocity in a relationship. As such, if one truly wants to know about the
quality of a person’s love, one should examine the way that a person remembers and
recollects the dead. The way in which one recollects the dead demonstrates the true
character of one’s love. Remembering the dead is the ideal of love, and any other
manifestation of love is more or less pure, unselfish, free, and faithful to the extent that it
approaches the qualities found in remembering the dead. The result is that the highest
ideal of love, the purest form of love, is exemplified by two fundamental qualities: first, it
is wholly asymmetrical. Just as one’s relationship to the dead does not depend on some
type of mutual exchange, so should all other relationships be grounded in asymmetrical
commitments between individuals. I do not mean that one should not be responsive to the
needs of another, but that one’s commitment to the other person is not dependent on the
actions, needs, or understanding of other people. In a genuine relationship, a person is
committed to the other whether he or she is in need or in plenty, whether he or she is
loving back or not, and whether he or she understands or fails to understand the person.
This asymmetry does not entail that there is, in fact, no reciprocity. Rather, it requires
that if there were no reciprocity, one would not terminate the relationship. Reciprocity is
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not a necessary condition for a genuine relationship. Thus, mutuality does not preclude
one from approaching the highest ideal of a relationship, but making reciprocity a
condition of one’s relationship would undermine the relation. Kierkegaard’s use of
recollecting the dead as a test suggest that one should consider recollecting the dead
primarily as a sort of thought experiment designed to test the character of one’s love.
The second fundamental quality is exemplified by the freedom found in highest
ideal of love. Love cannot be compelled or extracted from another. By its very nature, it
must be given freely. As above, this quality should be viewed as an ideal or test. A
child’s mother does not necessarily love her child less than the person recollecting the
dead, but one must be careful that one’s love for the child is not exchanged for acting out
of guilt or from other motivating factors. The test serves as a call to self-examination in
order to put one’s commitment under fire. Thus, the highest ideal of love is a free,
asymmetrical commitment to the other.
Although Kierkegaard’s discussion of the topic in Works of Love sheds light on
his meaning in “On the Occasion of a Confession,” it does not fully explain the passage.
Even though it is clear that all of the fundamental qualities of love discussed in Works of
Love are operative in his earlier work, it seems that something more is needed in order to
understand Kierkegaard’s conception of the individual’s relationship to others in “On the
Occasion of a Confession”. Kierkegaard seems to maintain that one is in some sort of
actual relationship with strangers, foreigners, and dead people in “On the Occasion of a
Confession”, whereas in Works of Love, he is more careful about the claims he is making.
It may be that his more developed deliberations on the subject in Works of Love are
simply elaborated more fully and that there is no conceptual difference involved. It is
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telling that the question for Kierkegaard in “On the Occasion of a Confession” asks about
one’s “frame of mind” toward others.
The transformation of one’s frame of mind may not, however, be all that distinct
from the view presented in Works of Love. Being in harmony with strangers, foreigners,
and the dead is merely the first result of the transformation of one’s frame of mind. There
are three other results that are more significant for one’s relationships to real, concrete
individuals, though certainly these results are not as captivating as the discussion of the
dead. First, one does not make an exception of oneself before the law. Making an
exception of oneself would presuppose some sort of distinction between oneself and
others which would undermine one’s relationships with others.184 Second, individuals
from various classes and cultures should be treated in a like manner. Each person is
recognized as an individual rather than as a member of a class or as a person with a
particular vocation.185 Kierkegaard does not maintain that one’s class or occupation are
unimportant. Rather one’s relationships with others should not be based on these
classifications. In fact, he claims that one’s relationships with other people are fulfilled
through one’s occupation, family life (including one’s relationship to one’s spouse,
children, and other family members), and in all of one’s social relations.186 Lastly, the
transformation brings it about that one recognizes each person as universally human. To
will one thing, Kierkegaard says, is to recognize a common human concern, namely, that
one should will one thing.187
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Perhaps it is in these more mundane and practical aspects of everyday
relationships that clarify how one can be in harmony with the dead and strange people.
One is in harmony with them because one is willing the good in truth. The task of being a
human being is to will the good in truth, and one is in harmony with all human beings,
even the dead and those who you do not know, when one wills the good in truth. There is
a decidedly moral and ethical component to Kierkegaard’s discussion of the topic here,
which coincides with the more concrete ethical obligations expressed in Works of Love.
Nevertheless, the focus in each of these two works is rather different. “On the Occasion
of a Confession” presents the situation from within one’s moral and ethical context (that
is to say, from within one’s particular vocational calling, one’s family life, etc.) from
which one must act. Works of Love does this as well, when, for example, Kierkegaard
claims that one’s ordinary relationships are transformed by the obligation to love the
other as a neighbor. Still, in Works of Love, the primary emphasis is on love itself rather
than on the responsibilities that arise out of one’s participation in social institutions like
one’s vocation, one’s marriage, or one’s community. The close ties between Works of
Love and “On the Occasion of a Confession” concerning a person’s relation to the dead
illustrates, at least somewhat, an internal connection between the works of 1846 and
1847, but this connection is further elaborated and presented in the next section as a
hermeneutical tool for understanding the role of community and relationships in the
overall authorship.
4.5.B. The Dialectic of Community From 1846-1847
The three stages of Kierkegaard’s dialectic of community progressively illustrate
the importance of the individual in community structures. In the first stage, the relation
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itself, the result of the connection between two individuals is understood to be more
important than the individuals within the relation. This stage is where one finds oneself
when one becomes aware of oneself as already a participant in some social relation or
institution. One may find oneself as, for instance, a member of a family or religious
organization. To be conscious of and to consider the importance and place of one’s
relations with others always arises out of a situation where the person exists in some
social relation that privileges the social relation over the individual as a participant in the
relation.
This understanding of a person’s social constitution is expressed in and criticized
in much of Kierkegaard’s early authorship. In fact, many of Kierkegaard’s works are
written according to a dialogical framework expressing directly the social relation by
which two or more individuals are purported related to one another. Either/Or, for
example, is a dialogue through the written medium between the aesthete A and Judge
William; Repetition, likewise, is the story of how the young man learns about the nature
of repetition through his experiences with his muse/beloved and his dialogue with
Constantin Constantius. The edifying discourses are addressed directly to the single
individual, that is, Kierkegaard’s reader, and they express the social relation that exists
between the edifying author, Kierkegaard, and his readers. In each of these works the
relation between the participants in the dialogue is the starting point for the overall
investigation into a particular perspective or work.
Furthermore, this characterization of social relations is like the relation between
individuals within “the public” as described in A Literary Review. One finds oneself as a
member, a number, of the public, and one’s perspective is shaped in fundamental ways
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by one’s status as a component of the public. The individual’s existence is constituted by
and through one’s membership in the public,188 and one’s identity is grounded in some
shared identity of all those who make up the public. To say that an individual is inferior
to the relation, the public, in this instance, is to say that the individual lacks a genuine
self. The self is determined purely by external, contingent factors such as one’s
environment or a group or set of groups to which one associates. The public takes
precedence over all of its members.
Although some form of awareness of the self’s dependence on external,
contingent factors is a necessary condition for having not only a more developed self but
also more developed social relations, the fact that one is aware that one’s self is primarily
derivative from these sources will not always result in the choice to have a self. That is to
say, awareness of this fact is a necessary condition for the development of selfhood and
community, but it is not a sufficient condition. The development of selfhood arises out of
an autonomous choice; it is a free decision. The choice that confronts one in this stage is
whether one is completely determined by externalities such as one’s feelings or
environment, or whether one will be an individual on the way to higher forms of
selfhood. This view appears to express a paradox: it seems to say that selfhood is
achieved through an autonomous choice, but an autonomous choice already presupposes
a self who is free and undetermined by external factors. To speak, then, of a choice to a
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be a self is paradoxical, if not unintelligible. The only response to the dilemma is that the
choice itself is the very same event as becoming a self. The two are mutually constitutive
of one another, and one can never arise without the other. It is also important to
emphasize that the choice to be a self in this stage does not entail any particular idea of
the self; the self is not necessarily a moral or responsible self, and it need not have a
unified life purpose. The developing self in this stage happens by negation; that is, the
person refuses to allow external contingencies to completely shape and direct one’s life
but instead freely appropriates them.189
The choice to be a self is where the second stage in the dialectic of community
begins. In this stage, the individual is said to be equal to the relation. Kierkegaard’s
illustrative comment on this stage refers to “earthly love,” that is, to preferential love.
Mutuality is the primary characteristic of relationships within this stage. The desire for
mutuality presupposes a conception of the self such that one looks to provide primarily
for oneself. Even a person’s apparently other-regarding actions implicitly contain within
this stage the expectation that such actions will be returned by the others. Everyone is
considered equal in this stage, at least inasmuch as everyone is thought to be an egoistic,
rational actor. It is presumed that everyone ultimately looks out only for one’s own, or
one’s own group, interest. These interests, however, are produced only in relation to the
interests of others. That is to say, the interest of each person is modeled at least partly on
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the interest of others. Kierkegaard contrasts the person who has a genuine or primitive
self to the self that is acquired through aping others.
[People] can be influenced to do one thing just as well as another, to fast
as well as to live in worldly enjoyment--the most important thing is that
they are just like the others, that they ape each other, do not stand alone.
But God wants neither one nor the other; what he wants is primitivity. Yet
this is the effort we shrink from most of all, whereas we relish everything
called aping. From this it is apparent what little good it does to bring an
objectively greater truth to bear--and then to allow aping. No godliness is
achieved by this, for in the divine sense the truth is primitivity. This is
why God's word is ordered in such a way that every assertion is
accompanied by its opposite. This demands primitivity. But both teachers
and followers feel best in aping and by aping--therefore they are lovingly
unanimous about it and call it love.190
According to this passage, a person can be influenced toward any number of ends
because a person is unable to “stand alone.” Conforming oneself to the image of others is
not only a product of being a mere component of the masses, but it is also an expression
of self-interest. Kierkegaard claims that people call aping “love,” and his criticism of
preferential love is that it is ultimately done out merely for reasons of self-interest.
In the following passages, Kierkegaard is even more explicit in drawing a
connection between aping and self-interest. He writes:
If all the millions of people alive approached me all together with the
greatest receptivity and said: "What do you want us to do? Do you want us
to do as you do?"--I would be obliged to answer: "No, there is not one
single person alive who shares my task, and, in my opinion, not one
person among these millions shares a task with another"-- --and precisely
this is what I must proclaim… [A]s a rule all proclamation aims at
collecting people; mine aims at dispersing them, making them single
individuals… [M]y task is this: myself an individuality and keeping
myself that (and in infinite love God in heaven keeps an eye on this), to
proclaim what boundless reality [Realitet] every man has in himself when
before God he wills to become himself. But consequently I do not have a
stitch of doctrine--and doctrine is what people want. Because doctrine is
the indolence of aping and mimicking for the learner, and doctrine is the
190
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way to sensate power for the teacher, for doctrine collects men. The
proclamation of individuality is: blessedly compensated within oneself--to
be sacrificed to men. In the strictest sense my proclamation is a service of
the spirit. Everything proclaimed with the aim of collecting men is
connected in one way or other to an animal definition of man… [But] man
is still an animal-creature, and the indolent inclination to ape and mimic
seems to be his second nature. That is why it is so very easy to collect
them in a herd; that proclaimer will get thousands who want to learn what
he says by rote, perhaps become professors of it... But are not the
proclaimers all too frequently to blame when the whole thing becomes
aping and copying, for it is to their earthly and temporal advantage…
What a tragedy, these thousands and thousands--every single one could
grasp the highest, acquire the infinite worth that is his--but all goes to
waste, and everything is also done by the politicians and their like to
transform them into specimens.191
Kierkegaard begins by contrasting his message and task with the proclamation that others
give. He claims that he does not want people to do as he does, and he does not even think
that any person shares the same task as any other.192 The demand of uniformity found in
these other types of proclamations is itself in the service of self-interest, and the view that
all human beings are rational, egoistic agents is an expression of this type of uniformity.
To the extent that people accept this view, they are transformed into “specimens” such
that one is more able to control and manipulate them and thereby gain some “earthly or
temporal advantage.”
A similar criticism is evident in Kierkegaard’s critique of comparison in both “On
the Occasion of a Confession” and Works of Love. Since, according to Kierkegaard, there
is no shared goal or task to which all must strive, it is not only wrong to compare oneself
to others, but it is impossible for people to be compared in relation to the fulfillment of
191
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such a task. Each person, as an individual, is said to be alone before God, and a person’s
task or vocation is itself individual and unique. It follows that any comparison improperly
conceives of another person’s or group’s task as one’s own rather than coming to terms
with one’s own task.
The choice which confronts a person in Kierkegaard’s second stage of the
dialectic of community, the choice to pursue some higher end other than one’s own selfinterest, moves beyond a model of society or community grounded in competition and
self-interest. For Kierkegaard the highest to which one can be devoted is God; all other
ends are ultimately subordinate and understood in terms of the relationship between the
single individual and God. While this is Kierkegaard’s position, it is important to make
two explanatory comments about it: first, having a relation to God does not necessarily
mean that a person is pursuing some interest higher than him- or herself. It could be the
case that a person believes in God or is religious primarily because the person seeks to
either gain some benefit or escape some punishment by means of worship. In which case,
the person’s relation to God is grounded in self-interest. Second, in making the choice to
pursue some higher end other than mere self-interest, it is not necessary that the all
relations be subordinate to the God-relation, so long as the end chosen is higher than
oneself, that is, the end is chosen not because of mere self-interest but for another
reason.193 By making this sort of choice, the single individual has a more developed form
of agency since one’s actions are not purely determined by self-interest.
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The third stage of the dialectic of community is reached when the individuals in a
relation are each superior to each of their relations. Kierkegaard illustrates this stage by
suggesting that it is like the “highest form of religion.” The individual is primarily and
fundamentally related to God and only secondarily to other people. Despite the primacy
of the God-relation, it is not the case that one should neglect or abandon one’s relations to
others because of the God-relation. This illustrative comment coheres well with the basic
views concerning the relationship between the God-relation and a person’s relations with
others in “On the Occasion of a Confession” and Works of Love, and it reframes the way
one conceives of the so-called one-to-one God-relation. Instead of the God-relation
severing or rendering unimportant all of one’s human relationships, it transforms the way
one ought to understand one’s relationships with others, and it establishes a duty to love
all people.
This stage of the dialectic begins when the single individual has chosen to pursue
the highest end, that is, God, and has, therefore, subordinated and understood all other
ends under God. Although this stage most closely resembles the common image of
Kierkegaard’s religious views, he merely conceives of this type of relation as the startingpoint of the third stage of the dialectic of community. There is, like each of the previous
stages, a choice involved in the progression of the third stage. It is also the case, just like
each of the previous stages, that the choice to remain where one begins, that is, where the
self is absorbed and lost in some greater social organism, or where an individual only
pursues his or her own egoistic self-interest in conflict and competition with all others, is
a substantial risk. Although it is possible and arguably reasonable that one should
advance in each stage of the dialectic, there is no guarantee that a person will decide to do
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so.194 The risk in the third stage is that the God-relation will be such that a person is
rendered incapable of having relationships with other people. This situation could arise
by fulfilling the demands of the God-relation, as it would have been for Abraham in Fear
and Trembling had he actually sacrificed Isaac, and it could arise when a person isolates
and alienates oneself from others and even oneself when one fails to live up to a
strenuous religious ideal.
Both “On the Occasion of a Confession” and Works of Love speak directly to this
problem. In the process of preparing for confession, the single individual is challenged to
examine oneself compared to the standard of willing the good without condition,
reservation, or concern for any sort of reward, and Kierkegaard claims that this
examination of oneself, if carried out thoroughly, will result in the transformation of
one’s frame of mind toward others. One is responsible for what happens in one’s
marriage, friendships, parent-child relations, work relationships, and other social
relationships, and the standard of “willing one thing” holds one responsible for how one
acts or reacts in those relationships no matter how the other acts or responds. For
Kierkegaard, the God-relation does not dispense with a person’s relationships with others
but it heightens one’s responsibility toward others.
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A person’s duty to love all people is, for Kierkegaard, a command given by
God.195 This duty, Kierkegaard claims, requires that one understand human relations in
terms of the God-relation. All of a person’s human relationships are, by this command,
transformed into the God-relation. This is what Kierkegaard means when he claims that
God always directs people to love others as one’s way of loving him. Although “a person
ultimately and essentially has only God to deal with in everything,” one must still remain
“in the world and in the earthly circumstances” to which one is assigned.196 This claim
from Works of Love vindicates Kierkegaard illustrative comment in his journal entry on
the dialectic of community. All human relationships are transformed into the Godrelation by means of the command to love, and this not only entails that there is a strict
identity established between loving God and loving other people, but it also ensures that
the God-relation itself does not exclude or dispense with a person’s obligations and
relationships to others. The choice in the third stage of the dialectic of community is the
choice to have one’s God-relation reshape and transform the way one understands and
acts in one’s relationships with others. This understanding not only precludes the view
that Kierkegaard’s conception of the single individual is antithetical to human social
relations, but it establishes the opposite view – that other people are not obstacles to
overcome on the path to selfhood and to God but are instead an essential part of a
person’s becoming a self and coming to God.
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The progression of the dialectic of community internally within A Literary
Review, “On the Occasion of a Confession,” and Works of Love shows that there is at the
very least a concentrated attempt at developing a role for the social in 1846 and 1847.
The fact that this development proceeds from where much of the earlier authorship leaves
off suggests that the social dimension of Kierkegaard’s thought is tied to the earlier
authorship, and even though some of the issues are reframed and reconsidered in the
latter authorship they are not abandoned and an argument can be made that the social
themes during 1846 and 1847 prepare one for the social critique of 19th century Danish
culture and the established Church.
4.5.C. The Relationship Between Kierkegaard’s and Hegel’s Social Thought
I have indicated previously that Karl Bayer, whose thought Kierkegaard deeply
appreciated, was a student of Hegel. Bayer adopts the language, argumentative style, and
many concepts from his mentor. The connection between Hegel and Bayer along with
Kierkegaard’s appropriation of Bayer’s theory of community reveals a new dimension to
the relationship between Kierkegaard and Hegel. In this section, I will describe the
current scholarship concerning the relation between Hegel and Kierkegaard, and then I
will explain how my understanding of Kierkegaard’s social thought reveals a new aspect
to this on-going discussion.
Although this view is no longer as universal as it once was, Kierkegaard is
generally regarded as a strict opponent of Hegel’s philosophical system. There is a
substantial amount of apparent textual support for this type of view, but it has maintained
it dominance primarily because of historical and institutional reasons rather than for
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textual reasons.197 These historical and institutional reasons prefigure the way that many
people interpret critical comments directed explicitly at Hegel. One of the most recent
and in depth attempts to understand the relationship between Hegel and Kierkegaard is
Jon Stewart’s Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered. Stewart attempts to point
out the inadequacy of what he describes as the “standard view” of the relationship
between Hegel and Kierkegaard. Stewart states that the standard view envisions the
relationship as a “purely negative one” where Kierkegaard “… rejected Hegel’s
philosophy wholesale and… used aspects of it only to ridicule them, often ironically.
Kierkegaard is thought to have been entirely original and to have taken leave of his
philosophical predecessor right from the beginning.”198 In other passages, Stewart
associates the “standard view” with those who would maintain that Kierkegaard was a
“critic of Hegel”199 and “engaged in a campaign against Hegel”200.
Stewart’s thesis is “that from the perspective of Kierkegaard’s own assessment, he
never had the great anti-Hegel campaign that much of the secondary literature has
ascribed to him. On the contrary, Hegel had a quite positive influence on him.”201 Stewart
is critical of these standard approaches to the relationship between Hegel and
Kierkegaard for textual, historical, and philosophical reasons. Stewart situates
Kierkegaard’s authorship within an intellectual culture which includes both Danish
Hegelians and their opponents. He argues that this social and historical context indicates
197
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not only that Kierkegaard was primarily critical of Danish Hegelians (as many others
have commonly maintained as well) rather than Hegel himself, but furthermore that
Kierkegaard’s critique of these Danish Hegelians establishes “a positive influence of
Hegel on Kierkegaard” where “… there are many more points of comparison and
similarity between the two thinkers than are generally recognized.”202
Stewart intends the defense of his thesis to be a direct challenge to Niels
Thulstrup’s thesis in his book Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel which is that “Hegel and
Kierkegaard have in the main nothing in common as thinkers, neither as regards object,
purpose, or method, nor as regards what each considered to be indisputable principles.”203
Although the sheer magnitude of historical information Stewart beings to bear on the
discussion is unparalleled, there have been a number of scholars who have made claims
similar to Stewart’s central thesis (though not quite as radical). For instance, Wilhelm
Anz, an influential mid-20th century German Kierkegaard scholar, argued that
Kierkegaard’s vocabulary, argument structure, and method are derived largely from the
German Idealist tradition from Fichte to Hegel.
More recently, the commonalities between Hegel and Kierkegaard have been
analyzed regarding particular topics such as the notion of dialectic and the development
of the self in each of the two thinkers. Stephen N. Dunning in his book Kierkegaard’s
Dialectic of Inwardness argues that while the content of Kierkegaard’s thought differs
from Hegel’s thought, the form of his work adapts and appropriates a number of Hegelian
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approaches.204 In particular Dunning analyzes the continuity between Kierkegaard’s
theory of stages and Hegel’s dialectics. This similarity, Dunning argues, shows that
Kierkegaard implicitly used Hegel’s own methods for very different aims than Hegel
himself. Thus, although Dunning maintains that Kierkegaard uses some form of Hegel’s
method, he used it in order to question the content of Hegel’s philosophical system.
In Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Mark C. Taylor argues that
there is much similarity between Kierkegaard and Hegel regarding the development of
self.205 Taylor argues that both Kierkegaard and Hegel conceive of the development of
self as a journey, though becoming a self means different things for each of the two
thinkers. Both Dunning and Taylor have equally demonstrated that the relationship
between Kierkegaard and Hegel is more complicated than that of simple opposites. They
both indicate structural similarities as well as very important differences between the two
thinkers. Although this approach may seem obvious, it nevertheless is quite distinct from
the way the relationship between Kierkegaard and Hegel has been traditionally conceived
(cf. Thulstrup’s thesis above) though most recent scholarship is more sensitive to
Kierkegaard’s debt to Hegel.
Stewart’s work, however, goes much further than Anz, Dunning, or Taylor. He
performs a concrete and detailed study of Kierkegaard’s corpus from his earliest
published piece “From The Papers of One Still Living” (1838) to The Sickness Unto
Death (1849) as well as a detailed study of Kierkegaard’s Danish interlocutors. He shows
how an overwhelming majority of the overt references to ‘Hegel’ or ‘Hegelianism’ are
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actually references to Danish Hegelians such as Martensen, Heiberg, and Adler. Stewart
concludes with a developmental thesis regarding the relationship between Hegel and
Kierkegaard. He argues that Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel develops over time
beginning with an initial more Hegelian period (1834-1843) which includes his earliest
journal entries, several minor publications, and Kierkegaard’s dissertation (or Master’s
thesis206) The Concept of Irony (which Kierkegaard later describes as an example of what
a “Hegelian fool” he was). This period ends with the publication of Either/Or where
“Hegel’s influence continues.”207 The second period (1843-1846) begins with the
publication of Fear and Trembling208 and culminates in 1846 with the publication of
Concluding Unscientific Postscript and was when most of The Book on Adler was written
which includes the last direct references to Hegel. This period is the shortest of the three
periods and the most interesting to philosophers because of the particular texts in this
period. During this period, Kierkegaard engaged in what Stewart terms “outward
polemics against Hegel and speculative philosophy.”209 The third period of Kierkegaard’s
relation to Hegel ranges from 1847 to his death in 1855. The primary work from this
period that Stewart discusses is The Sickness Unto Death. It demonstrates that
Kierkegaard was well versed in “Hegel’s dialectical method and in this aspect can be
regarded as being positively influenced by Hegel.”210 But this period is characterized by a
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general indifference to Hegel himself. Kierkegaard never mentions Hegel directly in this
period, and yet still uses Hegelian vocabulary, style, and methodology. His critiques of
his contemporaries (especially H.L. Martensen) are no longer clothed in criticism of
Hegel.
Two aspects of Stewart’s argument have created the most controversy. First,
Stewart’s discussion of the second period has caused a significant amount of controversy
because he maintains that Kierkegaard should primarily be viewed as targeting Danish
Hegelians with his “outward polemics” against Hegel. Stewart even argues that particular
passages in this period can be interpreted as defending Hegel against those who would
interpret him improperly even if Kierkegaard did not think himself doing this. This
interpretation is controversial because the weakest aspect of Stewart’s argument is when
he argues for a deep philosophical or conceptual divide between Hegel himself and his
Danish students.211 Many of their views (especially Heiberg and Martensen) appear very
similar to the positions adopted by other “right Hegelians”; and if Stewart fails to
establish that Danish Hegelians are bad exemplars of Hegelian philosophy, then merely
pointing out that Kierkegaard cloaks his criticism of Heiberg, Martensen, or Adler in a
critique of Hegel is insufficient to show that Kierkegaard is not critical of Hegel as well.
Although the occasion or reference which prompted Kierkegaard to make the criticism
may well have come from one of the Danish Hegelians, the criticism would apply to
Hegel insofar as the particular view accurately represents Hegel’s views as well. In some
cases, then, Stewart’s attention to Kierkegaard’s Danish contemporaries as well as his
focus on particular passages which reference Hegel in his discussion of the second period
211
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actually leads him to underestimate some of the broad philosophical disagreements
between Hegel and Kierkegaard.212 Stewart addresses this problem directly by showing
that Kierkegaard’s Danish contemporaries (as well as Kierkegaard himself) saw
themselves working within the tradition and lineage of Hegel – just as, say, Feuerbach
and Marx work in the ‘Hegelian tradition’ – even though they reject specific ideas and
elements in his thought. Although I do not think that Stewart position is entirely correct
concerning this first point, I ultimately find Stewart’s argument insightful, provocative,
and informative; and his works serves as a model for understanding the relationship
between the social philosophies of Hegel and Kierkegaard.
Stewart is also willing to admit that it may very well be the case that there are
cases where “Kierkegaard is indeed criticizing Hegel directly on some substantive
philosophical point.”213 According to Stewart, these broad disagreements between the
two thinkers indicate “that Kierkegaard and Hegel are engaged in fundamentally different
kinds of projects: while Hegel is primarily interested in providing a philosophical
explanation of the world in terms of concepts, Kierkegaard is primarily interested in the
religious life of the individual.”214 The usual portrayal of Kierkegaard with his polemic
aim at Hegel results from scholars not having sufficiently understood how each thinker
understands his project, and “Kierkegaard’s famous ‘critique’ of Hegel has been
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misunderstood in large part precisely because of the mistaken classification of
Kierkegaard as a philosopher.”215 This argument is the source of the second major
controversy concerning Stewart’s argument. Although Stewart makes no claim about
which method is to be preferred categorically, he does not think that Kierkegaard fits
within the history of 19th century European philosophy, at least as the discipline was
understood during the period. He claims that Kierkegaard is better understood as “ a
moralist, [a] social critic, or simply [a] religious thinker.”216
My account of Kierkegaard’s social philosophy addresses both of the issues that
Stewart raises. First, the specific content of Kierkegaard’s social philosophy provides a
framework that shows a much greater overlap on questions of interpersonal relationships
and community in the thought of Hegel and Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard indirectly adopts
some of Hegel’s views when he appropriates Bayer’s theory of community. The
relationships between Hegel and Bayer as well as Bayer and Kierkegaard shows a much
stronger connection between Kierkegaard and Hegel on issues in social philosophy than
Stewart has demonstrated about their views in general. I am not committed to the view
that Kierkegaard has more in common with Hegel than ordinarily recognized in areas of
faith and religion, and it is this claim that has resulted in much of the controversy
surrounding Stewart’s analysis of the relationship between Hegel and Kierkegaard.
Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s contemporary interlocutors are important for understanding
the relationship between Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s social philosophy, and this
connection supports my argument in a more direct way than do the figures that Stewart
identifies. Kierkegaard is critical of the Danish Hegelians (e.g., J.L. Heiberg and H.L.
215
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Martensen) treated in Stewart’s work, but Karl Bayer, whom Kierkegaard appreciated,
was Hegel’s student. Bayer’s conception of the relationship between freedom and
thought, and the relationship between community and morality, as well as the method he
employed in his description of the development of community are all derived from his
mentor. Insofar as Kierkegaard was influenced positively by Bayer in areas where Bayer
was profoundly influenced by Hegel, and, indeed, Kierkegaard adopted almost word-forword Bayer’s dialectic of community, then there is a much more concrete connection in
issues pertaining to interpersonal relationships and community between Hegel and
Kierkegaard than Stewart has established in his much broader project concerning their
relations in general.217
Second, I maintain that the most appropriate interpretations of Hegel’s social and
political philosophy has much more in common with Kierkegaard’s own views than has
been ordinarily admitted by Kierkegaard scholars.218 I suggest this is partly because the
interpretation of Kierkegaard as champion of the radical, isolated individual has only
recently subsided, and furthermore because many Kierkegaard scholars have an
inadequate and outdated conception of Hegel’s social philosophy.219 I suspect that many
217
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people familiar with Kierkegaard and Hegel would agree with my claim to some extent,
so long as I limited my claim to Kierkegaard’s portrayal of the so-called “ethical sphere”
rather than it also applying to Kierkegaard’s social views within or after the religious
sphere. But my defense of Kierkegaard’s social views does not arise out of the ethical as
it is portrayed in the ethical sphere. Rather, I have shown that the highest form of human
community is further developed by means of the God-relation. I have illustrated this
claim by appealing to Kierkegaard’s dialectic of community which culminates in a form
of community where the development of the individual also develops one’s commitment
and responsibility to others. Furthermore, of the three works that illustrate my views
about Kierkegaard’s social thought, two of them – Works of Love and Upbuilding
Discourses in Various Spirits – are written from the standpoint of someone on the other
side of the religious sphere. My claim, supported by both textual and historical evidence,
is that Kierkegaard’s fully developed concepts of interpersonal relationships and
community as expressed in both religious and non-religious texts are much more in line
with Hegel’s views that is often admitted.
This second point shows the limit of Stewart’s characterization of Kierkegaard as
merely a moralist, social critic and a religious thinker. Although Kierkegaard addresses
his most central topics – the nature and life of faith, the paradox, the importance of
subjectivity in religiousness – from the standpoint of a religious thinker rather than from
the perspective of a 19th century philosopher, it is not the case that Kierkegaard’s
concerns are wholly distinguishable from the general philosophical projects advanced in
the 19th century. Kierkegaard’s dialectic of community, its significance in the middle
period of his authorship, and his direct appropriation of the social and political

194

philosopher Karl Bayer’s views of community shows that there is a line of continuity
between Kierkegaard and his philosophical predecessors concerning the relation between
the individual and community.
In a personal letter, Kierkegaard applies this idea to political developments in 19th
century Europe. He claims that the political developments in Europe are a “vortex”
[Hvirvel] – a series of movements back and forth, like a typhoon, that lacks a fixed point.
The calls for revolution and political change in Europe were, Kierkegaard thought,
grounded in terms of competing teleological visions of how government should operate
and function. Kierkegaard’s criticism is that such a foundation for political change can
only result in back and forth struggle between two (or more) competing visions of how
society should be. While the current government is enacting its political agenda, the
reformers overreact in their opposition to it. Eventually, the reformers will win out and
enact their political agenda as an opposition party, and the old vanguard will overreact
against the reformers and so on and so forth. The result is that the split in society grows
ever larger encompassing a greater number of people and groups. These movements are
in constant conflict with one another and each one is unable to stop the other just as a
gadfly [Bremse] is unable to stop a train.220
In light of this situation, what most people believe about political movements is
mistaken. Kierkegaard explains:
Most people believe that so long as one has a fixed point to which one wants to
get, then motion is no vortex. But this is a misunderstanding. It all depends on
having a fixed point from which to set out. Stopping is not possible at a point
ahead, but at a point behind. That is, stopping is in the motion, consolidating the
motion. And this is the difference between a political and a religious movement.
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Any purely political movement, which accordingly lacks the religious element...
is a vortex, cannot be stopped, and is… the illusion of wanting a fixed point
ahead, which is wanting to stop by means of a gadfly [Bremsen[; for the fixed
point, the only fixed point, lies behind.221
Kierkegaard little theory of motion is an account of the proper source of political change.
There is no telos that grounds social advances and revolutions. In fact, presenting and
striving toward a teleological image of society contributes to the problem at hand.
Political injustice and failure can only be remedied by means of a clear and fixed
standard that unites those already engaged in the conflict. Kierkegaard characterizes this
“fixed point” as “that single individual,”222 and it is this type of individual – rather than
the content of one’s religious beliefs – that makes a movement religious rather than
political.
Socrates who called himself a “gadfly” [Bremse] exemplifies this strategy
of revolution. “[W]ith his gadfly’s sting he drove them forward in such a way that they
really moved backward, or in such a way that Sophistry perished and the single
individual came to his senses at the fixed point behind.”223 Socrates showed how the telos
toward which the Sophist aimed was not fixed at all. The only fixed point, on the
contrary, is in the individual and in inwardness. The Sophist makes the same mistake that
the 19th century political reformers made – that is, they presented alternative visions of
where they were going rather than coming from an ethically developed and secure
foundation. Kierkegaard likewise walks away from politics because it is asks the wrong
question – it asks where “one should go instead of asking whence one should depart.”224
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This concept is related to Kierkegaard’s idea of ‘the corrective’ and it illustrates the
importance of achieving unity through internal dissent rather than external revolution and
change. As I showed in Chapter Two, Kierkegaard always considered his overt as well as
his indirect criticisms are an attack from the inside intended to strengthen the whole.
Kierkegaard’s social thought is best viewed as a development and continuation,
even though it is critical regarding some points, of Hegel’s social thought. Although I
have argued that one overshoots the mark by trying to show a greater similarity between
Kierkegaard and Hegel on matters of faith and religion, I maintain that Kierkegaard’s
social thought confirms Stewart’s general thesis that there are much greater similarities
between the two thinkers than is ordinarily assumed, at least as it pertains to each of their
social philosophies.
Furthermore, understanding Kierkegaard’s debt to Hegel and Hegelians in the
development of his social philosophy is not just important for understanding
Kierkegaard’s thought. Just as Marx provides an insight into aspects of Hegel’s social
and political thought (e.g., the unsolved problem of poverty in The Philosophy of Right),
so might an understanding of Kierkegaard’s social philosophy provide a better
understanding of portions of Hegel’s social thought. One issue, in particular, that I think
Kierkegaard’s understanding of a presupposed unity which underlies social and political
differences may retroactively shed light on how Hegel (or Hegelians) can resolve a
conflict between, for example, a person’s private interests and the universal will of the
state, especially since Bayer’s theory of community is an appreciative critique of Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right. Hegel resolution, it seems, relies on having a single monarch who is
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the embodiment of the whole state,225 and while Hegel is correct that this monarchial
view need not limit the freedom of the state’s citizens, it does suggest that unity is not
ultimately grounded in relationships between human beings. Rather, the people of the
state are only one in the monarch. This point is made explicit in §279 in Philosophy of
Right. This passage, interestingly enough, is one of the few sections in Hegel’s writings
that Kierkegaard examined very closely dealt with directly and explicitly in his published
writings.226
Although this topic may seem esoteric, it has important ramifications for
understanding how unity can be forged in a pluralistic society that lacks a single unified
national “Spirit.” The monarch is the concrete embodiment of the unity of Hegel’s State,
and all individual differences in the populace are unified in this single individual. But for
Kierkegaard, unity is not grounded by looking to the monarch, but it is instead grounded
in the mutual development of individuals with the capacity to enter into and maintain
committed human relationships. Unity is found by looking back to oneself as an
individual who is able to make commitments to other people no matter the outcome.
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Chapter Five: Narrative Theories of Selfhood:
A Model for Understanding the Kierkegaardian Self?
In my fourth chapter, I defended a three-stage dialectic of community that
showed the development of the self in relation to one’s role in and obligations to the
community. In this chapter, I relate the development of selfhood within the dialectic
of community to a narrative theory of selfhood (henceforth, NTS) in order to
demonstrate how subjectivity relates to the social dimension of human life. Narrative
theory is already rather influential in literary theory and psychology, and it is
becoming more prominent within the field of philosophy. Philosophers who have
dealt with the subject range from Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur to Alasdair
MacIntyre and Daniel Dennett.1 The subject has also received considerable treatment
within Kierkegaard scholarship due to MacIntyre’s treatment of Kierkegaard and his
pseudonymous work Either/Or in After Virtue. John Davenport and Anthony Rudd
published a volume of essays in response to MacIntyre’s view of Either/Or entitled
Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue including a
reply by MacIntyre.2 The term ‘narrative’ is mentioned in the title, and it is a guiding
thread throughout the essays.3 One essay in particular even claims that there is little
difference between MacIntyre’s and Judge Wilhelm’s views about narrative and
virtue.4 The issue received more attention when John Lippitt criticized the
1
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“MacIntyrean Kierkegaardians” for trying to understand Either/Or in terms of
“narrative unity,” and for failing to address some problems with narrative theory in
general and MacIntyre’s view in particular.5
Although the particular approach one takes to Either/Or is relatively
unimportant for the purposes of my project, this discussion has raised a number of
important concerns that are directly relevant to my work including Kierkegaard’s
views on selfhood, narrative, and sociality. I have defended the view that
Kierkegaard’s thought has a definitive social component. This view is consistent with
Kierkegaard’s characterization of the unique one-to-one God relation as well as his
later attack on 19th century Danish social institutions, but it is grounded in the three
works written and published in 1846 and 1847, that is, A Literary Review, Upbuilding
Discourses in Various Spirits, and Works of Love. In this chapter, I will argue that a
NTS is useful for understanding Kierkegaard’s concept of self, and I will show that
this model of selfhood allows for, and even requires, a distinctive social dimension of
selfhood. In order to show this, I outline what I take to be a compelling narrative
account of selfhood. In doing so, I will explain the reasons for conceiving of selfhood
in terms of narrative by analyzing alternative narrative theories of selfhood.
5.1. Three Narrative Theories of Selfhood
There are numerous narrative theories of selfhood, and it is difficult to classify
them all. It is especially difficult since narrative theory is used in many different
disciplines with very different aims. Psychologists who appeal to the theory see a
therapeutic value of interpreting selfhood in terms of narrative, while literary theorists
see it as a useful tool for analyzing texts. Philosophers think that it will solve some
lingering problem in, for example, metaphysics or ethics. Because of these different
5
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disciplinary aims and approaches and also because of the differences among narrative
theories within a particular discipline, it is difficult to discuss narrative theories of
selfhood as a whole. As such, I am limiting myself to three philosophers who have
defended narrative theories of selfhood – Daniel Dennett, Alasdair MacIntyre, and
Marya Schechtman.6 These three theories are representative examples of a broad
cross-section of views. They show that there is no single NTS, and I will adopt
elements of each of these approaches in order to explicate what I take to be a
compelling NTS for understanding Kierkegaard’s concept of self.
It is difficult to understand what the phrase ‘narrative theory of selfhood’
means partly because the term ‘narrative’ is often used in different and misleading
ways. In many cases, it is not even clear how the term ‘narrative’ itself is being used.
Lippitt, for instance, claims rightly that although many Kierkegaard scholars employ
the concept of narrative extensively, none of them offer “a fully fleshed out account
of exactly what they mean by the term ‘narrative’.”7 A simple definition of ‘narrative’
is easy enough to provide, but it accomplishes little. Peter LaMarque provides a
simple definition of narrative as follows:
So what exactly is narrative? To narrate is to tell a story but the minimal
conditions for storytelling or for what counts as a story are indeed minimal…
[A]t least two events must be depicted in a narrative and there must be some
more or less loose, albeit non-logical, relation between the events. Crucially
there is a temporal dimension in narrative, not just in the sense that component
sentences are tensed but there must be a temporal relation between events,
even if just that of simultaneity. ‘The sun shone and the grass grew’ is a
narrative but ‘Bill kicked the ball and the ball was kicked by Bill’ is not
because the latter does not involve two events temporally related but a single
event represented in logically equivalent sentences.8
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In a narrative, one understands the component elements of the narrative in relation to
the whole structure. Nevertheless, a single sentence can express a ‘narrative,’ and if
the concept of narrative is that broad, then it alone, without further clarification, will
do little work for us in understanding narrative theories of selfhood. Thus, it is helpful
to discuss the different forms and manifestations of narrative theories of selfhood.
This approach demonstrates the multiplicity of views falling under the label. When
discussing Dennett’s, MacIntyre’s, and Schechtman’s views, I will illustrate the
similarities and differences in their views in terms of the following four criteria:
(1) Does the theory allow for a realist conception or self? There are three ways to
understand this question. First, to be a realist about the self is just to affirm the
genuine existence of the self. It denies that selfhood is a fiction simply created
by a narrative, and it means that one rejects both the claim that narratives
create the events they describe and the claim that narratives always distort
their subject matter. Second, it allows for the possibility that both the subject
and other people can be wrong about a particular conception of the self, and
third, it deals with the reality of self-deception about one’s own self. If a
theory is realist in some respects but not in others then I will call it quasirealist.
(2) Narrative requires a narrator, a source. Is the person qua self the narrator, or
do we attribute the title of narrator to the person in some other capacity, or
perhaps, even to some other source entirely? The way a theory characterizes
the source of a narrative distinguishes narrative theories of selfhood from one
another.
(3) Is the narrative model primarily or exclusively about a particular genre of
narrative? Some narrative theories of self conceive of fiction as the sine qua
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non of narrative theory and ignore other genres, for example, historical
narrative. Because of this focus on fiction, some theories will confuse notions
that are unique to fictional narratives with narrative theory as a whole. Other
theories, developed with a desire for greater objectivity, conceive of narrative
only as a literary narrative. That is, a self is an object similarly accessible to all
people just as a text is similarly accessible to readers.
(4) Is the NTS primarily descriptive, primarily normative, or some combination of
the two? A descriptive NTS claims that all (or most) people conceive of
themselves in terms of a narrative. They, in fact, see themselves within a
greater descriptive account of how their life is progressing. A normative NTS
claims that there are moral virtues associated with understanding one’s life in
a narrative. To adopt a descriptive NTS does not entail that one adopt the
normative theory. Likewise, to adopt a normative NTS does not entail that one
adopt the descriptive theory.
These four evaluative criteria will be applied to the views of Dennett, MacIntyre, and
Schechtman in order to illustrate the different types of narrative theories of selfhood
in the philosophical literature. I am interested in showing that the narrative
relationship between the subjective, intersubjective, and objective aspects of life is
helpful for understanding how Kierkegaard’s emphasis on inwardness and
subjectivity is inextricable from his views about the social development of the self.
The four criteria I have chosen are not the only ways that NTS differ from one
another, but these are the most important differences for the purposes of my project.
Nevertheless, this taxonomy is not limited to these three views. I hope that it will be
useful for classifying other narrative theories of selfhood.
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5.1.A. Dennett’s “The Reality of Selves”
Dennett’s NTS has a prominent role in his overall account of consciousness as
a product of evolutionary development. A theory of self, Dennett asserts, must be able
to explain how beings with selves came from beings without selves.9 It must be able
to explain how humans who now conceive of themselves as selves arrived at this
place. As such, Dennett is primarily concerned with providing a description of how
narrative functions in the formation of identity or selfhood. Dennett conceives of selfconstruction as a biological drive, and he claims normal human beings will construct a
self-narrative, even if the person does not understand precisely what he or she is
doing. Just as a beaver constructs a dam because it has a biological desire to stop the
sound of running water and just as a spider spins its web without realizing that it is
doing so, so the human creates a self.10 Human beings make a self by expanding its
boundaries by identifying some objects as one’s own (e.g., the person who claims, ‘I
was hit’ in a car accident) and by limiting one’s boundaries by denying responsibility
for some of one’s actions (e.g., involuntary motion).
Humans do this through the use of language and, more specifically, narrative.
Humans “are almost constantly engaged in presenting ourselves to others, and to
ourselves, and hence representing ourselves – in language and gesture, external and
internal.”11 We use this language to weave “self-protective strings of narrative” just as
the spider spins her web. We control and protect the account of who and what we are
by how, when, and what we tell ourselves and others.12 Because there is a biological
root to our story-telling, it turns out that it is not we, ourselves, who tell the stories,
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but it is the stories that tell us who we are. Rather than the self being the source of
narrative, it is the product that seems “as if [it flows] from a single source.”13 The
narratives we tell predispose others to view us as “unified agents.” Self is an “artifact
of the social processes that create us”14 forged by one’s own “autobiography.”15
Dennett maintains that the “reality of selves” is rather different from what we
ordinarily take them to be. The self is indeed a “center of narrative gravity,” but it is
merely an abstraction.16 The biological organism is real, but its unity and its
representation of itself are fictions. The self is merely a representation that is
improperly identified with the biological organism. The self is an image conditioned
by natural selection to increase a biological organism’s control over its environment.
The self is real, but it is an abstraction that exists only as long as the narrative which
defines it. Furthermore, the self need not always exist in the same body. If a narrative
were adopted in some other medium (biological or artificial), then the self would
continue to exist.17
As I have mentioned, Dennett’s NTS is presented as a descriptive account. He
refrains from making value judgments about those who have multiple selves, those
who have fractions of selves, or those who have no selves whatsoever, but he also
thinks that most human beings do, in fact, construct what functions as if it were a
single self. The self is a product of narrative rather than its source. Since the self is
simply an abstraction created by the biological organism, the narrator – the source of
the narrative – is not the human qua self but the human qua biological organism.
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Dennett’s account is also a clear expression of an anti-realist NTS. Although
he claims that the self is “real,” he means something drastically different by the term
than is ordinarily meant. His account, though it does not discuss the possibility
directly, leaves little room for a person to be wrong about who one is. To be wrong
about one’s self implies that there is something accessible to which we can compare
the narrative self, but since the narrative creates the self as an abstraction, there is no
criteria by which we can judge the accuracy of a narrative. There are no
intersubjective or objective criteria for judging whether an agent is deceived about
oneself.
At least part of the reason that Dennett is not a realist about the self is because
he only conceives of narrative as fictional narrative. Even though he does not
explicitly say that fictional narrative is his model of narrative, the only references he
makes about particular narratives are to fictional works (including Peter Rabbit, Moby
Dick, and Snoopy comics). A fictional narrative does, it seems, create the events that
it describes, but this is not true for all narratives. A historical narrative does not create
the events that it describes but is ordinarily judged by how faithfully it represents the
occurrences and facts of a given situation. In saying this, I am not claiming that every
work within the historical genre is accurate or unbiased, but it is, at the very least,
appropriate to ask the question, ‘Is this the way it actually occurred?’ in those types of
narratives. A narrative that “created the events” described would not be a historical
narrative, since it would not be appropriate to ask about the truth of such a narrative
To summarize: Dennett’s NTS: (1) is non-realist, (2) conceives of a self as a
product (rather than the narrator) of narrative, (3) considers all self narratives fiction,
and (4) is a descriptive account of self. The most attractive aspect of Dennett’s
account is that it entails no problematic views concerning the metaphysical status of
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the self. The self is an abstraction, and it has the same metaphysical or ontological
status as other abstractions.18 The least attractive aspects of Dennett’s theory, at least
in light of my goal in this chapter, is, first, that he is a non-realist about the self and
second, that his account is unable to explain how it is that humans are moral agents
responsible for their actions.19 Dennett not only spends less than a complete paragraph
on the topic, but his account also makes our biology rather than we ourselves
responsible for our actions.20
5.1.B. MacIntyre on Narrative Selfhood
MacIntyre’s narrative view of selfhood is expressed most clearly in After
Virtue. Contrary to the views of existentialists and “those analytical philosophers who
have constructed accounts of human actions which make central the notion of ‘a’
human action,”21 MacIntyre considers narrative theory as an appropriate way to
explain the fact that human actions are only properly understood in terms of an
agent’s psychological and social context in the past, present, and future. MacIntyre
claims that virtues are attributes of human life as a whole. This notion implies two
things: first, actions are meaningful because they are situated within the larger scope
of one’s life. Second, one’s social roles and obligations are not distinguishable from
one’s identity as a self.22 Narrative theory operationalizes MacIntyre’s attempt to
understand a person’s actions by appealing to a broader temporal and social situation.
He claims that his view of human action commits him to a “concept of a self whose
18

Even though his account does not appeal to any metaphysical theory of selfhood, it is not clear that
Dennett’s evolutionary account of the development of selfhood is anything more than a “just so” story
driven by his conception of the nature of human beings rather than any empirical evidence.
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unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative
beginning to middle to end.”23 But what precisely does MacIntyre mean by narrative?
How does it unify the elements of a life, and what constraints does MacIntyre propose
for his NTS?
The closest MacIntyre comes to clarifying the concept of narrative is in his
description of what takes place in a conversation. MacIntyre says that conversations
are narratives, albeit small ones. “I am presenting both conversations in particular
then and human actions in general as enacted narratives.”24 When overhearing or
participating in a conversation, MacIntyre says that one’s “ability to grasp the thread
of the conversation will involve the ability to bring it under some one out of a set of
descriptions in which the degree and kind of coherence in the conversation is brought
out…”25 These descriptions are the genres to which we classify conversations, though
they are not necessarily identical with literary genres. The content of the narrative is
classified (presumably implicitly) into a genre. The first aspect of MacIntyre’s
concept of narrative is that it has a particular genre. Second, narratives are joint
productions. That is, they are worked out, like conservations, through agreement and
negotiation with others in a social milieu. This fact is plainly true of conversational
narrative, though less obviously so for literary narratives. I will return to the idea that
narratives are joint productions when I discuss MacIntyre’s constraints on narrative
production.
Third, narratives have a beginning, middle and an end. Even though the
narrative may describe fundamental changes and new insights, and even though there
may be “digressions and subplots” the narrative of a life is still structured
23
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temporally.26 MacIntyre’s idea of an “end” to the narrative is rather strange. It is not
necessarily the same type of end as the end of a novel. There is a measure of choice in
enacting the narrative of one’s life, though it is constrained by one’s community and
environment. MacIntyre says, “[I]t is crucial that at any given point in an enacted
dramatic narrative we do not know what will happen next.”27 There are two points to
make about the unpredictability of a narrative. First, although narrative structure
demands unpredictability about the actions of particular individuals, the behavior of
social types can be predicted with a great deal of success by social scientists. The
descriptive process of the social scientist expresses general tendencies often with clear
exceptions. Thus, it is possible for the social scientist to quantitatively describe the
general tendencies of types of human beings even though the narrative of a particular
person of that social type may defy the general prediction. It follows that the genre of
narrative that we associate with a particular person’s life may change depending on
how the future turns out.28
Second, the narrative which composes the unity of a human self is found, at
least initially, in the search for a telos for one’s life. The unity of human life “is the
unity of a narrative embodied in a single life... The unity of a human life is the unity
of a narrative quest.”29 The discovery of a telos that directs and unifies a human life is
not accomplished in the beginning of the narrative of the human life, and the search
itself unifies the self in the place of some final end. Of course, as MacIntyre notes,
quests sometimes fail and lives are sometimes failures. That is, some lives are not
directed toward a final end and some have given up the search. But teleology is

26

MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 211.

27

MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 215.

28

MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 90-92, 215.

29

MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 219.

209

crucial for having and understanding one’s life as a single narrative, and it is,
therefore, crucial for selfhood.
A narrative structure unifies a life by making a person’s actions intelligible in
a distinctive matter. Narratives take place in a setting of some sort, whether it be an
institution, a social practice, or some other venue, but in all cases the setting is
contiguous with other environments. It is connected to other settings and it has a
history.30 We understand actions only when they are placed within two related
contexts: (1) the context of a person’s intentions, both short- and long-term, in
performing an action, and (2) the social setting that makes those intentions
understandable.31 To say that actions are intelligible only when placed in their
intentional and social context is identical to saying that actions are intelligible when
they have their place within a larger narrative.32 Thus, for MacIntyre, “Narrative
history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the
characterization of human actions.”33
The question of narrative intelligibility is not simply a metaphysical question
about the identity of a person over time. Rather the relationships of identity and
selfhood, on the one hand, and narrative intelligibility and accountability on the other,
mutually presuppose one another. Narrative gives us a way to understand that certain
actions are our own. An intelligible action is one where one can understand it as
coming from a particular source given the source’s intentions, past experiences,
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desires, and so forth. Individuals are responsible for their intelligible actions since
they are the authors of those actions.34
It is also important to recognize the constraints placed on life narratives. One
constraint is that a life narrative arises from one’s community of origin. “The story of
my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my
identity.”35 A further social constraint is that many other people participate in the joint
production of a person’s narrative. MacIntyre explains:
[W]e are never more than co-authors of our own narratives. Only in
fantasy do we live what story we please. In life, ... we are always under
certain constraints. We enter a stage which we did not design and we
find ourselves part of an action that was not of our making. Each of
us... plays subordinate parts in the dramas of others, and each drama
constrains the others.36
The crucial question for MacIntyre is not about one’s own narrative authorship but
instead about one’s participation in the narratives of others. “We enter into human
society… with one or more imputed characters – roles into which we have been
drafted – and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how
others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be construed.”37
MacIntyre further illustrates how he gives priority to the intersubjective aspect of
narrative selfhood when he claims, “I am what I may justifiably be taken by others to
be in the course of living out a story that runs from my birth to my death…”38
Because a human being is both the subject and object of one’s own narrative
and because the person is also a participant and object in the narratives of others,
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other people are justified in asking about a particular action if it is out of accord with
what other’s have justifiably taken one’s narrative identity to be. One should be open
to these sorts of questions, and one should even feel the need to give an account to
oneself, if an action is unintelligible in light of one’s narrative. Likewise, other people
who are participants in your narrative should be open to giving an account of their
incongruent actions for the same reasons.39
With an understanding of what MacIntyre means by narrative, intelligible
action, and selfhood, we are ready to analyze MacIntyre’s theory of narrative selfhood
according to the four criteria. First, MacIntyre, contrary to Dennett, thinks of his NTS
as both descriptive and prescriptive. It explains human experience in a compelling
way, and it is also the case that humans ought to conceive of their lives as a unity,
which is accomplished through understanding oneself narratively.
Unfortunately, MacIntyre is not as clear concerning the other three criteria. In
order to treat each of these questions, I will first identify three problems with
MacIntyre’s conception of narrative. First, he minimizes the role of subjectivity in
narrative construction. Second, his notion of narrative truth is problematic, and, third,
he confuses narratives about a life with the life itself. These issues problematize
MacIntyre’s basic views about narrative identity.
These three problems arise because MacIntyre maintains both that events and
facts do not exist outside of a narrative structure and that narrative can express
accounts that are “both true and intelligible.”40 MacIntyre is critical of any account of
human actions that excludes the importance of narrative. He rejects the Sartrean claim
that all narratives misinterpret human actions because according to MacIntyre, there
are no unnarrated human actions to compare with the narrated ones. Actions described
39
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outside the scope of a narrative structure “will always turn out to be the presentation
of what are plainly the disjointed parts of some possible narrative.”41 In some sense
then, MacIntyre conceives of narrative as a constitutive feature of facts and events.
The first problem with MacIntyre’s NTS is that it minimizes the role of
subjectivity in the production and appropriation of narratives. It is not clear in
MacIntyre’s account how a personal narrative is produced. He never identifies
explicitly the narrating subject, and if events do not exist outside the scope of
narrative then it is not clear how narratives are produced. Because of his concern in
situating selfhood in terms of a broader community narrative, it is most likely the case
that the self, at least initially, is something acquired passively from the roles imputed
to a person from one’s community. If this is MacIntyre’s view, then there is
something correct about it. A narrative view of selfhood implies (as Dennett also
maintains) that one appropriates many elements of one’s social and physical
environment in the development of self. But MacIntyre goes too far when he
characterizes narrative selfhood as a property wholly dependent upon others. “[T]he
narrative concept of selfhood requires… [that] I am what I may justifiably be taken by
others to be…”42 Selfhood is about how others “take” a person. Selfhood does not,
according to this view, necessarily imply anything about an agent’s subjective
states.43 Cases of dementia are examples where MacIntyre’s approach may be helpful,
since in those cases, a person’s subjective awareness of her own identity is rightly
dismissed in favor of how others justifiably understand the person. There are

41

MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 215.

42

MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 217.

43

I suspect MacIntyre would deny my claim, but it is also clear that the way other people take a person
holds a more prominent position for MacIntyre than any subjective understanding of the self.
MacIntyre claims, “I am the subject of a history that is my own and no one else’s, that has its own
peculiar meaning.” After Virtue, p. 217. This claim is made just after MacIntyre asserts that “I am what
I may be justifiably be taken by others to be.”

213

examples, however, where other people are mistaken about a person’s identity, even
though they are justified in understanding the person in precisely that way. Consider
the case of Robert Hanssen, the FBI agent turned Soviet spy.44 After 20 years of
service with the FBI, he was eventually arrested in 2001 as a spy working for the
U.S.S.R and Russia. For a number of years, there were little to no indications that
Hanssen was a double-agent. He had no ideological ties to communism or the
U.S.S.R, and he appears to have been a devout Catholic. He voluntarily approached
Russian intelligence, and he claimed that he only did it for the money. Hanssen’s
colleagues, at least for a number of years, justifiably took him to be a faithful
employee of the FBI, even though they were mistaken about his allegiances and his
identity. Although this is an extreme example, it shows that there is something amiss
about MacIntyre’s view of selfhood. MacIntyre pays too little attention to the one who
appropriates her identity from her community. MacIntyre has taken that which is a
justifiable constraint on narratives (i.e., that one ought to be able to explain one’s
actions even when those actions appear to conflict with one’s purported identity) and
made it the defining characteristic of selfhood. Robert Hanssen ought to be able to
explain why it is that he acted as a faithful FBI officer, even when he was acting
against the interest of the FBI; but in MacIntyre’s account it appears as if Robert
Hanssen is a faithful FBI employee simply because others justifiably take him that
way. MacIntyre is in a difficult position here: either he recognizes that the
intersubjectively accessible identity of an individual is not the distinguishing mark of
identity as such, or perhaps he could say that people were not justified in taking
Hanssen as a faithful FBI officer. In which case, it is not clear what would count as
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justification for thinking that any person is who they claim (and appear) to be.45
MacIntyre has minimized the place of subjectivity in the development of self and set
intersubjectivity in its place. Intersubjectivity plays a role in the formation of self, but
it is not the complete or even the primary story.
The second problem with MacIntyre’s view is that it is not clear how
MacIntyre can maintain that a narrative is “true” if any event outside the scope of a
narrative is “plainly the disjointed parts of some possible narrative.”46 If events really
do not exist prior to their narration, then it is not clear how the predicates about truth
and falsehood apply to narratives. MacIntyre clearly does not mean that narratives are
true insofar as they “create” the events they describe. He claims that a person is “a
story-telling animal… [who] becomes through his history, a teller of stories that
aspire to truth.”47 This claim implies that narratives can be true or false, and since a
person becomes a teller of true stories, it follows that there is some criteria for
distinguishing true and false narratives. Narratives about people’s lives are true to the
extent that they are able to represent accurately the person’s life, but this presupposes
that there is something to represent. It presupposes that events happen and that people
live lives prior to those lives being expressed in narrative.48
This mistake is not simply a theoretical problem for MacIntyre’s theory of
selfhood, since it shows that MacIntyre confuses a narrative of a human life with
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human life as such. This conclusion follows from the preceding analysis, but there are
also passages where MacIntyre explicitly makes this mistake. As an illustration of his
NTS, MacIntyre asks, “ [T]o what genre [does] the life of Thomas Becket
belong…”49 In his response, he considers the three different literary genres, including
hagiography, saga hero epic, and tragedy, and he concludes that, “The true genre of
the life is neither hagiography nor saga, but tragedy.” As Peter Lamarque points out,
MacIntyre has confused a narrative of a life with the life itself. This type of mistake is
similar to confusing the proposition about some state of affairs with the actual state of
affairs. Lamarque writes: “[H]e asks not about genres of narratives but, in a crucial
slip, what genres people’s lives belong in. This merging of life and narrative is a
mistake. A narrative, being a story, must be narrated, but a life need not be
narrated.”50
MacIntyre’s slip underscores a conceptual problem about the possibility of
subjective narration in MacIntyre’s NTS. Narratives are always stories about the past.
The future is only a part of a narrative insofar as it figures into a person’s goals or
expectations, and the present can never be captured in narrative since any attempt to
make the present an object of reflection is to think about a moment that has already
passed. MacIntyre concedes that narratives are understood retrospectively,51 but he
should remember Kierkegaard’s dictum that although “life [is] understood
backwards… it must be lived forwards.”52 Life need not be narrated, and it is only by
means of life, a particular type of life, that narratives are possible. This problem
becomes more acute for MacIntyre since he conceives of the narrative of a person’s
49
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life as a complete story with a beginning, middle, and an end. But, of course, a person
cannot narrate or appropriate the story that includes one’s own death. Therefore, the
story of a person’s life cannot be told until after the life has been lived. It is for this
reason that MacIntyre has to make selfhood something that is achieved on one’s
behalf by others. “I am what I may justifiably be taken by others to be in the course of
living out a story that runs from my birth to my death.”53 It follows from this that a
person cannot know the true and intelligible narrative which constitutes one’s identity
because whatever narrative the person presently understands as the story of her life
may change before (or even after) one’s death; and in death, one is no longer able to
subjectively appropriate any narrative of one’s now completed life.54 By not
considering a person’s own subjective self-understanding as primary, MacIntyre
makes the mistake of confusing “complete narratives” with actual lives. He wants to
maintain some intersubjective constraint on personal narratives, but he achieves this
result by wedding himself, ultimately, to a view of selfhood that is subjectively
unimportant to an agent.
In the preceding analysis, I have established that MacIntyre’s NTS is both
descriptive and prescriptive, and I have shown that, for MacIntyre, a person’s
community, rather than the person him- or herself, shapes and produces a person’s
identity.55 It remains to be seen to what extent MacIntyre is a realist about the self,
and whether he equates narrative theory in general with fictional narratives.
MacIntyre’s views on these subjects are complicated, and one could find passages to
support multiple contradictory interpretations. As such, I maintain that MacIntyre
53
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simply presents an ambiguous theory concerning the reality of the self and narrative
as fiction.
On the one hand, MacIntyre defends positions that are often associated with
non-realist theories of self. The self is inextricably tied to the narrative of its life, and
people are always already participants in a narrative structure. MacIntyre explicitly
claims that actions described allegedly prior to the imposition of a narrative will only
be actions that are components of some possible narrative.56 They are simply actions
that have been stripped of their narrative context. Presumably the same could be said
for the narrative construction of selfhood. Insofar as the self is produced in narrative,
talk of a self prior to the imposition of a narrative is talk about a self stripped of its
implied narrative context.
On the other hand, MacIntyre does suggest that people can be mistaken about
their own identity as well as the identity of others. As an example of the latter,
MacIntyre identifies one particular narrative as the best narrative for understanding
the life of Thomas Becket. This example shows that MacIntyre is a realist about the
self in that other people can be wrong about a person’s identity. He also maintains that
people can be wrong about their own identity. He explicitly claims that a person is
who they are taken to be by other people, and this claim implies that I could be
mistaken about my own identity if it does not cohere with the way that other people
view me. His basis for making this claim is not unproblematic, but he clearly wants a
realist conception of selfhood.
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Furthermore, as Lippitt claims, MacIntyre’s promotion of unifying narratives
raises the problem of self-deception.57 Most people feel no need to unify every aspect
of their lives in one complete narrative. The point “is not that I do not need to decide
how to balance the demands of work and family commitments, for example, in my
life. It is rather that I should not necessarily feel any obligation to bring each and
every aspect of my life under one grand narrative.”58 There is no need, for instance, to
unify my interest in Kierkegaard with my being a fan of professional football, but the
MacIntyrean ideal proposes a complete unity of one’s life. This ideal is antithetical to
the way humans seem to live their lives, and it, therefore, opens the possibility of selfdeception. This issue is more acute for MacIntyre since life narratives are essentially
perspectival. In any given situation, there are multiple, often contradictory narratives
that relay important elements of an event. Some narratives may encompass more
points of view or be consistent with a greater number of perspectives, but it is often
not possible for there to be a single, overarching narrative about an event. Narratives
are always fragmentary.59 It follows from this that any attempt to provide a single
narrative that encompasses all aspects of a situation or series of events, particularly a
complete life, is likely to either (1) minimize (or exclude) events that conflict with the
overall narrative or (2) result in the construction of false memories where the
purported event never occurred, but one remembers it as if it occurred. The unifying
narrative could very well be a fiction that conflicts with the way a life was actually
lived. Gordon Marino expresses the point like this: “[H]istorical narratives, personal
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or otherwise, that roll smoothly and comprehensively along usually do so because
they plow everything under.”60
MacIntyre, then, is a realist about the self in at least this respect: he claims that
some narratives are more truthful and intelligible than others. But his claim that
events are always already embedded within a narrative structure seems to suggest that
the events could not be considered outside of a narrative structure, and furthermore,
his desire for a single unifying life narrative that connects birth to death raises the
problem of self-deception. Both of these points count against the thesis that MacIntyre
has a realist conception of selfhood. It follows that MacIntyre is a quasi-realist about
selfhood.
Regarding MacIntyre’s model of selfhood, many commentators have
suggested that fiction or literary narrative plays too much of a role in his thought.61 I
agree with this claim insofar as MacIntyre privileges a third-person perspective
concerning the self over the first person subjective perspective of selfhood. In this
way, MacIntyre seems to conceive of all narratives like novels or books which present
a beginning, middle, and an end. As I have mentioned above, this view implies that
deception is known only from a 3rd person perspective. I do not think, however, that
MacIntyre attributes the same status to a narrative self and a fictional story. A
fictional story is evaluated on the basis of its intelligibility and literary merits (drama,
character development, etc.), but the narrative of a person’s life is evaluated,
according to MacIntyre, according to its intelligibility and its truthfulness.62
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As I understand MacIntyre, his NTS: (1) is quasi-realist, (2) conceives of
selfhood as a product (rather than the narrator) of narrative, (3) adopts a third-person,
objective account of self that makes selfhood an object similar to the way that a text is
an object for a reader, and (4) is both prescriptive and descriptive. There are a number
of problems with MacIntyre’s account, and I attribute the majority of them to (3).
Despite the many positive aspects of MacIntyre’s claim that actions can be rendered
more intelligible by placing them within their historical and social context, his actual
NTS leaves much to be desired.
5.1.C. Schechtman’s Narrative Constitution View of Self
Schechtman’s NTS is the most comprehensive and well-developed of the three
views discussed here. She calls her view of selfhood “narrative self-constitution.”63
She claims that it adequately characterizes what we mean when we discuss questions
of selfhood insofar as it captures and illuminates the motivating factors that justify
inquiry into questions of selfhood. There are four features that motivate the study of
selfhood, which Schechtman refers to as the “four features,” and they are “the relation
between personal identity and survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern,
and compensation.64
The task for a theory of self is not to explain how or when a self comes into
existence. Rather, it is to characterize what we mean when we use the term ‘self.’
Personal identity should not be slavishly devoted to reidentifying objects over time (or

genres need not be confined to the literary but his examples… suggest the higher reaches of literature
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through possible worlds), but it should focus on understanding what “actions,
experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, and so on (hereafter abbreviated
“characteristics”) are to be attributed to a given person.”65 Questions about
reidentifying a self raises different sorts of philosophical problems than questions
about what a self is. Schechtman claims that this “characterization question,” to which
narrative self-constitution supplies an answer, is closely tied to the four features.
Schechtman’s narrative self-constituion view of personal identity provides a
way of distinguishing which characteristics properly belong to an agent from those
that do not. Following MacIntyre, Schechtman attributes characteristics to an agent
insofar as the characteristics “hang together in a way that makes what she says, does,
and feels psychologically intelligible… [where we have a] a sense of how to
understand them coexisting in a single subject – [with a] sense of who this person is
and what the guiding principles of her life are.”66 Even though an action may be
completely understandable in general, it may be less intelligible if performed by a
particular agent (for example, the generally Stoical person who cries over a flat tire).
We generally understand which characteristics belong to an agent by means of a
person’s self-narrative. A person’s self-narrative does not view “the incidents and
experiences that make up his life… in isolation, but [he] interprets [them] as part of
the ongoing story that gives them their significance.”67
Having a self-narrative is, according to Schechtman, a constitutive part of
personhood. Schechtman weaves the concepts of personhood, moral agency, and
narrative selfhood all together in an intimate connection. She writes:
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Personhood – at least insofar as it acts as the underpinning for moral
agency, compensation, self-interested concern, and I contend, survival
– involves more than rudimentary consciousness… At the core of this
view is the assertion that individuals constitute themselves as persons
by coming to think of themselves as persisting subjects who have had
experience in the past and will continue to have experience in the
future, taking certain experiences as theirs. Some, but not all,
individuals weave stories of their lives, and it is their doing so which
makes them persons. On this view a person’s identity... is constituted
by the content of her self-narrative, and the traits, actions, and
experiences included in it are, by virtue of that inclusion, hers.68
The tight connection between narrative and moral personhood demonstrates the extent
to which Schecthman’s NTS is both descriptive and normative. I will return to this
topic later, but for now it is sufficient to note the central place of subjectivity in
Schecthman’s theory. Her view implies that a subject’s self-conception is central to
identifying the subject as a person and as a moral agent.
Although Schechtman emphasizes the subjective character of narrative
identity, she also holds that personhood “is an intrinsically social concept.” That is,
“The very concept of personhood is inherently connected to the capacity to take one’s
place in a certain complex web of social institutions and interactions – to act as a
moral agent, enter into contracts, plan for one’s future, express oneself and in general
live the life of a person.” 69 Achieving personhood is both subjective and
intersubjective insofar as an individual personally appropriates “her culture’s concept
of a person.” A culture’s concept of a person is what, for Schechtman, grounds the
limitations and constraints on what counts as an identity-constituting narrative. The
narrative in most cases should be consistent with the narratives that others tell about
an individual. Schechtman calls this the “objective” account of a person’s life; but it is
more properly understood as the intersubjective account. For Schechtman,
subjectivity and intersubjectivity are fundamental components of selfhood.
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Schechtman’s account of narrative selfhood addresses directly or indirectly all
of the evaluative criteria that I have outlined above. I will now consider how she
addresses each of those questions beginning with her realism. Schechtman’s view is
the most realist NTS of the three considered. She explicitly deals with cases of selfdeception or repression in her account. She maintains that narrative selfhood explains
a person’s actions and belief, and that one’s “identity-constituting narrative [must]
fundamentally cohere with reality.”70 This “reality constraint” sets the acceptable
parameters for identity-constituting narratives. A personal narrative can be wrong
insofar as it commits a person to views that are either plainly false or unwarranted
given the available evidence, and this undermines one’s claim to personhood.
The motivation for the reality constraint is that it is important for people “to
be able to engage in certain kinds of activities and interactions with others, and living
the life of a person requires living in the same world as other persons.”71 Social
interaction presupposes that participants agree on, at the very least, the basic contours
of their world. Schechtman’s reality constraint is essential for genuine social
interaction, and it is, therefore, constitutive of personhood. Those fundamentally out
of step with reality cannot have the same level of personhood as those who can
meaningful participate in social exchange.
Schechtman discusses two types of violations of the reality constraint: 1)
general factual errors about human beings and one’s environment,72 and 2)
interpretative errors where the interpretation, though not necessarily mistaken, is not a
good explanation of the data available.73 The delusional person who thinks he is
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Napoleon and the conspiracy theorist who thinks all people are out to get him both
have diminished capacities as persons, but the person who merely makes minor, easily
revised factual mistakes or who has a particular way of viewing the world (angry,
good-hearted, suspicious, etc.) maintains the ability to interact meaningfully with
others.74
Not only does Schechtman think that an individual can be mistaken about who
one is, but she also explicitly discusses the way that her NTS handles cases of selfdeception or, to use her terminology, self-blindness. Cases of self-blindness are
instances where one’s articulated “explicit self-narrative diverges from one’s implicit
self-narrative.”75 An “implicit narrative” is perhaps the strangest and most insightful
aspect of Schechtman’s NTS, since it suggests that a narrative need not be narrated.
An implicit narrative is the set of principles that organize and structure an individual’s
actions and experiences. To say that a narrative is implicit suggests that a narrative
exists and explains a person’s actions, even if no one is aware of it. It may be the case
that an individual’s psychological state explains one’s actions, but it is strange to
understand an unconscious psychological state as a narrative. This notion conflicts
with Schechtman’s early emphasis on the subjective qualities of narrative selfconstitution.
Furthermore, her claims about implicit self-narratives commit her to some
problematic positions. First, she asserts that a person can understand themselves by
means of a self-narrative even “without conscious awareness” of the narrative or the
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set of organizing principles that shape an individual’s implicit narrative.76 Second, it
forces her to consider the possibility that narrative may not be able to do the sort of
work that she is proposing here. She writes, “It does not matter much whether we say
that identity is determined by a person’s self-narrative or by his psychical
organization, so long as it is understood that the psychological forces constituting
identity are dynamic and active – things a person does – rather than static and passive
features she has.”77 But to say that unconscious organizing principles are “active” is
simply mistaken.78 A basic awareness of a set of organizing principles is a
prerequisite for having direct control over them. One way to resolve the problem is to
suggest that certain constitutive components of an individual’s identity are received
passively in addition to those components that are freely and actively chosen.
Schechtman’s emphasis on the activity of identity construction seems to preclude this
sort of response. Many of the problems that this issue raises for Schechtman’s NTS
are left unaddressed, and she does not seem to recognize the extent of the problem. In
Section 5.2.B, I will return to this issue and explain how a NTS can address the
problems that arise for Schechtman’s concept of implicit narrative.
Schechtman’s notion of an implicit narrative reveals two features of her NTS.
First, it shows that a human organism can produce a life narrative unconsciously.
According to Schechtman, beings that have a psychological organization or pattern to
one’s life, held consciously or unconsciously, have a self-narrative. The self is
constituted by these organizational patterns, and since narratives do not have to be
explicitly articulated, Schechtman can simply maintain that the individual has an
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implicit narrative that delineates a distinct self. The source of the narrative is found in
an individual’s psychological states, and it is this narrative that produces the self.
Second, Schechtman, contrary to Dennett and MacIntyre, does not presuppose some
notion of fictional or literary narrative. Neither does her view presuppose spoken
narrative.79 In fact, it may not require any narrative at all, since Schechtman admits
that an implicit narrative may not be an actual narrative.
As I mentioned above, Schechtman’s NTS is both descriptive and normative.
She closely ties the concepts of personhood and moral agency to an individual’s selfnarrative. A person without a well-developed self-narrative will have a diminished
capacity for achieving social interaction and personhood. Following MacIntyre,
Schechtman believes that narrative is a useful tool for understanding human actions
and it is a crucial element necessary for being a person in the broader moral
community.80
Regarding the four evaluative criteria, Schechtman (1) is a realist about
selfhood in all respects, (2) thinks that the way an individual organizes and frames her
experiences, whether consciously or unconsciously, produces the self, (3) does not
adopt any particular model of narrative, fictional or literary, as the sole representative
of narrative theory, and (4) has a descriptive and prescriptive NTS. As I have
mentioned above, the most problematic aspect of Schechtman’s theory is that she
makes use of the concept of an implicit narrative that does not actually have to be
narrated. The most attractive aspect of Schechtman’s theory is that she shows how
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subjective, intersubjective, and objective standpoints are all important in the
development of selfhood. She claims:
[A] person exists in the convergence of subjective and objective
features. An individual constitutes herself as a person by coming to
organize her experience in a narrative self-conception of the
appropriate form (something that individual human beings do as a
result of being socialized into their culture). ‘Appropriate form’ is not
something determined arbitrarily, but rather something that comes out
of the complex lifestyles and social interactions definitive of
personhood.
The subjective appropriation of narrative is of primary importance, but a person’s
narrative must be constructed in such a way so as to allow for interpersonal
relationships (the intersubjective feature of narrative selfhood) which would not be
possible without Schechtman’s “reality constraint” on identity-constituting narratives
(the objective feature of narrative selfhood).
5.2. Kierkegaard and Narrative Selfhood
These three, rather different, narrative theories of selfhood demonstrate that
there is no single unifying feature about narrative theories. Although each use the
term ‘narrative,’ each view has much more developed concepts about the nature of
narrative identity than the simple account outlined above where narrative components
are only understood in terms of the larger story. The four evaluative criteria show how
each of the views treat important topics differently from the other narrative theories of
selfhood. Whereas Schechtman sees her own project as vindicating a psychological
continuity theory of identity, Dennett’s view has much more in common with a bodily
continuity theory (since he relegates selfhood to the realm of fiction).81 MacIntyre is
primarily concerned with a notion of self that reveals the social and moral dimension
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of selfhood, and Dennett barely even comments about the moral implications of his
view.82 Dennett’s theory treats the self as a fictional creation, whereas MacIntyre and
Schechtman are realists to varying degrees. MacIntyre seems to think that a person’s
life narrative is just like a life presented in literary form, whereas it may not be
appropriate to call Schechtman’s “implicit narrative” a narrative in any sense.
There is no single NTS, and if one is to use (or criticize) the concept, one must
be clear about what one means by invoking the notion of narrative selfhood.83 I will
propose a particular NTS that is informed by Kierkegaard’s view of the self expressed
in his pseudonymous work The Sickness Unto Death. Although I begin with the
simple account of narrative outlined above, I will illustrate the view by explaining
how the NTS outlined here deals with the four evaluative criteria. I will then discuss
the benefits for narrative identity theory (5.2.A) and for understanding Kierkegaard
(5.2.B) of taking a narrative approach to selfhood.
5.2.A. Characterizing Narrative Selfhood
As I have mentioned above, I accept a simple definition of narrative.
Narratives are stories, though there are a multiplicity of styles and modes of
expression. In the story, there must be multiple events and some type of relationship
between events. Furthermore, the meaning of the component parts of the narrative are
understood only in relation to some of the other components of the narrative, if not the
entire narrative. As it pertains to theories of self, very little follows from these
relatively trivial observations about the nature of narrative. The strength of a NTS is
established by how we further clarify the type and structure of identity- or self-
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constituting narratives. What sort of self is constituted by narrative? What follows
about personal identity and related questions concerning, for example, moral
responsibility and desert? I will clarify what I take to be a compelling narrative
account of selfhood by describing how it addresses the evaluative criteria I have
presented above. Although I maintain that my proposed NTS is more compelling than
alternatives, the success of this particular theory is closely related to my overall
project of modulating the roles of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectivity for
the human self. The resulting NTS elucidates Kierkegaard’s theory of self and
narrative theory as it pertains to personal identity.
A NTS ought to hold to a realist conception of the self. To say that a NTS is a
realist theory of self is to affirm the genuine existence of the self. Such a view
maintains that concepts of selfhood are useful theoretical resources for explaining and
understanding human actions, and it denies the claims that a self is necessarily a
fictious creation or a distortion of a person’s true identity. It follows from this that a
person can be wrong about who one is, in both trivial and non-trivial ways. The
motivation for adopting a realist NTS arises from concerns about a person’s ability to
form and interact in social relationships. A realist conception of self is required if a
self is to live, on the one hand, in a social world with other selves, and, on the other
hand, in a world that is able to be investigated and known by others.
The theory of self presented in The Sickness Unto Death is a realist theory of
self. The self is identified with spirit, and it is described as the “relation that relates
itself to itself… the self is not the relation but is the relation’s relating itself to
itself.”84 This characterization presupposes three different notions of self. There is the
self as the relating, the self that is related, and the self that is the product of the
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relation. It follows from this characterization that the second form of self is there prior
to the act of relating; this form of self is treated as a given rather than a product of
self-creation. This notion of the self as in some respect given grounds the often
repeated claims about self-deception and despair (a misrelating of self to self).85
This approach to selfhood reveals an objective dimension to the way that a
person understands herself while retaining a subjective notion of selfhood. The self as
the relating of self to self is a process, an action where the self is developed; but the
materials used in the relating are there prior to the development of self. In fact, all the
constitutive parts of selfhood are there prior to the emergence of the self. In The
Sickness Unto Death, these elements of selfhood consist in one being a human being,
that is, a physical-psychical synthesis, for whom it is possible to understand and
incorporate (or misunderstand oneself or reject aspects of one’s nature) both aspects
of the following dyads: the infinite and the finite, the temporal and the eternal,
freedom and necessity, the physical and the psychical.86
This understanding of selfhood is particularly amenable to being understood in
narrative terms. The constitutive elements of narrative selfhood are there prior to any
narration. Not only are the historical facts and events that are described in a narrative
accessible to the narrating subject (and often to others as well) prior to his narration,
but he also has all of the necessary capabilities for constructing a narrative prior to
there being a narrative self. These capabilities include, at least all of the following:
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being conscious of oneself as distinct individual, a capacity for self-reflection, and the
ability to express oneself in language.
When I refer to historical events being accessible prior to being included in a
narrative, I am not implying that all narratives capture historical events just as the
actually occurred. On the contrary, I maintain that narratives, by their very nature,
express a particular point of view on a situation or series of events. Suppose I am
watching a football game on television, and I look at the clock and I wonder how long
I have been watching television. The second act of wondering takes a second-order
perspective on my first-order action of watching television. I am reflecting on my own
actions, and like all acts of reflection, I understand the object of my reflection from a
particular point of view, my own. This point of view is distinct from the reflection of
others on the same act. My own reflection involves wondering when the game will
end so that I will get to watch my favorite team play in late game. Another person
may reflect on my action and wonder how much time I have wasted by watching
television. In these two cases, my action is understood from the two different points of
view. All acts of reflection are directed at an object, and this object, even in cases
where one is reflecting on one’s own act of reflection, is never identical to the one
who is reflecting. Narratives, as a type of reflective understanding, always express a
distinct point of view, and they can only render an action or event intelligible
retrospectively.
Narrative perspectivism does not imply that the expressed point of view is
necessarily inaccurate or mistaken. In point of fact, to claim that all narratives are
inaccurate presupposes that there is some truthful expression of the way things really
are to which we can compare a narrative. Although the perspectival character of
narrative complicates questions about the truth of narratives, it does not rule out those
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questions. The historical events and facts that are described in a narrative and the
capacity to construct a narrative are necessary preconditions for constructing a
narrative self, and this notion corresponds well to the given self described above.
This way of characterizing the relation between the events described in a
narrative, the act of narration, and the narrative product is helpful for elucidating
some difficulties for narrative theories of selfhood. First, it draws a distinction
between the three forms of self: the historical, empirical self that is accessible to
inquiry, the subject who narrates and is the active self, and the narrative self which
expresses an understanding of how the empirical self relates to the active self. The
empirical self is an intersubjectively accessible object of study that allows us to
compare the accuracy and quality of narratives. There is also a subject who observes
and inquires about the events described, and there is a narrative self who connects the
object and subject in a narrative structure. This characterization of narrative selfhood
coheres well with the view of self presented in The Sickness Unto Death, even though
the language of narrative is never used in the work. This view also provides an
interesting insight into Kierkegaard’s journal entry where he claims, “life must be
understood backwards… [but] it must be lived forwards.” 87 A person can only narrate
or understand one’s own life (or the life of another) retrospectively. The narrative self
is one avenue for understanding life, but it is only possible because there is a subject
living the life of a person.
There is a further point that needs to be made in relation to this
characterization of narrative selfhood. Conceiving of the self in these three different
respects - as a narrating subject, historical self, and a narrative self – is structurally
similar to the Kantian and Fichtean ways of describing the self. For Kant, the
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transcendental subject is an a priori necessary condition for the possibility of
experience, and the transcendental subject is distinguished from the empirical self.
The empirical self is what one is conscious of when one examines one’s own
particular experiences and psychological states. We distinguish ourselves from others
with reference to our empirical selves rather than our transcendental selves, but the
activity of the transcendental subject makes empirical self-consciousness possible. 88
Fichte makes a similar distinction in his Wissenschaftslehre. In order “to
discover the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human
knowledge”, Fichte appeals to the activity of the I which posits itself absolutely. This
I can only be represented with a corresponding object, a not-I, something of which the
I is conscious. For Fichte, the I is limited and determined by the not-I, but the I is also
that which makes the not-I possible. This apparent contradiction is resolved via an act
of imagination. The imagination has the power to unite objects because it actively
brings opposites together, and the opposites in this case are the finite I and the finite
not-I.89
Kant and Fichte characterize three different aspects of the self – the self as an
object, the self as active subject, and the self as the relation between the self as object
and active subject. These three ways of understanding the self (or aspects of the self)
cohere well with the account described here. The primary difference is that in a NTS
emphasis is placed on the narrative of the self – that is, the relation between the
empirical and narrating self – rather than the narrating active self. The result is that
the narrative self represents a unique, concrete being who is represented in a variety
of ways – often accurately and inaccurately – who is active in the act of narration but
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passive insofar as she receives the content that makes up the self from outside herself
including her physical environment and social community.90
There are three strengths of this understanding of the self. First, it provides a
way to understand how one can emphasize and prioritize the role of subjectivity in the
development and formation of selfhood, while at the same time maintaining a place
for evaluating the accuracy and objectivity of self narratives. The self is something
which is always accessible for those who consider it. As such, a narrative can be
mistaken insofar as it mischaracterizes the historical, empirical self which is
accessible to both oneself and other people. Nevertheless, selfhood is still produced
only by the subject, even though a subject will appropriate concepts, attitudes, and
social roles from one’s environment. The publicly accessible components of selfhood
check against self-deception and explain how one could have a false self (or be in
despair to use the language of The Sickness Unto Death).
The second strength of this view is that it can account for some problems that
arise for a NTS. The characterization of the narrative self as an activity or process of
relating the historical, empirical self to the narrating subject accounts for some of the
difficulties in prominent narrative theories of selfhood. It shows how one can
maintain a “reality constraint” without making selfhood dependent on other people
like MacIntyre does. One evaluates the accuracy of a self narrative by comparing it
with other narratives about similar events or facts. It also follows from what I have
said about realism and about the relationship between the different manifestations of
the self that I am not committed to adopting a single genre of narrative as the model
of identity-constituting narratives. My commitment to a realist theory of self
precludes viewing narratives as merely a fictional narrative creation. Furthermore,
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since I distinguish the historical or empirical self who “lives life forward” from the
narrating self and the narrative self, I do not commit MacIntyre’s mistaken of
equating a narrative of human life with a human life as such. I am, therefore, not
adopting literary portrayals of life as the model of the narrative self.
This view also addresses some problems that arise when one appeals to a nonnarrated “implicit narrative,” while at the same time using the basic idea to specify the
object of a person’s narrative identity. That is, we can identity the object, the
character, the given self, who will be the subject of a self-narrative. This character has
a set of principles that organize its experiences and actions, but this fact neither
implies (a) that these experiences are organized in a unified narrative, nor (b) that the
principles themselves are “active” as Schechtman suggests. Having organized
experiences and actions are constitutive features of narrative, but they must be
expressed in word or thought. The subject plays a central feature in reflecting on these
patterns of organization and understanding them within a larger whole. That is, the
way in which a person’s experiences and actions are structured “implicitly” is that
they are given in such a way that a person is able to appropriate the experiences and
actions as one’s own through narrative. Having organized experiences and actions is a
necessary condition for narrative selfhood, but it is not sufficient. The narrative itself
expresses the relationship between these constitutive elements of the narrative and the
narrating subject. In an identity-constituting narrative, the narrator is related to the
character of the narrative by means of the self-narrative. A self-narrative expresses the
identity the narrator and the main character as one and the same. This view shows
how the narrative self is both passive and active. The production of a narrative is
active insofar as one takes up social roles or imposes one’s own meaning on a series
of events, but the content of the narrative is passive in that it is received as a given
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from other sources – it is not created by the self. The narrative object, the character is
there to be narrated, while the narrating subject makes the character one’s own.
The third strength of this NTS is that it explains the connection between
personal identity and one’s social relationships with others. A person is connected to
others through a common connection to particular historical events and the historical
self, which are elements of multiple narratives. Selfhood is inherently social insofar as
our social roles and interpersonal relations are constitutive of our identity through our
participation with others in our own personal narrative as well as the narratives of
others. The chief strength of a NTS is its ability to show the interconnections between
subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectivity in narrative. Adopting a narrative
understanding of Kierkegaard’s theory of self is motivated by the desire to incorporate
the social element into Kierkegaard’s thought, but it also helps resolve some lingering
theoretical problems in narrative theories of selfhood.
5.2.B. Why view the Kierkegaardian Self as a Narrative Self?
Although I have pointed out ways in which Kierkegaard’s theory of self is
expressed similarly to a NTS, I have yet to explain the primary motivation for
discussing the relationship between Kierkegaard’s account of self and narrative
selfhood. I have provided some textual support for my claim that Kierkegaard’s self
can be understood narratively, but the account of the self in The Sickness Unto Death
is not the primary reason for preferring this sort of interpretation of Kierkegaard’s
view of selfhood. There are two reasons to view Kierkegaard in this way: (1) it
coheres with and explains Kierkegaard’s views about the mutual development of self
and community in his dialectic of community by showing how an emphasis on
subjectivity can be understood without minimizing the social or objective dimensions
of existence. (2) It provides a way to understand the overall authorship that does not
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diminish the significance of the social period of Kierkegaard’s thought in 1846 and
1847. I have argued that Kierkegaard maintains that the social dimension to human
existence plays a more important role in his thought than is ordinarily assumed. In my
fourth chapter, I showed how Kierkegaard described the progression of the dialectic
of community as the development of both the community and the individuals that
make up the community. A community has the task of developing individuals, and
developed individuals are necessary for genuine community. A well functioning
community will educate its constituents so that they can further develop the
community. The separation of the self from the public in A Literary Review describes
the subjective isolation and the beginning of the individual’s education. Willing the
good in truth in “On the Occasion of a Confession” and loving one’s neighbor in
Works of Love demonstrate the ways in which personal development manifests itself
in fulfilling interpersonal and communal duties to other people. A NTS coheres with
and provides a way to understand Kierkegaard’s views here. Although a narrator – a
subject – produces a narrative, the narrative is constituted by the appropriation and
adoption (or rejection) of the social roles one occupies in a community. A subject is
never an isolated subject – a person’s identity is always related, at least in some
capacity, to one’s physical or social environment.
Perhaps the most exciting aspect of reading Kierkegaard’s theory of the
development of self as a narrative is that the incorporation of the subjective,
intersubjective, and objective aspects of selfhood provides a way to understand the
authorship as giving a central place to the social dimension of Kierkegaard’s thought,
while at the same time not ignoring the earlier emphasis on the individual and the
one-to-one God relation or the later attack on the Danish Church. In this schema, the
early works from Either/Or through Concluding Unscientific Postscript, describe the
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development of the individual vis-à-vis the one-to-one God relation. Ethical duties
within this period are understood as subordinate to the God-relation, and the highest
expression of the individual is represented by the figure of Abraham who spurns
human relationships, represented by Isaac, in order to commit himself absolutely to
God. There is a real risk, if the authorship is only considered up to Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, that one could easily take the Kierkegaardian self as
fundamentally and ultimately detached from every human relationship for the sake of
the God-relation. But the resulting concept of self is of an individual who is able to
stand alone against other people, the culture, the mores of his day. Thus, the first
period of the authorship is analogous to the role of subjectivity in the formation of
narrative selfhood.
The type of individual described in the early authorship is, furthermore,
essential for the types of social relationships and ethical commitments described in
“On the Occasion of a Confession” and Works of Love. Only when an individual is
willing to stand alone for the good against the masses is a person able have the proper
frame of mind for understanding one’s obligations to other people. Only when an
individual is willing to love the neighbor – not only in words and thoughts but in
specific actions, regardless of who the neighbor is or whether the neighbor returns the
love – only then is one able to make the type of commitment that is constitutive of
genuine interpersonal relationships. The three works in 1846 and 1847 – A Literary
Review, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, and Works of Love – describe the
social dimension to Kierkegaard’s thought. These works show the ethical and social
dimension to Kierkegaard’s theory of self. One does not reject one’s social
obligations to one’s spouse, child, or neighbor, to give a few examples, in order to
fulfil the demands of the God-relation. Rather one’s already existing social
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relationships are transformed and purified by means of the God-relation. This social
period of Kierkegaard’s authorship corresponds to the incorporation of the social or
intersubjective in narrative selfhood.
The final period of Kierkegaard’s authorship, for my purposes, begins in 1848
with the presentation of idealized Christianity and culminates in his attack on
Christendom. Rather than viewing the attack literature as an aberration or a rejection
of Kierkegaard’s earlier portrayals of Christianity, it is a claim about how the
narrative of Christian Denmark and Christendom is a farce. It denies the accuracy of
the dominant narrative of the time that Denmark was a Christian nation, and
Kierkegaard attempts to show, by appealing to New Testament Christianity that this
narrative is mistaken.91 I do not mean to suggest that the narrative analogy is the best
or only way to read the authorship, but merely that it explains how one can understand
the authorship without ignoring or diminishing the significance of the social aspect of
Kierkegaard’s body of work or his theory of self.
5.3. Conclusion
In chapter three, I described Kierkegaard’s concept of self in such a way that
there was no explicit conflict between oneself and others. In chapter four, I employed
Kierkegaard’s dialectic of community to show that the Kierkegaardian self is a social
self. In this chapter, I have presented a NTS as a model for understanding how to
relate the subjective and intersubjective self in Kierkegaard’s thought. This model
highlights the central place of sociality in Kierkegaard’s thought, and it can also help
resolve some lingering problems for narrative theories of selfhood.
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shows how the attack literature, even if mistaken, is continuous with Kierkegaard’s earlier work.
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Chapter Six: The Importance of Understanding Kierkegaard’s Social Thought
I have provided a holistic account of Kierkegaard’s social thought that showed
how Kierkegaard’s self is really a social self. Kierkegaard’s criticisms of sociality and
having dealings with others are well known, and I began my argument by describing how
these criticisms are instances where Kierkegaard conceives of his work as a corrective.
Then, I addressed two of the most sustained critiques of community and interpersonal
relationships in Kierkegaard’s authorship by showing the implicit social dimension in the
account of Abraham in Fear and Trembling and the critique of the Danish Church at the
end of Kierkegaard’s life. These two components of my argument are the negative thesis
in my project insofar as they show that Kierkegaard never precludes the possibility of a
social dimension to his thought. The negative thesis show three things about
Kierkegaard’s social thought: (1) his critiques of society, community and interpersonal
relationships in general are often expressed in such a way that there is good reason to
consider the possibility that there is an implicit subtext that indicates the social dimension
of his critiques; (2) Kierkegaard’s well developed accounts of faith, subjectivity and
religiosity as expressed in, for example, Fear and Trembling and the final attack on the
Church are consistent with a social reading of Kierkegaard’s project. Thus, it is possible
to incorporate these primary Kierkegaardian themes into an overall account of
Kierkegaard’s work that does justice to his social thought. (3) It follows from (1) and (2)
that Kierkegaard need not be interpreted as an atomistic thinker who privileges the
individual over social relationships. This third point prepares the way for my positive
thesis that there is a clearly articulated account of the importance of human relationships
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and community in Kierkegaard’s thought that has important historical and philosophical
implications.
I defended my positive thesis in three ways. First, I showed that there are a large
number of texts that revealed the priority of human relationships in Kierkegaard’s overall
thought. In one significant journal entry that outlines Kierkegaard’s ‘dialectic of
community,’ he explains how the individual and the community mutually constitute the
other. This entry provides a framework for understanding the relationship between
Kierkegaard’s earlier emphasis on inwardness and subjectivity and his later work
concerning sociality and ethics in human relationships. Three of Kierkegaard’s works in
1846-1847 – A Literary Review, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, and Works of
Love – are consistent with and confirm the general framework provided in the dialectic of
community passage. This interpretation is useful for resolving particular textual and
philosophical problems that arise in these three works including Kierkegaard’s claim in
the latter two works that a person can be in a meaningful relation with the dead.
The second way I defended the positive thesis was by situating Kierkegaard’s
social thought in its immediate historical and intellectual context. This context shows that
Kierkegaard appropriated the social views of Karl Bayer as the primary source for his
dialectic of community. Karl Bayer was an appreciative, though not uncritical, student of
Hegel, and his theory of community is closely related to Hegel’s. The historical
connection between Kierkegaard, Hegel, and Bayer shows that Kierkegaard’s
understanding of human relationships and sociality ought to be understood in the context
of post-Kantian social and political philosophy. Kierkegaard treats similar subjects,
borrows terminology and contributes to an underappreciated strand of thought that
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emphasizes the role of the individual in the development and growth of community. This
line of argument has implications on our understanding of Kierkegaard’s relationship to
Hegel and to post-Kantian Europoean social and political philosophy more generally.
The third way I defended my positive thesis was by showing how a
Kierkegaardian narrative theory of selfhood can provide a philosophically interesting
model for understanding the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity.
Although Kierkegaard asserts that the subjectivity of the early authorship is related to the
social character of life in the later authorship, he never explicitly clarifies or explains how
the two are related. In order to illustrate how the two might be related, I presented a
Kierkegaardian narrative theory of selfhood as a framework for understanding the
relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity in the self. This issue has become
a prominent issue in Kierkegaard scholarship in relation to MacIntyre’s criticism of
Either/Or in After Virtue. I argued that three prominent narrative theories of selfhood –
Dennett’s, MacIntyre’s, and Schechtman’s – have significant problems that can be
addressed with a Kierkegaardian narrative theory of selfhood. Such an account shows
how subjective notions of self are related to the social dimension of human existence.
The thesis that Kierkegaard has something meaningful to say about interpersonal
relationships and community is supported by each of these arguments. The implications
and contributions of this study to Kierkegaard studies, post-Kantian European social
philosophy, and narrative identity theory are closely tied to each of these arguments.
Within Kierkegaard studies, my holistic account of the social dimension within
Kierkegaard’s corpus reveals the priority of ethics and sociality in his overall thought.
Although a significant number of Kierkegaard scholars now recognize a distinctive social
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and moral dimension to Kierkegaard’s thought, the community is still somewhat divided
on this issue. Despite some general sympathy for my position, there has never been a
systematic study of this aspect of his thought that (1) addresses the authorship as a whole
(rather than just Kierkegaard’s edifying works or A Literary Review), (2) gives an
account of how the earlier, pseudonymous authorship and the later attack literature are
consistent with Kierkegaard’s social views, and (3) situates Kierkegaard’s project in the
context of 19th century Danish and European social thought. Most of the prior work on
the topic has been very limited in scope or simply addresses a single work or two, and
none of it deals with the relation between Kierkegaard’s social thought and his
contemporaries and intellectual forbearers. This project fills this gap in Kierkegaard
studies.
This account also has implications for our understanding of the relationship
between Kierkegaard and Hegel and the development of 19th and 20th century European
social philosophy. My account of the connection between Kierkegaard and Bayer as well
as between Bayer and Hegel shows how Kierkegaard is indebted to Hegel and that there
is more similarity between the two thinkers than is ordinarily admitted regarding the
relationship between the individual and other people. Although this historical claim is
interesting in its own right, my argument also provides a new way of imagining 19th
century social thought. Rather than characterizing unity as a product of a common
teleological purpose that tends to exclude those who either are explicitly excluded by the
imagined idea of unity (e.g., nationalism excluding immigrants or ethnic minorities) or
who simply fail to appropriate the idea for themselves, unity is something that is
presupposed in one’s practices and activities as a human person. As Kierkegaard says, it

244

is something that lies behind rather than something to which we strive toward, and this
presumed unity allows for multiplicity and difference to flourish against a backdrop of a
deep and shared commitment to one another. What is shared here is not a set of social and
moral customs (as it is, for example, in the Greek Sittlichkeit which is the complex set of
social relations embodied in social mores, religious custom and the like); nor is it an
abstract notion of the human person stripped of the particularities of human existence.
Rather, what is shared is the fact that one is able to become an individual who is able to
make an internal commitment manifested in external practices and actions toward another
person such that one’s commitment is able to be maintained even against public or
societal pressure. For Kierkegaard, this type of individual is the foundation and ground of
genuine unity. Much more needs to be said in order to spell out explicitly the differences
between this conception of unity and how it reframes 20th century developments in social
thought and political theology but for now, I will simply indicate that Kierkegaard’s
social thought is relevant to the topic and that this is an area that requires further study.
Finally, this study also aids in the development of narrative identity theory. The
distinction between the three operative notions of self – the historical, empirical self; the
subjective narrating self; and the narrative self as the relation between the self as
historical, empirical object and the self as the narrator – provides a framework for
discussing the overall value and limits of narrative identity theory. A Kierkegaardian
narrative theory of selfhood is able to address objections better than alternative accounts.
The constitutive components and attributes of selfhood are operative and available prior
to the construction of a narrative self and they are necessary conditions for the possibility
of self-narration. As such, this particular narrative theory of selfhood adopts a realist
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theory of self. But it is also explains the fluidity and malleability in how we characterize
and understand ourselves. That is, the way in which a person develops and conceives of
him- or herself plays a fundamental role in how the subject and other people characterize
and understand the person. This overall project fills a gap within Kierkegaard
scholarship, and it also makes an initial contribution that will require further elaboration
in both post-Kantian European social and political philosophy and narrative identity
theory.
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